tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post1695119894841984008..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: Rational Persuasiveness and Religious Arguments (Part 2)John Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-83553091652551762372010-12-05T14:42:13.430+00:002010-12-05T14:42:13.430+00:00I have no problem acknowledging that naturalism wo...I have no problem acknowledging that naturalism would suffer from the same problems. What I said in the post is that "what is true for religion is also likely to be true for naturalism or other worldviews". I thought that would be enough to cover this point. I have acknowledged this elsewhere at any rate, as for example in my podcast on Flew's Theology and Falsification. I don't stress it here because I'm summarising Faust's article.<br /><br />Also, I don't know whether I've ever claimed to be a naturalist. I'm certainly more sympathetic to naturalism and would like to contribute to the naturalist project, but I'm not convinced that it is intellectually unimpeachable. <br /><br />I also agree that the kind of result you mention is unavoidable if we accept Faust's subjective account of persuasion (it is not, incidentally, an account of plausibility as far as I can tell). However, I am not sure -- and I state this in the post -- that things are as clearcut as Faust makes out. For example, I am not sure about the division between core and peripheral beliefs. In my own experience, most of my beliefs have changed during the course of my lifetime. This leads me to doubt that I have a clearly-defined, practically unassailable core. But maybe everybody likes to think they are more open to evidence than they actually are.<br /><br />As for needing an objective account of plausibility as opposed to a subjective account of persuasion, I agree that the former would be preferable. But I do not think it to be realistic. The naive account relies on some account of "truth" that will be debateable and whose acceptability will depend on many (subjective) factors.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-26253243933772305822010-11-28T20:44:47.334+00:002010-11-28T20:44:47.334+00:00I cannot see how this account can possibly avoid t...I cannot see how this account can possibly avoid the implication that "naturalist" arguments are equally non-informative or circular. You note that naturalist beliefs are also "core" beliefs... why did you not draw the obvious conclusion that this account has equally devastating implications for naturalism?<br /><br />In fact, on this account, the only reason someone would refrain from drawing this (patently obvious) conclusion is that their naturalist beliefs are deep within their epistmic core, and make them "blind" to this kind of implication. Irony abounds.<br /><br />Once we make the plausibility of arguments relative to the subjective states of individuals, this kind of result is unavoidable. Everyone's got a "core", and there is no possibility of ultimate agreement between two persons with significantly different "cores". The reason we bring in the "naive" model is that we need <i>reality</i>, and not just subjective probability, to ultimately adjudicate between rival positions.Vanitashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03190524739107446297noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-62170094974338772902010-11-04T14:31:41.509+00:002010-11-04T14:31:41.509+00:00I enjoyed reading these two articles John, thanks!...I enjoyed reading these two articles John, thanks!<br /><br />I don't know why Faust is surprised to find that most of the arguments for theism aren't rationally persuasive for atheists, since there are underlying premises that the two camps disagree on with respect to subjective probability. Most theists today might settle for showing that theism is rational. Maybe naturalism will be in the same boat in a few hundred years, who knows. <br /><br />I would even venture the claim that the closer to the center a belief sits, the less likely it is that a rationally persuasive argument could even be made for it that isn't somehow doxastically circular. A <a href="http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/10/political-aporetics-liberty-versus-equality.html" rel="nofollow">parallel observation </a>has been made about the political dispute between the left and the right being irresolvable because of deeply held commitments to liberty or equality.<br /><br />With regards to non-epistemic states and atheism, Paul Vitz has written a book called "The Psychology of Atheism," and James Spiegal has written one called "The Makings of an Atheist."<br /><br />Cheers!<br /><br />DavidDavid Parkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13714637134009580948noreply@blogger.com