tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post807269944075896691..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: The End of Skeptical Theism? (Part 3) - Extreme Moral SkepticismJohn Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-54827518421289586052010-11-04T20:20:07.262+00:002010-11-04T20:20:07.262+00:00Oh I see, you said epistemic relationship. My bad....Oh I see, you said epistemic relationship. My bad.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-90007412305311881372010-11-04T20:19:15.878+00:002010-11-04T20:19:15.878+00:00Well I don't what he says in that earlier arti...Well I don't what he says in that earlier article, but the quotation above about design-based arguments is from his 2009 article on skeptical theism. <br /><br />The point about the reverse noseeum inference is interesting although I'm not convinced it works. Alexander Pruss uses something similar (although he tries to avoid associating himself with ST) when dismissing Rowe's arguments on the grounds of its appeal to "anomalous cases".<br /><br />Also the quote says nothing about the relationship between us and good states of affairs. It talks about all-things-considered goods, which, I presume, may or may not include us (human beings). I mentioned conscious rational beings because that is an example of a good that is often brought up in design arguments (e.g. Robin Collins).<br /><br />As for how ST might undermine ordinary moral practice, see part 4 and also the posts on Stephen Maitzen's articles. The basic idea is that the skeptical principles embraced would undermine consequentialism (because we can't evaluate consequences) and divine command theory (because we can't reliably identify God's commands).John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-70844400779637445812010-11-04T19:52:27.658+00:002010-11-04T19:52:27.658+00:00Sorry, I definitely didn't mean to convey that...Sorry, I definitely didn't mean to convey that Bergmann was responding to the same article that you are summarizing here.<br /><br />I don't see exactly how Hasker's objections (or the others you mention) show that the ST principles undermine the background beliefs of theism to the extent that ordinary moral practice is undermined. I will read over those articles again, perhaps I am missing something important (it wouldn't be the first time). <br /><br />As a side note: Bergmann does indeed admit (Peterson's "Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion." 2003.) that design-based arguments for God should be rejected. However, he doesn't conclude this on the grounds that they require an epistemic relationship between us and goods states of affairs. He does so on the grounds that they make the invalid noseeum inference:<br /><br />1. We can't conceive of an evolutionary reason for biological feature X<br />2. Therefore there probably isn't an evolutionary reason for biological feature X<br /><br />By the way, I promise not to be a comment annoyance on your blog. It just so happens the problem of evil is one I have been studying quite a bit the past year or so. One day I hope to have a blog of my own, but I need to learn to write more clearly first. Haha!<br /><br />Cheers,<br />DavidDavid Parkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13714637134009580948noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-25559809893397529952010-11-04T19:17:18.819+00:002010-11-04T19:17:18.819+00:00So that's a response to the earlier argument b...So that's a response to the earlier argument by Almeida and Oppy, and not a response to Hasker's objections. Indeed, as far as I know, Hasker's article is a response to Bergmann's most up-to-date (2009) defence of skeptical theism. Bergmann could well be preparing a response to Hasker. After all, philosophical debates of this kind have a tendency to cycle-on indefinitely.<br /><br />Anyway, the quoted passage would seem to miss the point of the objection mounted by Hasker (and the others covered in this series). It might be true that the theist's background beliefs could sustain moral practice, but the point here is that the skeptical principles being endorsed undermine those background beliefs as well.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-59349557413843060672010-11-04T18:03:42.238+00:002010-11-04T18:03:42.238+00:00Bergmann has responded to the concerns that Hasker...Bergmann has <a href="http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/In%20Defense%20of%20Skeptical%20Theism.pdf" rel="nofollow">responded</a> to the concerns that Hasker and others were having with his argument:<br /><br /><i>...the strongest conclusion...is not the general claim that skeptical theism as such undermines ordinary moral practice but rather the significantly weaker claim that endorsement of ST1 – ST3 in the absence of various background beliefs that theists are very likely to possess undermines ordinary moral practice.</i> (p. 5)David Parkerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13714637134009580948noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-61600805842755627772010-09-08T12:27:09.958+01:002010-09-08T12:27:09.958+01:00It just occurred to me that 1-4 in my previous com...It just occurred to me that 1-4 in my previous comment don't actually constitute a complete argument. For that, we would need:<br /><br />5. Therefore, ST1-ST4 fail to undermine the evidential problem of evil.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-7217340104804354582010-09-07T17:41:34.602+01:002010-09-07T17:41:34.602+01:00Good question. Hasker isn't as perspicuous as ...Good question. Hasker isn't as perspicuous as I would like on this point but I think his argument is roughly the following.<br /><br />1. There are n specific instances of evil (E1...En) to which ST1-ST4 apply.<br /><br />2. ST1-ST4 imply that the probability of there being outweighing goods for each specific instance is (hypothetically) 0.8.<br /><br />3. This implies that the combined probability that each of n instances of prima facie evil is outweighed by a greater good is equal to 0.8 to the power of n.<br /><br />4. This number would be vanishingly small (test this by letting n=20 or something).<br /><br /><br />My only problem with this is that maybe ST1-ST4 don't apply to specific instances of prima facie evil but rather to the total sum of prima facie evil in the world. This would imply just one multiplication by 0.8.<br /><br />Anyway, Swinburne's objection would still seem to hold in this case. Hence, the skeptical theist needs to completely undermine all probability assessments.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-8776517986748569772010-09-07T15:24:44.943+01:002010-09-07T15:24:44.943+01:00John D,
"This would not be sufficient to unde...John D,<br />"This would not be sufficient to undermine the evidential problem for there are vastly many instances of prima facie evil and, given enough of them, the probability that each and every one is outweighed by some greater good becomes vanishingly small"<br /><br />How exactly does this work? Doesn't ST1-ST4 outweigh the probability assigned to each and every prima facie evil we mention no matter how many they are or is Hasker also taking into account what Swinburne said about increasing our subjective probability assignment?Bogdanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15449119709471870254noreply@blogger.com