Tuesday, July 14, 2015

New Paper - Human Enhancement, Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility




I have a new paper coming out in the journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. This one deals with two objections to human enhancement. In both cases I first try to strengthen and clarify the objections before arguing why I think they ultimately fail. Fuller details are below. The official version of the paper won't be published for a couple of months, but you can access the final pre-publication drafts at the links I provide (philpapers is open access; academia.edu may require free sign-up in order to access).

Title: Human Enhancement, Social Solidarity and the Distribution of Responsibility
Journal: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Links: Philpapers; Academia; Official
Abstract: This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency (i.e. the ability to control and manipulate all aspects of one’s agency). The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and in neglecting some obvious ways in which the enhancement project can be planned so as to avoid its degradation. The second objection, though common to several writers, has been most directly asserted by Saskia Nagel, and is concerned with the impact of hyperagency on the burden and distribution of responsibility. Though this is an intriguing objection, I argue that not enough has been done to explain why such alterations are morally problematic. I try to correct for this flaw before offering a variety of strategies for dealing with the problems raised. 

Friday, July 10, 2015

The Case for a Marriage-Free State





The last couple of months have seen major victories for marriage equality. In May, Ireland voted to legalise same-sex marriage in a national referendum — the first country in the world to do so by popular vote. In June, the US Supreme court issued a landmark 5-4 decision legalising same-sex marriage throughout the United States. These were important steps toward building a fairer and more just society. If marriage is to continue to exist as a legally-recognised relationship status, then it is important that it do so in an egalitarian and inclusive manner. I don’t think anyone should doubt this.

But there is something worth doubting in the midst of all these victories. Should marriage continue to exist as a legally-recognised relationship status? Think about what this means. We enter into relationships with other human beings all the time. These relationships tend to support a number of different functions or roles. Some are purely commercial or business oriented; some are concerned with friendship and sociality; some are sexually intimate; some are directed towards property-sharing; some are about rearing children; some are about mutual caregiving and support. Legal recognition of these relationship functions usually results in the parties to them gaining a number of legal rights and duties. The distinctive feature of marriage-recognition (in modern liberal societies) is that it focuses on a particular kind of relationship — viz. a monogamous relationship — which fulfils a number of these functions — typically caregiving, sexual intimacy and child-rearing — and bundles together a bunch of rights and duties that then attach to the members of that relationship. The question is whether this special status and bundling of rights should continue.

This is a question that has long exercised certain feminist theorists. They view marriage as a problematic institution with a number of troubling properties. Some are inclined to support alternative kinds of relationship-recognition. Clare Chambers’s article ‘The Marriage Free State’ offers an interesting perspective on this debate. She argues that the state should stop legally recognising marriage and should not replace marriage-recognition with some alternative type of relationship-recognition (e.g. civil unions). Instead, she argues that the state should regulate relationship functions on a piecemeal basis.

In the remainder of this post, I want to take a look at Chambers’s argument for the marriage-free state. Two caveats before I do so. First, as I understand it, the defence of the marriage-free state contained in the paper I read is an incomplete and imperfect overview of the case that she will present in a forthcoming book. Second, this is not a topic with which I am overly familiar. Reading and writing about Chambers’s paper is way for me to feel my way into this debate. I’ll offer some of my own thoughts along the way, but these are very much preliminary and, no doubt, naive.


1. The Feminist Critique of Marriage
If you’re going to make the case for a marriage-free state, then it probably makes sense to first ask whether marriage-recognition is a bad thing. After all, societies have been affording married couples a special legal status for centuries (millenia even). If we are going to move away from this societal status quo, we’ll need some convincing (not that loyalty to the status quo is always a good thing; just that it usually takes something dramatic to push people away from it). Fortunately, many leading feminist theorists have already obliged on this front by providing a number of reasons to doubt the value of marriage-recognition.

The problem, as Chambers notes, is that there is a faintly paradoxical air to two of the standard critiques:

Critique One: Marriage is a deeply patriarchal and sexist institution that oppresses and harms women.

Critique Two: Marriage is an inegalitarian institution because it is (traditionally anyway) heterosexist and so excludes homosexual couples from the benefits enjoyed by heterosexual couples.

The second critique has obviously found favour, and marriage-equality is now on the ascendancy in many Western countries. But the second critique appears to be in tension with the first. The problem is this: the first critique seems to suggest that marriage is bad for some of the people who enter into it (specifically women); the second seems to suggest that marriage is good for the people who enter into it and should therefore be expanded to others. How can marriage be both of these things? We need to think in a little bit more detail about the alleged harms of marriage.

These harms can be divided into two main categories:

Practical Harms of Marriage: These are harms to the material or legal condition of the people who enter into the marriage. They result directly from being in this particular kind of relationship.

Symbolic Harms of Marriage: These are harms that result from the social meanings that attach to the institution of marriage. These harms need not result from being in this particular kind of relationship. Indeed, they are often felt by people who are not party to a marital relationship.

Historically, there were many practical harms to women who entered into marriage. The most obvious of these were legal. Married women lost legal status and effectively became the chattel of their husbands. This then exposed them to a number of potential material harms such as domestic abuse, marital rape, loss of opportunity, and increased burdens of carework and child-rearing. Obviously, the status of non-married women in such societies wasn’t exactly stellar either (though it did improve over time) so it may be difficult to say whether women were worse off when married, but this doesn’t detract from the fact that, historically, there were a number of practical harms clearly associated with the institution.

What’s the position nowadays? In most Western societies, the legal disbenefits of marriage have disappeared. Women are no longer their husband’s chattel. They retain their independent legal status and associated legal rights. They also gain legal rights associated with inheritance, tax, and property-sharing (though this varies from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction). Still, these changes have been costly: many women had to suffer in the process. Furthermore, many material harms of marriage persist, including in particular the disproportionate share of home/care based work that is taken on by women. On the whole, though, it is probably very difficult to determine whether being married is, on net, practically bad for women. The effects are likely to vary greatly, depending on the woman, the partner, and the relevant social and cultural norms. (Also, though it is not mentioned in Chambers’s article, there are some studies suggesting various health benefits of marriage. They would presumably need to be factored into any overall assessment - though cause and effect is difficult to disentangle)

The symbolic harms of marriage are rather different. Symbolically, marriage tends to reinforce a certain view of women and their role or status in society. This is clear in the symbolism of the traditional ‘white wedding’. Chambers describes it aptly:

The white wedding is replete with sexist imagery: the father ‘giving away’ the bride; the white dress symbolising the bride’s virginity (and emphasising the importance of her appearance); the vows to obey the husband; the minister telling the husband ‘you may now kiss the bride’ (rather than the bride herself giving permission, or indeed initiating or at least equally participating in the act of kissing); the reception at which, traditionally, all the speeches are given by men; the wife surrendering her own name and taking her husband’s. 
(Chambers 2012)

In addition to this, the social meaning that attaches to the institution of marriage has a number of indirect effects on women. Chambers does quite a good job outlining these, and I am loathe to cut out all the details and examples she gives, but I don’t want to repeat everything she says so I’ll just cut to the bottom line: the social meaning tends to reinforce the view that being married is what women should ultimately aspire to; that not being married is to be in an inferior state of existence; and this has the effect of narrowing women’s aspirations and opportunities.

Now, it might be argued in reply that these symbolic effects have improved over time. Women don’t have to take on their husband’s names, they don’t have to have traditional ‘white weddings’ (though the pressures are still there) and so on. But whether marriage can symbolically break with the negative features of its past is unclear. One of the reasons why marriage is socially valued and protected is because it is traditional. This means that the symbolic meaning is directly linked with the history of the institution. Consequently, it is much more likely that marriage is symbolically tainted by its past meanings; and hence much more difficult to drain it of those meanings.

This brings us back then to the second critique of marriage: its heterosexist and inegalitarian nature. Why is it, if marriage is so bad, that many feminist and homosexual theorists and activists support marriage equality? The apparent paradox is easily resolved. What these theorists recognise is that (a) marriage-recognition does bring with it some practical (primarily legal) benefits and (ii) the symbolic value of marriage would, if extended to homosexual couples, help foster a greater sense of social belonging and acceptance. Nevertheless, accpeting these two things is consistent with believing in the practically and symbolically negative aspects of marriage too. In other words, the position can be that it would be better if marriage-recognition is extended to include homosexual couples, but it would be even better again if the state stopped legally recognising marriage.


2. The Case for Piecemeal Relationship-Recognition
But if the state is going to stop recognising marriage, what is it going to do instead? Presumably, relationships will still happen and will still need to be regulated. This is where Chambers’s paper gets really interesting. To think about what happens in a marriage-free state, we need to recall what it means, legally speaking, to recognise marriage as a special relationship status. It means that you single out a particular kind of relationship (monogamous unions) for special recognition, you presume that this relationship brings together a number of important relationship functions, and you bundle together a bunch of rights and duties and apply them to the members of these relationships. When it comes to non-marital forms of relationship-recognition, this implies two choices either: (i) we continue to bundle or (ii) we don’t.

The difference is between holistic relationship recognition and piecemeal relationship recognition. In the former case, we establish a new unique relationship status that replaces marriage (e.g. a civil union) and assign a bundle of rights and duties to that relationship. In the latter case, we don’t establish a new unique relationship status. Instead, we look to the different relationship functions, and regulate those functions individually (i.e. on a piecemeal basis).

The case for alternative holistic regulation has been set out by others. Chambers points in particular to the work of Elizabeth Brake and Tamara Metz who both call for the state to provide special recognition for caregiving relationships in lieu of marriage. Metz argues for recognising intimate caregiving unions (ICGUs); Brake argues for minimal marriage, which is a relationship based on caregiving. In Brake’s case, it is argued that there should be no upper limit on the number of parties to such a relationship, nor any restriction on entry on the basis of sex/gender.

Chambers argues that there are two problems with these holistic approaches to relationship-recognition:

The Bundling Problem: The holistic approach assumes that most of the important functions of life can be satisfied in one core relationship. In other words, that we can get what we need in terms of property-sharing, intimacy, caregiving and child-rearing (among other things) in one special relationship. It also assumes that the state is well-placed to determine and regulate the nature and extent of that relationship. Bundling also has an exclusionary effect insofar as the rights and duties are only obtainable by those who are in such relationships.

The Opt-In Problem: Proposals for holistic regulation invariably assume that the special relationship status is one that people will opt into. On the one hand, this makes sense: people should be free to determine whether they want the bundle of rights and duties associated with that relationship status. On the other hand, the opt-in approach often works against weaker and more vulnerable relationship partners. People can be involved in factually equivalent relationships and yet not have the associated legal rights because they have not opted-in or because the status quo favours one of the relationship partners not opting in. This used to be a particular problem for non-married co-habiting couples, and still is in some jurisdictions, though more favourable rules are now in place.

In light of these problems, Chambers argues for a piecemeal approach to relationship recognition. This approach rejects bundling. It focuses instead on the different relationship-functions and regulates those individually. Thus, for example, there would be one set of regulations for the child-rearing function, another for the property-sharing function, another for the sexual-intimacy function and so on. There would be no particular ex ante restrictions on who could share these functions. The regulations for each function would have to be developed and argued for independently. More controversially, Chambers argues that the regulation of these functions should not be conducted on an opt-in basis. Instead, the rules should apply simply by virtue of the fact that people share those functions with others.

I have some resistance to this prima facie compulsory system of regulation, but there are three points worth bearing in mind. First, it is possible in many cases that people will consent to sharing those relationship functions with others and will be aware, in advance, of the rights and duties associated with doing so. Second, we already impose some relationship regulations on people without their explicit consent. For instance, many of the rights and duties associated with parenting and child-rearing now apply irrespective of the parents’ official marital status (though there are still many that do). This is usually justified on the grounds that the child’s interests take precedence (i.e. that there is a greater good at stake). And third, Chambers suggests that in some cases the rules and regulations could apply on an opt-out basis. This would preserve liberty by an alternative means.



3. Conclusion
Anyway, that’s it for this post. The briefly recap, there is a standard feminist critique of the institution of marriage. This critique holds that marriage is heterosexist and oppressive to women for both practical and symbolic reasons. Finding some alternative form of relationship-recognition would, therefore, be welcome. When looking for an alternative, we have two options with which to contend. We can adopt a holistic approach and look for some alternative relationship status into which we bundle rights and duties, e.g. civil unions or intimate caregiving unions. The problem with this holistic approach is that it assumes most of the important life functions can be satisfied within one relationship status and that people should be free to opt-into a bundle of rights and duties. This is often factually inaccurate, exclusionary and problematic for the more vulnerable members of a relationship. Consequently, Chambers thinks that we should regulate relationships on a piecemeal basis, focusing on the different relationship functions instead of one particular relationship status. I think this proposal is interesting and I look forward to seeing her flesh it out in more detail in her forthcoming book.

Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Is effective regulation of AI possible? Eight potential regulatory problems




The halcyon days of the mid-20th century, when researchers at the (in?)famous Dartmouth summer school on AI dreamed of creating the first intelligent machine, seem so far away. Worries about the societal impacts of artificial intelligence (AI) are on the rise. Recent pronouncements from tech gurus like Elon Musk and Bill Gates have taken on a dramatically dystopian edge. They suggest that the proliferation and advance of AI could pose a existential threat to the human race.

Despite these worries, debates about the proper role of government regulation of AI have generally been lacking. There are a number of explanations for this: law is nearly always playing catch-up when it comes to technological advances; there is a decidedly anti-government libertarian bent to some of the leading thinkers and developers of AI; and the technology itself would seem to elude traditional regulatory structures.

Fortunately, the gap in the existing literature is starting to be filled. One recent addition to it comes in the shape of Matthew Scherer’s article ‘Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems’. Among the many things that this article does well is that it develops the case for thinking that AI is (and will be) exceptionally difficult to regulate, whilst at the same time trying to develop a concrete proposal for some form of appropriate regulation.

In this post, I want to consider Scherer’s case for thinking that AI is (and will be) exceptionally difficult to regulate. That case consists of three main arguments: (i) the definitional argument; (ii) the ex post argument and (iii) the ex ante argument. These arguments give rise to eight specific regulatory problems (illustrated below). Let’s address in each in turn.

(Note: I won’t be considering whether the risks from AI are worth taking seriously in this post, nor will I be considering the general philosophical-political question of whether regulation is a good thing or a bad thing; I’ll be assuming that it has some value, however minimal that may be)





1. The Definitional Argument
Scherer’s first argument focuses on the difficulty of defining AI. Scherer argues that an effective regulatory system needs to have some clear definition of what is being regulated. The problem is that the term ‘artificial intelligence’ admits of no easy definition. Consequently, and although Scherer does not express it in this manner, it seems like the following argument is compelling:


  • (1) If we cannot adequately define what it is that we are regulating, then the construction of an effective regulatory system will be difficult.
  • (2) We cannot adequately define ‘artificial intelligence’.
  • (3) Therefore, the construction of an effective regulatory system for AI will be difficult.


Scherer spends most of his time looking at premise (2). He argues that there is no widely-accepted definition of an artificially intelligent system, and that the definitions that have been offered would be unhelpful in practice. To illustrate the point, he appeals to the definitions offered in Russell and Norvig’s leading textbook on artificial intelligence. These authors note that definitions of AI tend to fit into one of four major categories: (i) thinking like a human, i.e. AI systems are ones that adopt similar thought processes to human beings; (ii) acting like a human, i.e. AI systems are ones that are behaviourally equivalent to human beings; (iii) thinking rationally, i.e. AI systems are ones that have goals and reason their way toward achieving those goals; (iv) acting rationally, i.e. AI systems are ones that act in a manner that can be described as goal-directed and goal-achieving. There are further distinctions then depending on whether the AI system is narrow/weak (i.e. focused on one task) or broad/strong (i.e. focused on many). Scherer argues that none of these definitions is satisfactory from a regulatory standpoint.

Thinking and acting like a human was a popular way of defining AI in the early days. Indeed, the pioneering paper in the field — Alan Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ — adopts an ‘acting like a human’ definition of AI. But that popularity has now waned. This is for several reasons, chief among them being the fact that designing systems that try to mimic human cognitive processes, or that are behaviourally indistinguishable from humans, is not very productive when it comes to building actual systems. The classic example of this being the development of chess-playing computers. These systems do not play chess, or think about chess, in a human-like way; but they are now better at chess than any human being. If we adopted a thinking/acting like a human definition for regulatory purposes, we would miss many of these AI systems. Since these systems are the ones that could pose the largest public risk, this wouldn’t be very useful.

Thinking and acting rationally is a more popular approach to AI definition nowadays. These definitions focus on whether the system can achieve a goal in narrow or broad domains (i.e. is the system capable of optimising a value function). But they too have their problems. Scherer argues that thinking rationally definitions are problematic because thinking in a goal-directed manner often assumes, colloquially, that the system doing the thinking has mental states like desires and intentions. It is very difficult to say whether an AI system has such mental states. At the very least, this seems like a philosophical question that legal regulators would be ill-equipped to address (not that philosophers are much better equipped). Acting rationally definitions might seem more promising, but they tend to be both under and over-inclusive. They tend to be over-inclusive insofar as virtually any machine can be said to act in a goal directed manner (Scherer gives the example of a simple stamping machine). They tend to be under-inclusive insofar as systems that act irrationally may pose an even greater risk to the public and hence warrant much closer regulatory scrutiny.

I think Scherer is right to highlight these definitional problems, but I wonder how serious they are. Regulatory architectures are made possible by law, and law is expressed in the vague and imprecise medium of language, but problems of vagueness and imprecision are everywhere in law and that doesn’t prove an insuperable bar to regulation. We regulate ‘energy’ and ‘medicine’ and ‘transport’, even though all these things are, to greater or lesser extent, vague.

This brings us back to premise (1). Everything hinges on what we deem to be an ‘adequate’ definition. If we are looking for a definition that gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership, then we are probably looking for the wrong thing. If we are looking for something that covers most phenomena of interest and can be used to address the public risks associated with the technology, then there may be reason for more optimism. I tend to think we should offer vague and over-inclusive definitions in the legislation that establishes the regulatory system, and then leave it to the regulators to figure out what exactly deserves their scrutiny.

In fairness to him, Scherer admits that this argument is not a complete bar to regulation, and goes so far as to offer his own, admittedly circular, definition of an AI as any system that performs a task that, if it were performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence. I think that might be under-inclusive, but it is a start.


2. The Ex Post Argument: Liability Gaps and Control Problems
The terms ‘ex post’ and ‘ex ante’ are used frequently in legal scholarship. Their meanings will be apparent to anyone who has studied Latin or is familiar with the meanings of ‘p.m.’ and ‘a.m.’. They mean, roughly and respectively, ‘after the fact’ and ‘before the fact’. In this case, the ‘fact’ in question relates to the construction and implementation of an AI system. Scherer argues that regulatory problems arise both at the research and development of the AI (the ex ante phase) and once the AI is ‘unleashed’ into the world (the ex post phase). This might seem banal, but it is worth dividing up the regulatory challenges into these distinct phases just so as to get a clearer sense of the problems that might be out there.

We can start by looking at problems that arise once the AI is ‘unleashed’ into the world. It is, of course, very difficult to predict what these problems will be before the fact, but there are two general problems that putative regulators would need to be aware of.

The first is something we can call the ‘foreseeability problem’. It highlights the problem that AI could pose for traditional standards for legal liability. Those traditional standards hold that if some harm is done to another person somebody else may be held liable for that harm provided that the harm in question was reasonably foreseeable (there’s more to the legal standard than that, but that’s all we need to know for now). For most industrial products, this legal standard is more than adequate: the manufacturer can be held responsible for all injuries that are reasonably foreseeable from use of the product. With AI things might be trickier. AI systems are often designed to be autonomous and to act in creative ways (i.e. ways that are not always reasonably foreseeable by the original designers and engineers).

Scherer gives the example of C-Path, a cancer pathology machine learning algorithm. C-Path found that certain characteristics of stroma (supportive tissue) around cancerous cells were better prognostic indicators of disease progression than actually cancerous cells. This surprised many cancer researchers. If autonomous creativity of this sort becomes common, then what the AI does may not be reasonably foreseeable and people may not have ready access to legal compensation if an AI program causes some injury or harm.

While it is worth thinking about this problem, I suspect that it is not particularly serious. The main reason for this is that ‘reasonable foreseeability’ standards of liability are not the only game in town. The law already provides from strict liability standards (i.e. liability in the absence of fault) and for vicarious liability (i.e. liability for actions performed by another agent). These forms of liability could be expanded to cover the ‘liability gaps’ that might arise from autonomous and creative AI.

The second ex post problem is the ‘control problem’. This is the one that worries the likes of Elon Musk, Bill Gates and Nick Bostrom. It arises when an AI program acts in such a way that it is no longer capable of being controlled by its human makers. This can happen for a number of reasons. The most extreme reason would be that the AI is smarter and faster than the humans; less extreme reasons could include flawed programming and design. The loss of control can be particularly problematic when the interests of the AI and the programmers no longer align with one another. Scherer argues that there are two distinct control problems:

Local Control Problem: Arises when a particular AI system can no longer be controlled by the humans who have been assigned legal responsibility for controlling that system.
Global Control Problem: Arises when an AI can no longer be controlled by any humans.

Both of these control problems would present regulatory difficulties, but the latter would obviously be much more worrying than the former (assuming the AI is capable of doing serious harm).

I don’t have too much to say about this since I agree that this is a problem. I also like this particular framing of the control problem insofar as it doesn’t place too heavy an emphasis on the intelligence of an AI. The current furore about artificial superintelligence is philosophically interesting, but it can serve to obscure the fact that AI systems with much lower levels of ability could pose serious problems if they act outside the control of human beings (be that locally or globally).


3. The Ex Ante Argument: Discreetness, Diffuseness, Discreteness and Opacity
So much for the regulatory problems that arise after the creation and implementation of an AI system. What about the problems that arise during the research and development phase? Scherer argues that there are four such problems, each associated with the way in which AI research and development could leverage the infrastructure that has been created during the information technology age. In this sense, the regulatory problems posed by AI are not intrinsically different from the regulatory problems created by other systems of software development, but the stakes might be much higher.

The four problems are:

The Discreetness Problem: AI research and development could take place using infrastructures that are not readily visible to the regulators. The idea here is that an AI program could be assembled online, using equipment that is readily available to most people, and using small teams of programmers and developers that are located in different areas. Many regulatory institutions are designed to deal with largescale industrial manufacturers and energy producers. These entities required huge capital investments and were often highly visible; creating institutions than can deal with less visible operators could prove tricky.

The Diffuseness Problem: This is related to the preceding problem. It is the problem that arises when AI systems are developed using teams of researchers that are organisationally, geographically, and perhaps more importantly, jurisdictionally separate. Thus, for example, I could compile an AI program using researchers located in America, Europe, Asia and Africa. We need not form any coherent, legally recognisable organisation, and we could take advantage of our jurisdictional diffusion to evade regulation.

The Discreteness Problem: AI projects could leverage many discrete, pre-existing hardware and software components, some of which will be proprietary (so-called ‘off the shelf’ components). The effects of bringing all these components together may not be fully appreciated until after the fact. (Not to be confused with the discreetness problem).

The Opacity Problem: The way in which AI systems work may be much more opaque than previous technologies. This could be for a number of reasons. It could be because the systems are compiled from different components that are themselves subject to proprietary protection. Or it could be because the systems themselves are creative and autonomous, thus rendering them more difficult to reverse engineer. Again, this poses problems for regulators as there is a lack of clarity concerning the problems that may be posed by such systems and how those problems can be addressed.

Each of these problems looks to be serious and any regulatory system would need to deal with them. To my mind, the diffuseness and opacity problems are likely to be the most serious. The diffuseness problem suggests that there is a need for global coordination in relation to AI regulation, but past efforts at global coordination do not inspire confidence (e.g. climate change; nuclear proliferation). The opacity problem is also serious and likely to be compounded by the growing use of (and need for) AI in regulatory decision-making. I have written about this before.

Scherer, for his part, thinks that some of these problems may not be as serious as they first appear. For instance, he suggests that although discreetness is a possibility, it is still likely that AI research and development will be undertaken by largescale corporations or government bodies that are much more visible to potential regulators. Thus, from a regulatory standpoint, we should be thankful that big corporations like Google, Apple and Facebook are buying-up smaller scale AI developers. These bigger corporations are easier to regulate given existing regulatory institutional structures, though this must be balanced against the considerable lobbying power of such organisations.

Okay, that’s it for this post. Hopefully, this gives you some sense of the problems that might arise with AI regulation. Scherer says much more about this topic in his paper, and develops his own preferred regulatory proposal. I hope to cover that in another post.

Saturday, July 4, 2015

Humanism, Transhumanism, and Speculative Posthumanism




I have recently been working my through David Roden’s book Posthuman Life: Philosophy at the Edge of the Human. It is a unique and fascinating work. I am not sure that I have ever read anything quite like it. In the book, Roden defends a position which he refers to as speculative posthumanism. This holds, roughly, that the future we are creating through technological change could give rise to truly weird and alien forms of posthuman life.

In defending this position, Roden takes the reader on a philosophical romp through contemporary debates about transhumanism and artificial intelligence, suffusing this with discussions of Kantianism, pragmatism, phenomenology and postmodernism. It is this fusion of literatures, combined with Roden’s engaging use of sci-fi examples and illustrations, that makes the work so unique and interesting (in my opinion).

Anyway, there’s lots of good stuff in the book, and I hope to cover some of its meatier elements in future posts. Today, I just want to cover something relatively straightforward — but critical if you want to understand the significance of the thesis being defended in Roden’s book. Like many who debate the ethics of transhumanism, I’m sometimes confused by the terminology that is thrown around by the participants. In particular, I find myself confused by the distinction between terms like humanism, transhumanism and posthumanism. I know that others have tried to identify these distinctions in the past — including Kevin LaGrandeur in his article ‘What is the difference between posthumanism and transhumanism? — but I have rarely found those discussions illuminating.

This is one place where Roden’s work is particularly useful. He helps the reader to understand the distinctions between these different concepts by paying close attention to how they have been used in the literature, and he also further clarifies the existing literature by distinguishing between two major forms of posthumanism. This, I think, is very helpful since it is that term ‘posthumanism’ and the overlap/disjunction between it and ‘transhumanism’ that is the source of most confusion.

You can read Roden’s book for the full analysis; I’m just going to share the results of that analysis here, which focuses on four discrete concepts (he discusses several more in the book). They are: humanism, transhumanism, critical posthumanism and speculative posthumanism.


Humanism: This is any view that singles out humans from other forms of life. This is generally based on the notion that humans possess some special faculty or attribute (reason; intelligence; consciousness; rationality; autonomy; humour; similarity to God etc) that differentiates them from all other forms of life. These special faculties are then typically taken to warrant special ethical treatment. Humanism also usually encompasses the protection, celebration and glorification of these unique attributes.

Transhumanism: This is a socio-ethical view holding that advanced forms of technology can be used to transcend certain limitations of the human condition. The appealed-to forms of technology are referred to as NBIC technologies by Roden (nanotech; biotech; information technology; and cognitive science). The forms of transcension that these technologies make possible are various. I like the summary adopted by David Pearce, who argues that transhumanists are committed to the three ‘supers’, i.e. super-longevity, super-intelligence, super well-being. In other words, transhumanists are committed to using NBIC technologies to live radically longer lives, increase their cognitive abilities, and achieve higher states of conscious bliss and satisfaction. The interesting thing about transhumanism, from Roden’s perspective, is that it works very much within the humanist ideology. That is to say, transhumanists are often committed to enhancing and improving the kinds of attributes that humanists single out as being unique and special markers of humanity (rationality, intelligence, autonomy etc). They just want to do so through technology.

Critical Posthumanism: This is the view, common in the critical humanities, that takes issue with humanism. In other words, that challenges the view of the human subject as something that is unique and worthy of glorification. One of the most widely-challenged humanist views is the one associated with Descartes. The Cartesian view is that the human is a single, unified, rational, self-governing entity that sits apart from the external world in which it operates. Critical posthumanists argue that this Cartesian view of the human subject is mistaken, highlighting various fluid relationships between the mind, body and external world, noting how those relationships are made even more fluid by modern technologies, and attempting to deconstruct the notion of a single unified self. Critical posthumanists often scoff at certain transhumanist projects, like mind-uploading, on the grounds that such projects implicitly assume the false Cartesian view.

Speculative Posthumanism: This is a view that shares certain elements of transhumanism and critical posthumanism. It shares the transhumanist fascination with the ways in which technology can be used to modify and enhance human attributes. But it also shares some of the critical posthumanist belief that the single, unified, rational human subject may be wiped out by these technological changes. Thus, speculative posthumanism is committed to the notion that future technological successors of the human race could be radically alien and different. Indeed, speculative posthumanists hold that these beings could completely cease to be human by virtue of technological change. This could lead to a radical restructuring of the values inherent in present social orders. For example, the construction of a hivemind or Borg-like society could negate many of the supposedly valuable and humanistic features of contemporary societies.


Anyway, that’s all I wanted to share in this post. The majority of Roden’s book is spent defending the possibility of speculative posthumanism, encouraging us to take it seriously, and mapping out some of the weirder possible contents of the posthuman future. This strikes me as being a valuable project.

Monday, June 29, 2015

Technological Unemployment and Personal Well-being: Does work make us happy?




Let’s assume technological unemployment is going to happen. Let’s assume that automating technologies will take over the majority of economically productive labour. It’s a controversial assumption, to be sure, but one with some argumentative basis. Should we welcome this possibility? On previous occasions, I have outlined some arguments for thinking that we should. In essence, these arguments claimed that if we could solve the distributional problems arising from technological unemployment (e.g. through a basic income guarantee), then freedom from work could be a boon in terms of personal autonomy, well-being and fulfillment.

But maybe this is wrong. Maybe the absence of work from our lives will make us miserable and unfulfilled? Today, I want to look at an argument in favour of this alternative point of view. The argument comes from Nicholas Carr’s recent book on automation. Carr has a bit of a reputation as a technology-doomsayer. But I think he sometimes makes some reasonable points. His argument on work is quite interesting. When I first read it, I didn’t think much of it. But upon re-reading, I saw that it is slightly more subtle and interesting than I first supposed.

Carr’s argument rests on two main claims: (i) the importance of the ‘flow’ state in human well-being; (ii) our inability to be good judges of what will get us into such ‘flow’ states. These two claims directly challenge the typical anti-work arguments. Let’s see exactly how it all fits together.


1. A Simple Anti-Work Argument
We start by considering the anti-work view, i.e. the one that is opposed to what Carr has to say. I won’t consider any particular proponent of this view, though there are many. Instead, I’ll consider a simple, generic version of it.

The anti-work view is premised on the notion that work is generally unpleasant and undertaken against our will. Proponents of the view highlight the valorisation and glorification of the work ethic in contemporary capitalist societies. They claim that we have all been duped into making a virtue of an economic necessity. Work is labour undertaken for some economic reward (or hope of such a reward), but we don’t really get to choose our preferred form of labour. The market dictates what is economically valuable. If we are lucky, we get to do something we don’t hate. But even if we are lucky, we will soon find that work invades our lives. We will spend the majority of our time doing it; and the time that we are not working will be spent recovering from or preparing for it. And it gets even worse. In the modern era, there is a creeping erosion of our leisure time, and a collapse in the possibility of achieving a work-life balance. Communications technologies mean that we are always-contactable; always-switched on, and always-working.

Wouldn’t it be so much better if we could remove these work-related pressures from our lives? If machines could take over all economically important labour, we would be free to spend our time as we wish. We could pursue projects of genuine personal, social and moral interest. We could rebalance our lives, spending more time at leisure, engaging in what Bob Black has called the ‘ludic life’. Surely, this would be a more healthful, meaningful and fulfilling existence?

To put all this into a slightly more formal argument:


  • (1) If we are free to choose how to spend our time (rather than being forced to work for a living), then we will engage in activities that confer greater levels of well-being and meaning on our lives.
  • (2) If there is technological unemployment, we will be free to spend our time as we please.
  • (3) Therefore, if there is technological unemployment, we will be able to engage in activities that confer greater levels of well-being and fulfillment on our lives.


There are several problems with this argument. For one thing, I suspect that premise (2) is unpersuasive in its present form. The notion that freedom from work will automatically free us up to spend our time as we please sounds naive. As hinted at above, a lack of employment could lead to a severe existential crisis as people need to find resources to meet their basic needs. That might make them even less ‘free’ than they were before they lost their jobs. Unless that distributional problem can be addressed, premise (2) will be a weak link in the chain of reasoning.

But as I mentioned above, let’s assume that this particular issue can be resolved. Focus could then shift to premise (1). This is the one that Carr seems to cast into doubt.


2. The Importance of Flow and the Paradox of Work
Carr’s argument centres around the concept of the ‘flow state’. This is something that was brought to popular attention by the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. It is a state of mental concentration and immersion that is characterised by a strong positive affective experience (sometimes described as ‘rapture’ or ‘joy’). It is distinct from states of extreme mental concentration that are characterised by negative affective experience. A flow state is something you have probably experienced at some point in your life. I know I sometimes get it while writing.

The interesting thing, from Carr’s perspective, is that the flow state seems to be an important component of well-being and fulfillment. And, perhaps more importantly, that we aren’t very good at identifying the activities that help us to bring it about. This is due to the ‘paradox of work’, which was also described by Csikszentmihalyi.

In a series of experiments, Csikszentmihalyi used something called the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) to gauge what sorts of activities most increased people’s feelings of subjective well-being and happiness. The ESM tries to sample experimental subjects’ moods at separate intervals during the course of a typical day. The subjects’ wear a device (in the original studies it was a pager) that beeps them at certain times and asks them to complete a short survey. The survey itself asks them to explain what they were doing at that moment in time, what skills they were deploying, the challenges they faced and their psychological state.

In the 1980s, Csikszentmihalyi used this method on groups of workers from around Chicago. The workers came from different industries. Some were in skilled jobs; some were in unskilled jobs. Some were blue-collar; some were white collar. They were given pagers that beeped on seven occasions during the course of the day, and complete the associated surveys.

The results were interesting. Csikszentmihalyi and his colleagues found that people were happier working than they were during leisure time. People felt fulfilled and challenged by work-related activities; whereas they felt bored and anxious during their time off. And yet, despite this, people said that they didn’t like working and that they would prefer to be taking time off. This is where the so-called ‘paradox of work’ comes into play. According to the results of the ESM, people are happier at work than they are at leisure; and yet people still express a desire not to be working.

What are we to make of this? Carr thinks that the results of Csikszentmihalyi’s study provide an example of a broader psychological phenomenon: the problem of miswanting. This is something that has been documented by the psychologists Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson: people often want things that they think will make them happy but end up having the opposite effect. In this respect, certain social conventions surrounding the importance of spending time with one’s friends and families may be encouraging people to block-out the positive feelings associated with work, and biasing them in favour of activities that don’t really make them happy.

But why is it that leisure time is not as fulfilling as work? The answer comes from the importance of having some level of challenge and pressure in one’s life. Csikszentmihalyi identifies nine different factors that contribute to the attainment of the flow state. These include achieving the right balance of mental exertion and anxiety. Too much external pressure, arousal and anxiety and you won’t be able to enter a flow state; too little and you will also miss it. The problem is that during ‘down time’ we often fail to have the right amount of pressure, arousal and anxiety. Consequently, we lapse into the bored and listless state that Csikszentmihalyi found amongst his experimental subjects. Work has the benefit of imposing a structure and schedule that encourages the right level of arousal and anxiety.

Carr sums up the position in the following quote:

…a job imposes a structure on our time that we lose when we’re left to our own devices. At work, we’re pushed to engaged in the kinds of activities that human beings find most satisfying. We’re happiest when we’re absorbed in a difficult task, a task that has clear goals and that challenges us not only to exercise our talents but to stretch them. We become so immersed in the flow of our work…that we tune out distractions…Our usually wayward attention becomes fixed on what we’re doing. 
(Carr 2015, 16)

In short, as Carr sees it, we are often happiest while working.


3. The Case against Anti-Work and Technological Unemployment
How does all this translate into an argument against technological unemployment? The simplest thing to say is that the evidence introduced by Carr casts into doubt the conditional claim embodied in premise (1). This premise seems to be claiming that there is a causal link between the freedom to choose how to fill one’s time and the level of well-being and fulfillment that one experiences. This now seems to be in doubt. It looks like mere freedom to choose how to fill one’s time is not enough. One must fill one’s time with the right kinds of activities. People might be able to do this without the rigid structure of a job — Carr himself concedes as much — but often they will not. They will be tempted to rest on their laurels and won’t have the pressures and challenges required for truly immersive engagement.

This then is the problem with technological unemployment: The kinds of automating technology that take away human jobs will taken away the pressures, anxieties and structures needed to attain flow. Indeed, the situation will be exacerbated if the same kinds of automating technology filter into our leisure time as well (e.g. if people start to use automating technologies to assist with the challenging and difficult aspects of their hobbies). In short:


  • (4) The attainment of flow states is an important component of human well-being.
  • (5) If left to their own devices, people are often bad judges of what will get them into a flow state: they may need the pressure and structure imposed by employment to get them to engage in the right sorts of activity (support: Csikszentmihalyi’s work)
  • (6) Therefore, mere freedom to choose how to spend one’s time is no guarantee that the time will be spent engaging in activities that confer greater levels of fulfillment and well-being.


The result is the negation of premise (1).

Is this argument any good? Even if I concede premise (4), I have a few worries. For one thing, I worry about the over-reliance on Csikszentmihalyi’s work. I know the concept of the flow state is widely endorsed, but I’m not so sure about the paradox of work. The study Carr refers to was performed during the 1980s. Has it been confirmed in subsequent studies? I don’t know and I simply have to plead ignorance on the psychological science front here (if you know of follow-up studies or similar studies please let me know in the comments section). One thing that does strike me, however, is that in discussing this one example, Carr refers to the notion that people were socially conditioned into thinking that leisure time should be more pleasurable than work. It seems to me that there is a countervailing type of social conditioning that tries to glorify the ideal of being ‘busy’ and ‘working’. Could this be tricking us into thinking that our working lives are more valuable than they actually are?

The second worry I have relates to premise (5). As someone who effectively sets their own agenda for work, I see no reason to suppose the absence of the employment-relation would rob us of the ability to achieve true flow states. In particular, I see no reason to suppose that waged labour is the only thing that could provide us with the pressures, challenges and structures needed to engage in truly immersive activity. Indeed, it seems somewhat patronising to suggest that employment is the best way for most people to achieve this. There are plenty of other pressures and challenges in life (e.g. self-imposed goal setting and reinforcement from one’s social peers). Indeed, modern technology may actually help to provide a framework for such pressures and challenges outside of waged labour, for example through social-sharing and gamification. I’m not saying these are good things; I am just saying there are other ways of achieving the end that Carr seems to desire.

That said, I do think there is something to worry about when it comes to automation and personal fulfillment. There is a danger that automation will be used by people to avoid all seemingly unpleasant or challenging activities, in the private sphere as well as in the economic sphere. But the danger associated with this must be kept in perspective. There is tendency among automation doomsayers to assume that automation will take over everything and we will be left with nothing. But this is just as naive as the view that being free to choose one’s activities will make one happier. Automating some activities can free us up to pursue others, i.e. to exercise our creativity and ingenuity in other ways. The potential benefits of this, when weighed agains the degrading and negative aspects of waged labour, ought to be kept in mind.

Anyway, that’s it for this post. To briefly recap, anti-work enthusiasts often make the case against work by appealing to the notion that being free to spend one’s time as one chooses will allow one to engage in activities that confer greater fulfillment and well-being. Carr, relying on the work of Csikszentmihalyi, argues that this is too simplistic. People are often bad judges of what kinds of activities confer the most benefits. In particular, they are bad at choosing activities that will help them to reach a flow state. Cskikszentmihalyi’s studies suggest that people are often happier working than they are at leisure. This is because they need some pressure and challenge in life. Work may be the best source of this pressure and challenge. Although I think this is an interesting argument, and I agree about the simplicity of some anti-work arguments, it seems to me to have several weaknesses. In particular, it seems to over-rely on one study; ignore many of the negative aspects of work; and assume too readily that work is the best (or only) source of pressure and challenge.

Thursday, June 25, 2015

The Logic of Surveillance Capitalism




You have probably noticed it already. There is a strange logic at the heart of the modern tech industry. The goal of many new tech startups is not to produce products or services for which consumers are willing to pay. Instead, the goal is create a digital platform or hub that will capture information from as many users as possible — to grab as many ‘eyeballs’ as you can. This information can then be analysed, repackaged and monetised in various ways. The appetite for this information-capture and analysis seems to be insatiable, with ever increasing volumes of information being extracted and analysed from an ever-expanding array of data-monitoring technologies.

The famous Harvard business theorist Shoshana Zuboff refers to this phenomenon as surveillance capitalism and she believes that it has its own internal ‘logic’ that we need to carefully and critically assess. The word ‘logic’ is somewhat obscure in this context. To me, logic is the study of the rules of inference and argumentation. To Zuboff, it means something more like the structural requirements and underlying principles of a particular social institution — in this instance the institutions of surveillance capitalism. But there’s no sense in getting hung up about the word. The important thing is to understand the phenomenon.

And that’s what I want to do in this post. I want to analyse Zuboff’s characterisation and assessment of the logic of surveillance capitalism. That assessment is almost entirely negative in nature, occasionally hyperbolically so, but contains some genuinely provocative insights. This is marred by the fact that Zuboff’s writings are esoteric and not always enjoyable to read. This is largely due to her opaque use of language. I’m going to try to simplify and repackage what she has to say here.

Zuboff identifies four key features in the logic of surveillance capitalism. In doing so, she explicitly follows the four key features identified by Google’s chief economist, Hal Varian. These four features are: (i) the drive toward more and more data extraction and analysis; (ii) the development of new contractual forms using computer-monitoring and automation; (iii) the desire to personalise and customise the services offered to users of digital platforms; and (iv) the use of the technological infrastructure to carry out continual experiments on its users and consumers.




Each of these four features has important social repercussions. Let’s look at them in more depth.


1. Data Extraction and Analysis
The first feature of surveillance capitalism is probably the most obvious. It is the insatiable appetite for data extraction and analysis. This what many refer to under the rubric of ‘big data’ and what people worry about when they worry about data protection and privacy. Zuboff says that there are two things you need to understand about this aspect of surveillance capitalism.

First, you need to understand the sources of the data, i.e. what it is that makes it fair to refer to this as the era of ‘big data’. There are several such sources, all of which feed into ever-increasing datasets, that are far beyond the ability of a human being to comprehend. The most obvious source of data is the data from computer-mediated transactions. The infrastructure of modern computing is such that every computer-mediated transaction is recorded and logged. This means that there is rich set of transaction-related data to be mined. In addition to this, there is the rise of the so-called internet of things, or internet of everything. This is the world being inaugurated by the creation of smart devices that can be attached to every physical object in the world, and can be used to record and upload data from those objects. Think about the computers in cars, lawnmowers, thermostats, wristwatches, washing machines and so on. Each one of these devices represents an opportunity for more data to be fed to the institutions of surveillance capitalism. On top of that there are the large datasets kept by governments and other bureaucratic agencies that have been digitised and linked to the internet, and the vast array of private and personal surveillance equipment. Virtually everything can now be used as a datasource for surveillance capitalism. What’s more, the ubiquity of data-monitoring is often deliberately hidden or ‘hidden in plain sight’. People simply do not realise how often, or how easy it is, for their personal data to be collected by the institutions of surveillance capitalism.

Second, you need to understand the relationship between the data-extracting companies, like Google, and the users of their services. The relationship is asymmetric and characterised by formal indifference and functional independence. Each of these features needs to be unpacked. The asymmetry in the relationship is obvious. The data is often extracted in the absence of any formal consent or dialogue. Indeed, companies like Google seem to have adopted an ‘extract first, ask later’ attitude. The full extent of data extraction is often not revealed until there is some scandal or leak. This was certainly true of the personal data about wi-fi networks extracted by Google’s Street View project. The formal indifference in the relationship concerns Google’s attitude toward the content of the data it extracts. Google isn’t particularly discriminating in what it collects: it collects everything it can and finds out uses for it later. Finally, the functional independence arises from the economic use to which the extracted data is put. Big data companies like Google typically do not rely on their users for money. Rather, they use the information extracted as a commodity they can sell to advertisers. The users are the product, not the customers.

It is worth dwelling on this functional independence for a moment. As Zuboff sees it, this feature of surveillance capitalism constitutes an interesting break from the model of the 20th century corporation. As set out in the work of economists like Berle and Means, the 20th century firm was characterised by a number of mutual interdependencies between its employees, its shareholders and its customers. Zuboff uses the example of the car-manufacturing businesses that dominated American in the mid-20th century. These companies relied on large and stable networks of employees and consumers (often one and the same people) for their profitability and functionality. As a result, they worked hard to establish durable careers for their employees and long-term relationships with their customers. It is not clear that surveillance companies like Google are doing the same thing. They do not rely on their primary users for profitability and often do not rely on human workers to manage their core services. Zuboff thinks that this is reflected in the fact that the leading tech companies are far more profitable than the car-manufacturers ever were, while employing far fewer people.

For what it’s worth, I fear that Zuboff may be glorifying the reality of the 20th century firm, and ignoring the fact that many of Google’s customers (and Facebook’s and Twitter’s) are also primary users. So there are some interdependencies at play. But it might be fair to say that the interdependencies have been severely attenuated by the infrastructure of surveillance capitalism. Companies really do require fewer employees, with less stable careers; and there is not the same one-to-one relationship between service users and customers.

One final point about data extraction and analysis. There is an interesting contrast to be made between the type of market envisaged by Varian, and made possible by surveillance capitalism, and the market that was beloved by the libertarian free-marketeers of the 20th century. Hayek’s classic defence of the free market, and attack on the centrally-planned market, was premised on the notion that the information needed to make sensible economic decisions was too localised and diffuse. It could not be known by any single organisation or institution. In a sense, the totality of the market was unknowable. But surveillance capitalism casts this into doubt. The totality of the market may be knowable. The implications of this for the management of the economy could be quite interesting.


2. New Contractual Forms
Whereas data extraction and analysis are obvious features of surveillance capitalism, the other three features are slightly less so. The first of these, and arguably the most interesting, is the new forms of contractual monitoring and enforcement that are made possible by the infrastructures of surveillance capitalism.

These infrastructures allow for real-time monitoring of contractual performance. They also allow for real-time enforcement. You will no longer need to go to court to enforce the terms of a contract or terminate a contract due to breach of terms. The technology allows you to do that directly and immediately. Varian himself gives some startling examples (I’m here quoting Zuboff describing Varian’s ideas):

New Contractual Monitoring and Enforcement: “If someone stops making monthly car payments, lenders can ‘instruct the vehicular monitoring system not to allow the car to be started and to signal the location where it can be picked up.’ Insurance companies, he suggests, can rely on similar monitoring systems to check if customers are driving safely and thus determine whether or not to maintain their insurance or pay claims.” 
(Zuboff 2015, 81)

I can imagine similar scenarios. My health insurance company could use the monitoring technology in my smartwatch to check to see whether I have been doing my 10,000 steps a day. If I have not, they could refuse to pay for my medical care. All sorts of social values could be embedded into these new contractual forms. The threat of withdrawing key services or disabling products will be ever-present.

Zuboff argues that if such a system of contractual monitoring and enforcement becomes the norm it will represent a radical restructuring of our current political and legal order. Indeed, she argues that it would represent an a-contractual form of social organisation. Contract, as conceived by the classic liberal writers, is a social institution built upon a foundation of trust, solidarity and rule of law. We know that we cannot monitor and intervene in another person’s life whenever we wish, thus when we rely on them for goods and services, we trust that they will fulfil their promises. We have recourse to the law if they do not. But this recourse to the law is in explicit recognition of the absence of perfect control.

Things are very different in Varian’s imagined world. With perpetual contractual monitoring and enforcement, there is no real need for social solidarity and trust. Nor is there any real need for the residual coercive authority of the law. This is because there is the prospect of perfect control. The state need no longer be a central mediator and residual enforcer of promises. Indeed, there is no real need for the act of promising anymore: you either conform and receive the good/service; or you don’t and have it withdrawn/disabled. Your promise to conform is irrelevant.

This new contractual world has one other important social repercussion. According to Zuboff, under the traditional contractual model there was a phenomenon of anticipatory conformity. People conformed to their contractual obligations, when they were otherwise unwilling to do so, because they wished to avoid the coercive sanction of the law. In other words, they anticipated an unpleasant outcome if they failed to conform. She believes that Varian’s model of contractual monitoring and enforcement will give rise to a distinct phenomenon of automatic conformity. The reality of perpetual monitoring and immediate enforcement will cause people will instinctively and habitually conform. They will no longer choose to conform; they will do so automatically. The scope of human agency will be limited.

This is all interesting and provocative stuff. I certainly share some of Zuboff’s concerns about the type of monitoring and intervention being envisaged by the likes of Varian. And I agree that it could inaugurate a radical restructuring of the political-legal order. But it may not come to that. Just because the current technology enables this type of monitoring and intervention doesn’t necessarily mean that we will allow it do so. The existing political legal order still dominates and has a way of (eventually) applying its principles and protections to all areas of social life. And there is still some scope for human agency to shape the contents of those principles and protections. These combined forces may make it difficult for insurance companies to set-up the kind of contractual system Varian is imagining. That said, I recognise the countervailing social forces that desire that kind of system too. The desire to control and minimise risk being one of them. There is a battle of ideas to be fought here.


3. Personalisation and Customisation of Services
The third structural feature of surveillance capitalism is its move towards the customisation and personalisation of services. Google collects as much personal data as it can in order to tailor what kinds of searches and ads you see when you use its services. Other companies do the same. Amazon tries to collect information about my book preferences; Netflix tries to collect information about my viewing habits. Both do so in an effort to customise the experience I have when I use their services, recommending particular products to me on the basis of what they think I like.

Zuboff thinks that there is something of a ‘Faustian pact’ at the heart of all this. People trade personal information for the benefits of the personal service. As a result, they have given up privacy for an economic good. Varian thinks that there is nothing sinister or worrisome in this. He uses the analogy of the doctor-patient or lawyer-client relationships. In both cases, the users of services share highly personal information in exchange for the benefits of the personal service, and no one thinks there is anything wrong about this. Indeed, it is typically viewed as a social good. Giving people the option of trading privacy for these personalised services can improve the quality of their lives.

But Zuboff resists this analogy. She argues that something like the doctor-patient relationship is characterised by mutual interdependencies (i.e. the doctor relies on the patient for a living; the patient relies on the doctor to stay alive) and are protected and grounded in the rule of law. The disclosures made by are limited, and subject to an explicit consensual dialogue between the service user and service provider. The relationship between Google and its users is not like this. The attempts at consensual dialogue are minimal (and routinely ignored). It is not characterised by mutual interdependencies; it often operates in a legal vacuum (extract first, ask questions later); and there are no intrinsic limits to the extent of the information being collected. In fact, the explicit goal of companies like Google is to collect so much personal information that they know us better than we know ourselves.




The Faustian pact at the heart of all this is that users of these digital services are often unaware of what they have given up. As Zuboff (and others) put it: surveillance capitalism has given rise to a massive redistribution of privacy rights, from private citizens to surveillance companies like Google. Privacy rights are, in effect, decision rights: they confer an entitlement to choose where on the spectrum between complete privacy and total transparency people should lie. Surveillance capitalism has allowed large companies to exercise more and more control over these kinds of decisions. They collect the information and they decide what to do with it.

That said, Zuboff thinks people may be waking up to the reality of this Faustian pact. In the aftermath of the Snowden leak, and other data-related scandals, people have become more sensitive to the loss of privacy. Legal regimes (particularly in Europe) seem to be resisting the redistribution of privacy rights. And some companies (like Apple in recent times) seem to be positioning themselves as pro-privacy.


4. Continual Experimentation
The final feature of surveillance capitalism is perhaps the most novel. It is the fact that technological infrastructure allows for continual experimentation and intervention into the lives of its users. It is easy to test different digital services using control groups. This is due to the information collected from user profiles, geographical locations, and so on. There are some famous examples of this too. Facebook’s attempt to manipulate the moods of its users being the most widely-known and discussed.

Varian argues that continual experimentation of this sort is necessary. Most methods of big data analytics do not allow companies to work out relationships of cause and effect. Instead, they only allow them to identify correlational patterns. Experimental intervention is needed in order to tease apart the causal relationships. This information is useful to companies in their effort to personalise, customise and generally improve the services they are offering.

Zuboff gets a little bit mystical at this stage in her analysis. She argues that this sort of continual intervention and experimentation gives rise to reality mining. This is distinct from data-mining. With continual experimentation, all the objects, persons and events in the real world can be captured and altered by the technological infrastructure. Indeed, the distinction between the infrastructure and the external world starts to breakdown. As she puts it herself:

Data about the behaviors of bodies, minds and things take their place in a universal real-time dynamic index of smart objects within an infinite global domain of wired things. This new phenomenon produces the possibility of modifying the behaviors of persons and things for profit and control. In the logic of surveillance capitalism there are no individuals, only the world-spanning organism and all the tiniest elements within it. 
(Zuboff 2015, 85)

I’m not sure what Zuboff means by an ‘infinite domain of wired things’. But setting that aside, it seems to me that, in this quote, with its mention of the “world-spanning organism”, Zuboff is claiming that the apotheosis of surveillance capitalism is the construction of a Borg-like society, i.e. a single collective organism that consumes reality with its technological appendages. The possibility and desirability of such a society is something I discussed in an earlier post.


5. Conclusion
To sum up, Zuboff thinks that there are four key structural features to surveillance capitalism. These four features constitute its internal logic. Each of the features has important social and political implications.

The first feature is the trend toward ever-greater levels of data extraction and analysis. The goal of companies like Google is to extract as much data from you as possible and convert it into a commodity that can be bought and sold. This extractive relationship is asymmetrical and devoid of the mutual interdependencies that characterised 20th century corporations like General Motors.

The second feature is the possibility of new forms of contractual monitoring and enforcement. The infrastructure of surveillance capitalism allows for contracts to be monitored and enforced in real-time, without the need for legal recourse. This would constitute a radical break with the classic liberal model of contractual relationship. There would be no need for trust, solidarity and rule of law.

The third feature is the desire to personalise and customise digital services, based on the data being extracted from users. Though there may be some benefits to these personal services, the infrastructure that enables them has facilitated a considerable redistribution of privacy rights from ordinary citizens to surveillance capitalist firms like Google and Facebook.

The fourth, and final feature, is the capacity for continual experimentation and intervention into the lives of the service users. This gives rise to what Zuboff calls reality-mining, which in its most extreme form will lead to the construction of a ‘world-spanning organism’.

Tuesday, June 23, 2015

Drunken Consent to Sex and Personal Responsibility




(Previous entry)

This post is part of an ongoing series on the ethics of intoxicated consent to sexual relations. The series is working its way through the arguments from Alan Wertheimer’s work on this topic.

In the previous entry, I looked at something called the ‘responsibility claim’. According to this claim, one ought to be held responsible for actions one performs whilst voluntarily intoxicated. This claim is widely accepted, and indeed forms the basis for the legal system’s attitude toward criminal responsibility and voluntary intoxication. There are many potential arguments in its favour, several of which were reviewed in the previous entry. We won’t go through them again. Instead, we’ll simply assume that the responsibility claim is correct and go on to assess its implications for intoxicated consent to sexual relations. This means we are looking for an answer to the question: if you are responsible for actions performed whilst voluntarily intoxicated (including actions like killing or raping another person) does it thereby follow that your consent to sex whilst voluntarily intoxicated is valid?

We will look at two arguments in this post. The first, from Heidi Hurd, argues that if we accept the responsibility claim, then we ought to accept that intoxicated consent is valid. To do otherwise would be inconsistent. The second, from Susan Estrich, argues that Hurd is wrong since we never hold victims of crime responsible for what happens to them whilst drunk. Wertheimer thinks that both arguments are mistaken and that a more nuanced approach to the implications of the responsibility claim is required. We won’t get to his personal opinion today, but we will cover his criticisms of Hurd and Estrich.


1. Hurd’s Argument: Intoxicated Consent can be Valid
When considering the implications of the responsibility claim, it is tempting to adopt an analogical mode of reasoning. This involves imagining a situation in which someone is drunk and is/is not held responsible for what they did, and then reasoning from this case to the case of intoxicated consent to sex. The analogical mode makes sense given the nature of the responsibility claim. As noted the last day, the responsibility claim is not an ironclad and exceptionless rule. It merely states that one can be (and often is) held responsible for one’s drunken acts; this does not exclude the possibility of certain exceptions to this rule. Given the non-absolute nature of the responsibility claim, it makes sense to work our way through a range of representative and analogous cases in order to work out its implications for the consent case. Little surprise then that both Hurd and Estrich adopt this analogical mode of reasoning.

Hurd’s analogy is the most direct. She focuses on cases in which a drunken man and a drunken woman have sex. She asks us first to imagine a case in which a drunken man has sex with a woman who does not signal consent; she then asks us to imagine a case in which a drunken woman does signal consent to the sex. She then poses the question: how could it be that the man would be held criminally responsible for raping the woman in the first case, and that woman’s intoxicated consent is declared invalid in the second? Her position is neatly summed up in the following quote:

…we should be loathe to suggest that the conditions of responsibility vary among actors, so that the drunken man, who has sex with a woman he knows is not consenting is responsible for rape, while the drunken woman who invites sex is not sufficiently responsible to make such sex consensual. 
(Hurd 1996, p 141)

To put this argument in slightly more formal terms:


  • (1) If a voluntarily intoxicated man has sexual intercourse with a woman who does not signal consent, he is criminally responsible for rape. (call this Case A)

  • (2) A voluntarily intoxicated woman who consents to sex is like the voluntarily intoxicated man in Case A in all morally important respects.

  • (3) Therefore, the consent of a voluntarily intoxicated woman is valid.



Analogical arguments of this sort are never logically watertight. The conclusion only follows on a defeasible and probabilistic basis. The argument depends entirely on the strength of the analogy, i.e. how morally similar are the two cases? Hurd thinks they are pretty similar because the degree of moral accountability faced by the man is quite high. Why shouldn’t the same be true for the woman?

Wertheimer thinks that Hurd’s argument is much too quick. He thinks there are two major problems with it. The first is that she fails to appreciate the different sorts of capacities that are required for responsibility vis-a-vis valid consent. It is generally true to say that responsibility tracks capacity. That is, in order to be responsible for X you must have the mental and physical capacity to do X. In the criminal law, the kinds of mental capacities that are singled out for responsibility are quite low. In order to be held criminally responsible for someone’s death you must either intend their death or serious injury, or be reckless with respect to their deaths. Unless an intoxicated person lacks consciousness, it is relatively easy for them to have such mental capacities. The same is true for rape, where the requisite mental capacity is the intention to sexually penetrate another human being. It is very difficult to see how anything short of severe intoxication could impair this capacity (though it is possible to imagine scenarios in which penetration occurred but was not intentional). You could reject the criminal law’s position on all this and argue that higher capacities are required, but if you don’t reject the legal position then the problem is that consent seems like really does require higher mental capacities. As Wertheimer points out, responsibility concerns how we should respond to what an agent has done; consent concerns what it is morally permissible for us to do to that agent. It seems plausible to suggest that the the ‘transformations [brought about by consent] require a deeper expression of the agent’s will than the intentions required for culpability for wrongdoing’ (Wertheimer 2000, 387).

The second problem with Hurd’s argument is that it fails to identify the limitations of ascribing responsibility to a particular agent. In saying that a person is responsible for some particular act (X), one is not committed to saying that the person is responsible for all the consequences of X (i.e. for bearing all the moral burdens associated with the act). To use a simple analogy, if I choose to go cycling without a helmet, I assume a certain risk of being in an accident. But it does not follow that I should necessarily bear all the costs associated with an accident, should one occur. That cost is likely to be borne socially, by either a governmental or private insurance fund, because that is a more appropriate way of distributing the associated burden. The same might be true in the case of intoxicated decisions to consent to sex. The agent might be responsible for some of her intoxicated behaviour, but not for all the consequences of her consent.


2. Estrich’s Argument: Intoxicated Consent may not be Valid
We move on then to consider Estrich’s opposing argument. This argument holds that the responsibility claim does not entail the validity of intoxicated consent. In making this argument, Estrich relies on analogies that are, in my experience, extremely common in the debate about consent and intoxication. She also uses these analogies to directly engage with the issue of distributing moral burdens associated with particular kinds of activities.

She points out that we don’t always hold the victims of other sorts of crimes morally accountable for getting themselves into a position where it was more likely for those crimes to occur. Instead, we resolutely impose moral accountability on those who carry out the crimes. She thinks it follows from this that we shouldn’t leap to the conclusion that someone who signals consent whilst voluntarily intoxicated is morally accountable for that consent. She gives the following examples to illustrate her point:

[we would not impose the risk burden on] people who walk alone on dangerous streets at night and get mugged or people who forget to lock their cars or leave the back windows of their houses wide open. 
(Estrich 1992, 10)

The analogies can be made even stronger. I would argue that we wouldn’t impose the moral burden on such people even if they were voluntarily intoxicated at the time. I could walk down a dangerous street whilst voluntarily intoxicated, but that wouldn’t mean that I wasn’t being criminally assaulted if I got beaten up by a group of thugs when I did. Why shouldn’t we adopt a similar approach in the case of intoxicated consent?

To put this in slightly more formal terms:


  • (4) People who perform actions that raise the risk of their being victims of crime (whilst voluntarily intoxicated) do not necessarily bear the moral burdens associated with those crimes (e.g. people who walk down dangerous alleyways or who forget to lock their cars are not responsible if they are mugged or robbed); the criminals bear the moral burden.

  • (5) The woman who consents whilst voluntarily intoxicated is like (or might be like) the victims of crime in these cases in all morally important respects.

  • (6) Therefore, the woman may not necessarily bear the moral burden associated with her intoxicated consent.


There is some appeal to this argument. It echoes the strong anti-victim blaming arguments one finds elsewhere in the literature on sexual assault. To take an obvious example, we (rightly) would not say that a woman who wore a revealing skirt should shoulder some of the moral burden associated with her sexual assault, even if it was true that wearing such a skirt raised the probability of her being sexually assaulted.

Still, there are problems with the argument. These can be detected in the slightly equivocal expression of premise (2). This expression is mine, not Estrich’s or Wertheimer’s, but it reveals a certain weakness in the case that Estrich is trying to make. To understand this weakness, you have to bear in mind two things. First, throughout this series of posts we are imagining cases in which a woman clearly signals consent to sexual relations whilst voluntarily intoxicated; not simply cases in which women are victims of sexual assault whilst voluntarily intoxicated. The latter sort of cases are, no doubt, common, but they are very different from the former because they may not involve any signal of consent. To put it more pithily, we are imagining cases in which a woman gets drunk, signals consent to sex, and engages in sex; we are not imagining cases in which a woman gets drunk and then someone engages in sexual activity with her without her consent. The second thing we need to bear in mind is the ‘moral magic’ of consent. Consent, if valid, transforms an impermissible act into a permissible one. Thus, determining whether or not valid consent is present always changes our moral interpretation of a given scenario.

These two things suffice to block the analogies upon which Estrich seeks to rely. In her imagined cases, the people really are victims of crime. There is no ambiguity or uncertainty about it. If I walk down the dangerous alleyway, whilst intoxicated, and someone physically attacks me, then I am a victim of crime. The physical attack would be criminal irrespective of whether I was drunk at the time or whether I foolishly assumed the risk associated with walking down that alleyway. This is very different from the intoxicated consent scenario. There is ambiguity and uncertainty in these cases. If the consent is valid, then the act is not criminal; if it is not valid, then it is criminal. The moral interpretation of the case varies dramatically depending on which is true.

To sum up, neither Hurd’s nor Estrich’s argument from analogy settles the matter with respect to the implications of the responsibility claim. Hurd is wrong to suppose that responsibility for criminal activity whilst voluntarily intoxicated entails the validity of consent whilst voluntarily intoxicated. The sorts of capacities required for valid consent seem like they might be higher than the capacities required for responsibility, and hence voluntary intoxication might affect the former but not the latter. Similarly, Estrich is wrong to suppose that an analogy can be drawn between cases in which someone is a clearcut victim of crime (whilst voluntarily intoxicated) and cases in which the moral status of intoxicated consent is in issue.