tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post143772493466419139..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: The Frankfurt Counterexample Defended - NucciJohn Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-57528867480439094312018-09-14T10:55:40.427+01:002018-09-14T10:55:40.427+01:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08430403610243814980noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-32515408748900692812011-04-15T17:57:04.270+01:002011-04-15T17:57:04.270+01:00Also my choice would have to be the deciding facto...Also my choice would have to be the deciding factor for this outcome to come about.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08211165934207198843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-15865583587962490102011-04-15T17:55:37.440+01:002011-04-15T17:55:37.440+01:00I don't think 8 holds in the argument. To be a...I don't think 8 holds in the argument. To be able to do otherwise seems like an ability to <i>choose</i> to do otherwise. I'm responsible for the outcome if my choice does in fact lead to whatever outcome I've chosen.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08211165934207198843noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-38236699132316929392011-04-14T22:06:57.754+01:002011-04-14T22:06:57.754+01:00Hi Robert,
I'm pretty ambivalent about Nucci&...Hi Robert,<br /><br />I'm pretty ambivalent about Nucci's paper, but it was short and easy to summarise.<br /><br />The objection your making (and have made in the past) is a general one, of course. All Frankfurt counterexamples rely on the presence of a counterfactual intervener to prevent some morally significant alternative possibility from arising. The problem is that this still allows for some kinds of alternative possibilities to arise prior to the activation of the counterfactual intervener.<br /><br />It is possible then to claim that pre-intervention deviations from the actual sequence could ground the intuition of moral responsibility in the case as described.<br /><br />To overcome your objection you'd have to construct an example which precluded all alternative possibilities and which still suggested the agent was morally responsible. I'm not sure if that's possible, but there's a pretty good paper from David Hunt that tries to do it (unfortunately, it's too long for me to summarise on the blog right now and it's pretty intricate):<br /><br />David Hunt "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action" (2000) <i> Philosophical Studies </i> 97: 195<br /><br />And another (somewhat related) one by Stephen Kearns which argues people can be responsible for necessary truths (which I confess I haven't read properly yet):<br /><br />Kearns "Responsibility for Necessities" (2010) <i> Philosophical Studies </i> Online First (maybe published by now, not sure).<br /><br />You can get those through SpringerLink (maybe elsewhere) if your university has a subscription. If not you can email me. I'll make my address available via my "complete profile" page for a couple of days.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-28335529230161146082011-04-14T20:24:38.788+01:002011-04-14T20:24:38.788+01:00Thanks as usual for finding interesting articles, ...Thanks as usual for finding interesting articles, John. Unfortunately, I can't get Analysis without paying for it, so I haven't read the actual article.<br /><br />There seems to me to be a big problem with the following:<br />"Avoiding to kill Smith implies that it is somehow up to Jones whether or not Smith is killed."<br /><br />Suppose I am driving on the road and a squirrel runs in front of the car. I swerve to avoid running it over. This does not by any means determine whether or not the squirrel gets run over: it could be run over by the next car, or the next, .... But I have avoided that the squirrel was killed <i>by me.</i><br /><br />Likewise, in the counterfactual scenario, the relevant factor should be whether Smith was killed <i>by Jones.</i> Whether or not Smith was killed by Black in control of Jones's body, or by a heart attack, or by lightning, seems totally irrelevant.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.com