tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post2915237799751955699..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: Does Consciousness Matter from an Ethical Perspective? John Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-63147282033835827222023-05-14T14:14:01.308+01:002023-05-14T14:14:01.308+01:00Your question boils down to the main political qu...Your question boils down to the main political question in times like this.: either affirmation or negation of metaphysical realms. (PC). How about considering convergence between PC and AC into a vector force, versus AC linear force. Isn't vector force always slower and less rewarding in terms of vivid and more reach access memory? Perhaps it is, because it takes more factors into consideration while shaping output. And we did not even touch ethics yet. Jelena Todorovic Clementehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14473464332370727753noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-44451492861703344722019-04-12T14:21:01.778+01:002019-04-12T14:21:01.778+01:00I agree that PC may not be necessary for personhoo...I agree that PC may not be necessary for personhood, but I think that's somewhat from whether it is sufficient for moral standing (and/or very important for moral standing). Also, I have no idea whether PC is possible in the absence of AC or vice versa: it seems conceivable to me that they could be separable, but maybe this is one of those things that isn't really conceivable at all (maybe philosophers are just deluding themselves that they have reliable intuitions/imaginings about this)<br /><br />From your argument above though, I think P3 is the one that sits least well with me. What warrants the claim that vivid access consciousness is "experientially equivalent" to PC for some?John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-8433102203355428092019-04-11T10:45:34.627+01:002019-04-11T10:45:34.627+01:00Yes, as an attempt at a reductio wrt phenomenal co...Yes, as an attempt at a reductio wrt phenomenal consciousness and<br />Siewert's wager.<br /><br />P1a. One must be sentient to have some kind of moral standing.<br />P1b. Minimally, one must be able to suffer.<br />P2. Suffering requires phenomenal consciousness (PC).<br /><br />C1. PC is a key feature of personhood.<br /><br />P3. Vivid access consciousness (memory, imagination) is<br />experientially equivalent to (indistinguishable from) PC for<br />some human, by all accounts.<br />P4. For other humans, similar mental function is present<br />but as a less vivid access consciousness.<br />P5. Focal loss of the capacity for such experiences due to neurological<br />diseases does occur, without effects on other facets of conscious experience.<br />(Affected individuals notice the effect, and find it annoying and<br />a loss of function).<br /><br />C2: Access and phenomenal consciousness can be<br />functionally interchangeable in *particular* domains between<br />persons. I think this is stronger than for perceptual faculties<br />eg cortical blindness (v blindsight).<br /><br />C3: By a stepwise replacement model, it seems plausible to me that we can now<br />posit being a *person* with no phenomenal experiences. Say, for example,<br />this person accesses visual information about the world only via working<br />or short term memory. Hey, isn't that all of us absent-minded people<br />;)? Maybe PC is incoherent? At the very least, C1 seems contestable.<br /><br />Consider suffering due to acute tissue injury, psychogenic pain, and anticipated pain, and types of consciousness in each case.<br />David Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-31949109993846253352019-04-10T22:39:21.382+01:002019-04-10T22:39:21.382+01:00Levy draws explicit links between his view and Fre...Levy draws explicit links between his view and Freud in the paper so I think that's a good point. <br /><br />I'm not sure I follow the second point though. Is the idea that your phenomenal experiences are somehow richer and more detailed than mine, but the mere fact that they are richer and more detailed than mine doesn't make a difference when it comes to our moral standing? Or am I misunderstanding?John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-14231211405989085212019-04-10T12:24:19.806+01:002019-04-10T12:24:19.806+01:00I'm not the only person who has trouble with t...I'm not the only person who has trouble with the very idea of a p-zombie, and I don't think it does much work here. Ever since Freud we have had no problem with people acting for unconscious reasons - blameworthiness (very much related to standing) requires some kind of "access". <br /><br />More generally, if I have an eidetic memory or strong powers of visualisation, so that my recollections have a phenomenal quality that yours lack, I don't think we can make much of such a common inter-individual difference.<br />David Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.com