tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post4693233098553555854..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: On Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (Part Three)John Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-18927033080398733462018-09-14T10:51:41.895+01:002018-09-14T10:51:41.895+01:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08430403610243814980noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-13299027452026479372011-05-03T08:41:43.665+01:002011-05-03T08:41:43.665+01:00Sounds like an interesting thesis. I do hope to re...Sounds like an interesting thesis. I do hope to read a good account of this sort one day. <br /><br />My fear with game-theoretic accounts is that they're too abstract. They might show us an abstract pattern most intelligent creatures will approach, but they (at least at the level I considered them) neglect the fact that all intelligent creatures aren't at this optimum peak, they're somewhere below that. And that, of course, includes us. They are a kind of eschatology of morality, rather than morality, in my opinion - saying where morality will end up, rather than where it is. <br /><br />Still, I'd like to read a good account in this vein.<br /><br />I do think the metaethical categories can be a bit confusing and unhelpful at times. Is the above position natural realism, or non-natural... well, as long as it's understood, it doesn't really matter now does it? <br /><br />As for my non-Platonism and EDA - the concern is that the foundation of thought, logic, remains unfounded. While one does not assume that logic <i>exists</i> in the world, one has to assume logic in order to <i>talk</i> about the world. This is not the only direction of thought that leads to this conclusion, but it's still a disturbing realization.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-9400650160666684872011-05-01T14:25:41.212+01:002011-05-01T14:25:41.212+01:00Interestingly enough, I made a similar argument ab...Interestingly enough, I made a similar argument about how game theoretic considerations could be used to support a form of non-natural moral realism in my PhD thesis. I did so on the grounds that there was some similarity between mathematically defined equilibria and the mind-independent moral entities that realists typically believe in (especially if you subscribe to Platonism, which I know you do not - incidentally, if you are not a Platonist about math and logic, should you be concerned by evolutionary debunking arguments?).<br /><br />On reflection though, I think might have confused different forms of realism when I made that argument. Non-natural realists usually believe moral entities cannot be reduced to any other type of entity, and I worry that my argument might be seen to reduce the moral to the mathematical. Still, I hold out some hope that naturalistic realists might be open to that kind of argument.<br /><br />I still prefer using game theory from within a constructivist metaethics. Depending on the liberality of your assumptions (as you point out), I think you can argue for the existence of some pretty robust moral truths (ones that hold across a number of possible worlds) like Fairness.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-74576602156409940502011-05-01T13:07:51.222+01:002011-05-01T13:07:51.222+01:00The most interesting EDA are in regards to epistem...The most interesting EDA are in regards to epistemic norms. In a sense they are trivial in that it's relatively easy to become convinced that evolution tracks e.g. logic. But they underlie the deep presuppositional nature of our reasoning. So I still find them disturbing.<br /><br />As regards to moral norms, I still maintain a glimmer of hope that RE would converge to some game-theoretic optimum given fairly liberal assumptions. For example, it may be possible to argue that the sense of Fairness would evolve in any sufficiently intelligent social species out of ecological considerations (biological similarity between breeding individuals, co-dependence...) and game-theory, and that this would determine the RE as some form of utilitarianism. I'm not sure how correct that is, but I think it is a (moral-realist?) position that cannot be easily written off.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-55663675845534116262011-04-29T21:56:11.844+01:002011-04-29T21:56:11.844+01:00Yes.
Thanks for pointing that out.Yes.<br /><br />Thanks for pointing that out.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-22054665686941648772011-04-29T21:13:38.157+01:002011-04-29T21:13:38.157+01:00"Someone wishing to make this response would ..."Someone wishing to make this response would need to argue that evolutionary processes really do track moral truth (see here for a version of that response)"<br /><br />I guess you forgot to attach the link.Bogdanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15449119709471870254noreply@blogger.com