tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post494082636632090251..comments2024-03-28T05:47:54.177+00:00Comments on Philosophical Disquisitions: Vincent on the Responsibility-Liability GapJohn Danaherhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-9520283319589950362012-01-27T23:04:27.048+00:002012-01-27T23:04:27.048+00:00Yes, it just expands one of the "clinical con...Yes, it just expands one of the "clinical considerations" Vincent discusses (p 43) to show it contains a concept of prospective virtue responsibility ;), one that extends forward into the arena of future actions (will X act responsibly in the future?). It is also "complicated" and "intertwining" to assess this.<br /><br />Looking over Vincent again, I was also thinking about proportionality. If another individual W had caused X's misfortune, we expect restitution by, and/or punishment of, that individual according to our usual concepts of justice. But we restrain punishment to what is proportional, and restitution to what is possible (insurance etc). Surely if we think Ronald is responsible for his current state, the same considerations should guide our treatment of him. This is all being argued without the comparison with Richard.David Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-11350499150153352522012-01-27T12:16:34.552+00:002012-01-27T12:16:34.552+00:00Ah I see. So the idea is that responsibility is ba...Ah I see. So the idea is that responsibility is basically irrelevant to distributive issues, at least in the sense that responsibility claims don't entail anything in particular about distributive claims. <br /><br />Instead, utilitarian principles decide who is entitled to what, but the fact that X was responsible for something in the past has evidential weight in deciding on the most efficient distribution of resources.John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-41555148197267968862012-01-27T08:29:33.660+00:002012-01-27T08:29:33.660+00:00Well the setup, as I understood it, was the state ...Well the setup, as I understood it, was the state has to allocate scarce resources to one of two individuals who have a some kind of a right to health care or financial assistance. If we argue that liability responsibility is irrelevant to these rights, a straight utilitarian argument might be that we will allocate the resources to the individual where there is the greatest probability it will do long term good. If we know one individual has previously self harmed (acted immorally), it is prudent to treat the individual who is less likely to undo the effects of our intervention.<br /><br />After noticing various problems with my original post, I also considered this viewpoint:<br /><br />Ronald was responsible for his outcome (we argue only he is affected by his immoral behaviour), and has been punished for his action by developing cancer or going broke. He has thus discharged his liability. Richard, by contrast, has suffered undeservedly. If his illness/ruin was due to the actions of another person, we would have argued that person has liability responsibility. I have an intuition that he is *owed* something (an anti-liability): the state in this case can step in. (Insert joke about undeserving poor and middle class morality here).David Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-68680393548396426622012-01-26T16:56:02.252+00:002012-01-26T16:56:02.252+00:00But you'd have to add more, wouldn't you:
...But you'd have to add more, wouldn't you:<br /><br />(5) If X is likely to repeat A, then X ought to be liable (to someone?) for A.<br /><br />Is that what you have in mind?John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-64246104775418825772012-01-26T11:38:57.444+00:002012-01-26T11:38:57.444+00:00The use of the term liability seems to imply a dut...The use of the term liability seems to imply a duty of restitution by R., and if so who else but to the party injured by his behaviour. Alternatively, he is to be punished twice, once by his own actions, and then by society? In current medical practice, the only criterion in these matters is re future action eg will not continue or resume smoking after therapy, will restrict diet rather than stretch a gastroplasty in the case of morbid obesity, will undertake not to gamble away further money. Repeated failures will then lead to one falling down the list, as less likely to benefit from the intervention.<br /><br />I suppose one could argue then that<br /><br />(4) Since X is outcome responsible for A, then X is likely to repeat XDavid Duffyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12142997170025811780noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-76702747033940812112012-01-25T17:15:28.069+00:002012-01-25T17:15:28.069+00:00You certainly can. Cheers. I enjoyed writing it so...You certainly can. Cheers. I enjoyed writing it so I hope you can enjoy it too. (Perhaps, though, this comment was left on the wrong post?)John Danaherhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06761686258507859309noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1780806945960886534.post-48752671827267466212012-01-24T10:03:38.838+00:002012-01-24T10:03:38.838+00:00Can I just write, kudos on the the Kobayashi Maru ...Can I just write, kudos on the the Kobayashi Maru analgoy.mpghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00445199879510273357noreply@blogger.com