Did God Command Genocide? (Part 2) Copan's Casuistry

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This post is part of my series on Wes Morriston's discussions of theistic morality. For an index, see here.

I am currently working my way through an article entitled "Did God Command Genocide? A Challenge to the Biblical Inerrantist".

In Part 1, I sketched the broad outline of Morriston's argument. What it boils down to is this: if God commanded genocide -- as he apparently did according to Deuteronomy -- then he needs to have had morally sufficient reasons for doing so. It is unlikely that he had such reasons. Therefore, the bible cannot be an accurate representation of what God said.

As noted in Part 1, the key for the inerrantist is to provide some moral justification of what God did that takes account of what is actually said in the bible.

In this post, we take a look at one such attempt from the Christian philosopher Paul Copan.


The Cultural Milieu
At the outset it must be acknowledged that Copan's discussion is not a response to Morriston's argument but a more general response to the arguments of the New Atheists.

The NAs relish pointing out the moral atrocities that are apparently condoned by Yahweh in the Old Testament. These atrocities seem to undermine the idea that Christians occupy the moral high ground. So you can see the attraction.

Copan tries to defend Yahweh. One of his key arguments is that any moral judgement we may wish to issue must take into account the socio-cultural milieu of the ancient near east (ANE). The ANE had very different, almost brutal, moral standards. It was, after all, a fallen world.

Yahweh and the Mosaic laws offered incremental moral improvement over what was common in the ANE. God was working with the available raw material in a way that respected human freedom and took the first steps on the path to the ethical ideal represented by Jesus.

Now questions arise as to why God would choose to do things in this incremental fashion, and as to whether Copan has got the cultural milieu of the ANE right, but we can leave these to one side. The historical relativism promoted by Copan still would not justify God's commanding of genocide. It would not give us the morally sufficient reasons we are looking for. Something more is required.


Copan's Justification
To his credit, Copan rises to the task. But he proffers a somewhat mixed argumentative strategy. He presents four lines of evidence that might justify the command:

1. The Canaanite religion was incorrigibly wicked, it had to be wiped out.
2. The language of Deuteronomy seems to tacitly presume that the Canaanites will be around in the future.
3. The "utter destruction" language is clearly hyperbolic since the text of Joshua assumes some Canaanites will survive.
4. God, as the author of life, does not stand in the same moral relation to human beings as we do to each other. He does not owe us our lives; he can take them away if he wishes. He can do this directly (by his own actions) or indirectly (by commanding the actions of others).

(2) and (3) are clearly designed to downplay the genocide and so target P3 from Morriston's original argument. They are not successful because they simply ignore the clear command for genocide.

(1) and (4) seem like more straightforward moral justifications of God's command. Now, even if God has the right to take away life, as (4) is suggesting, surely he cannot take it away capriciously? He must have some reason for doing so. Thus we are left with (1): the idea that the Canaanites were so wicked that they had to be eradicated.

This seems to be the most popular line among biblical inerrantists. It is often coupled with the idea that the Holy Land needed to be purified for the Jews.

But why is genocide the only way to get rid of a wicked religion? Why not use the method of rational persuasion? Surely God would not use an inefficient and brutal method where a more subtle and human one was available?

These questions, rhetorical as they are, seem to force the inerrantist to defend the indefensible. One shocking manifestation of this comes from Copan's justification for the slaughter of the Canaanite children. Consider the following quote:

What then of the children? Death would be a misery, as they would be ushered into the presence of God and spared the corrupting influences of a morally decadent culture.

This would appear the apologetics at its worst. Indeed, after the passage just quoted, Copan goes on to justify other killings as a form of necessary "collateral damage".

If any of this is going to work, then it must be shown that the Canaanite religion was irredeemably wicked, to such an extent that genocide was the only option for its eradication. That is a proposition that will be explored in future entries.

Did God Command Genocide? (Part 1) The Problem

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This post is part of my series on Wes Morriston's works on theistic morality. For an index, see here.

Over the next few posts I want to cover the following article by Morriston:

"Did God Command Genocide? A Challenge to the Biblical Inerrantist" (2009) 11 Philosophia Christi 7-26

This article presents a fairly compelling argument against the doctrine of biblical inerrancy by focusing on the genocidal passages in the Old Testament.

In this post, I will introduce the broad outline of Morriston's argument, sketching its form and its dialectical context.


The Genocide Passages?
There are many morally questionable commands from Yahweh in the Old Testament, but Morriston focuses his attention on certain parts of the Exodus-Deuteronomy story. After fleeing from Egypt, procrastinating in the Sinai and finally entering Israel, God commanded (through Moses) the genocide of the Canaanites. He said:

You must utterly destroy them; you shall make no covenant with them; and show no mercy to them (Deut. 7:1-2 RSV)

...in the cities that the Lord your God gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive nothing that breathes (Deut. 20:16 RSV)

This seems to be a pretty clear case of God signing a blank cheque for genocide.


The Argument
Morriston argues that this passage presents a series problem to the biblical inerrantist. Genocide is probably the greatest moral offence that we know of: to systematically attempt to wipe out an entire people/culture/race/ethnicity without any concern for individual differences is an abomination.

That God would command such a thing is unthinkable, unless he had exceptional reasons for doing so. But going on the biblical texts, he did not have exceptional reasons. Thus, it is more than likely that the human authors of the bible got it wrong.

The argument can be stated formally as follows (this is a slight reworking of the version found in Morriston's article - I've added a premise in the interests of clarity):

• P1. God exists and is morally perfect.
• P2. Genocide is morally wrong, unless there are exceptional countervailing moral concerns.
• C1. So God would not command genocide unless he had morally sufficient reasons for doing so.
• P3. According to the OT, God commanded genocide.
• P4. It is highly unlikely that God has morally sufficient reasons for commanding genocide.
• C2. So it is highly unlikely that the OT is inerrant.

Morriston suggests that P1, P2 and P3 would not be denied by an inerrantist. Consequently, P4 is where the rubber may fail to hit the road. The inerrantist will have to argue that God had morally sufficient reasons for commanding the genocide.

The argument is illustrated below. This will provide an illustrative framework for the remainder of the discussion.

The Dialectical Context
In arguing that God had morally sufficient reasons for the Canaanite genocide, the inerrantist faces certain dialectical restrictions.

First of all, it is not open to them to make the standard skeptical theist hand-waving argument: "God is wholly other, beyond all human comprehension; just because we cannot find a morally sufficient reason for his actions does not mean that morally sufficient reasons do not exist."

The reason that this move is barred is straightforward: we must contend with the actual biblical setting of the Canaanite genocide. We must ask whether it is at all likely that in the circumstances described god had sufficient reason for commanding genocide. We cannot appeal to some vague possibility of sufficient reason.

Furthermore, many reasons for the genocide are actually offered in the bible. So we must ask whether these reasons are sufficient warrant for the command of genocide.

David Hume on Religion (Part 5): Natural Belief

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This post is part of my series on David Hume's critique of religion. For an index, see here. The series works off an article by J.C.A. Gaskin in the Cambridge Companion to Hume.


In previous entries, I have covered Hume's attack on the intellectual foundations of religious belief. In Part 2, we saw how Hume seriously challenged the cornerstone of natural theology, namely: the argument from design. In Part 3, we saw how he damaged the credibility of revelation. And in Part 4, we examined his argument concerning the religious perversion of morality.

After all this, the obvious question arises: why, if it rests on such shaky grounds, does religious belief exist in the first place? And why does it persist in the face of rational criticism? Hume was interested in both questions.

Gaskin limits himself to the second of these questions and discusses how Hume's attack on religion may have given succor to modern-day "Basic Belief" epistemology.

Hume the Fideist
Hume ends his discussion of miracles with the following enigmatic comment:

Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of [the veracity of Christianity]: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

This comment could easily be interpreted as a form of "prudential irony". Hume frequently employed this device: he would mount an attack of religious belief only to follow it up with a profession of piety. So perhaps we should not read into it too much.

But there are those who disagree; who say that, if we look at Hume's sceptical philosophy as a whole, this statement is an endorsement of fideism. That is, the idea that belief in God is unassailable by reason; that it is somehow natural or basic ("natural" is the phrase used by Hume scholars; "basic" is associated with the Plantinga school).


What is a Natural Belief?
Hume did not use the term "natural belief" himself. It is something that has been read back into his work by Humean scholars. The reason is that, despite his relentless assault on all aspects of philosophy, Hume seemed to concede that certain beliefs were unavoidable, such as belief in an external world or belief in other minds.

To be more precise, Humean scholars identify three criteria shared by all natural beliefs:

1. They are prior to any process of reasoning and are not long dislodged by critical argument.
2. They are indispensable presuppositions of knowledge and conduct. That is, we cannot proceed in any inquiry or activity without supposing them.
3. These beliefs are universal, shared by all cultures.

Take the example of belief in an external world. Does this match all three criteria? Would it be really impossible to live without belief in an external world?

An anecdote might make the point. Bertrand Russell once recounted a story concerning a letter he received from a solipsist. She wrote that her position was rationally unassailable and that she couldn't understand why there weren't more solipsists!

Well, I am sure we can agree that in this instance there is something radically inconsistent in this person's system of beliefs. Clearly she does believe in the external world, although she is trying to deny it.

God Belief as Natural Belief

Many religious believers have tried to apply this idea to belief in God. They often proceed by using the analogy with belief in an external world or belief in other minds. Perhaps the most famous attempt to do this was by Alvin Plantinga, whose work I have discussed before.

But does belief in God really satisfy the three criteria outlined above? Well, it is certainly possible to dislodge belief in god with sceptical argument, many atheists are testament to this fact. This applies mutatis mutandis to the idea that belief in God is universal. So the argument must be that belief in God is indispensable.

There are certainly those who would argue this. They might say that God-belief is essential in order for morality to have any motivational power; or in order to make sense of the world; or in order for life to have ultimate purpose. The problem with this is that it falls back on arguments that Hume has already dismissed.

Gaskin thinks it pretty obvious that Hume would not endorse this idea of natural belief in God. The analogy with belief in an external world or belief in other minds simply does not hold up.

David Hume on Religion (Part 4): The Perversion of Morality

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This post is part of my series on Hume's critique of religion. For an index, see here. The series works off an article by J.C.A. Gaskin in the Cambridge Companion to Hume.

In this post I will take a look at Hume's views on morality and religion. The take-home message is straightforward: Hume thinks that religion invariably distorts and perverts our natural moral sentiments. There is much to unpack in that message, so let's start unpacking.

Natural Sympathy and Moral Obligation
The first step in Hume's argument is the development of a reasonably coherent account of morality that is devoid of religious content. Hume bases this account on "sympathy", which is the human ability to feel and understand the pain, suffering, joy and elation of other human beings.

Because we share a reasonably common nature, we have certain common responses to the actions of others: we dislike actions that induce misery and like actions that increase happiness. So some actions meet with common approval and some meet with common disapproval.


Common approval and disapproval are, for Hume, the basis of natural moral discriminations. Moral rules are thus sourced in human nature and not in some supernatural force.

But maybe the religious person could argue that even if morality has its basis in the happiness of human beings, we need religious belief to make the commitment to moral rules motivationally salient. Without such belief, we will always be tempted to act in a self-regarding and unsympathetic manner. In effect, this person is arguing that religion must be the source of moral obligation.

Hume disagrees. His account of natural moral obligation is quite unique in secular philosophy and is located in sections 9.14-15 of the second Enquiry. His main point, which many will be familiar with, is that "passion" or emotion is the only source of obligation. This is because passion is the only thing that can motivate us ("reason is the slave of the passions").

Living is society with others, there are certain interests that press upon our passions and motivate us to do good. These include: (i) self-interest in doing to others what we would like them to do to us; (ii) a desire to be well-thought of by others; and (iii) desire for "inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity [and] a satisfactory review of our own conduct."

A better account of Hume's moral theory could be made (I may return to it someday), but that will suffice for now because the goal here is to show how religion corrupts our natural morality.

The Religious Perversion of Morality
Hume consistently equivocates in his defence of natural morality. For example, he will say "all others things being equal", this is how morality would work. These ceteris paribus clauses are designed to acknowledge that morality is frequently distorted by social practices and intellectual beliefs. The distorter-in-chief being religion.

How does religion distort morality? Hume saw some of this first hand. He argued that the strength of religious commitment was often such that it made people lose touch with their natural moral sentiments. The passion for religion overcame all other passions. This had some terrifying manifestations as, for example, in the cases of witch burning and the righteous infliction of pain on others.

Hume would probably argue that non-religious ideologies, such as communism, can have a similar effect. Indeed, we should be extremely wary of anybody who is passionately consumed by an ideology. That way, madness lies.

David Hume on Religion (Part 3): The Credentials of Revelation

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This post is part of my series on David Hume's critique of religion. For an index, see here.

I'm working off an article by J.C.A. Gaskin from the Cambridge Companion to Hume. In Part 2, I covered Hume's takedown of the design argument. Hume identified this argument as the core of natural theology. The other branch of theological argument concerns the verisimilitude of revelation. In this part, I cover Hume's objections to this branch of theology.

The picture above is by Albrecht Durer and it depicts a part of the resurrection story. This emphasises an important point. Although he was not explicit about it, Gaskin hints that Hume's main target in his work on miracles was, in fact, belief in the resurrection.



Of Miracles
Hume's argument on miracles is contained in the first volume of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. It comes in two parts. The first part presents a general a priori argument mandating arch-scepticism in the face of claims of the miraculous. The second part presents case histories and a posteriori arguments showing how poor our evidence of the miraculous actually is.

Here, we shall focus on the a priori argument. It is worth considering what Hume himself had to say about this:

I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument...which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.

Hume may well have been flattering himself, but the continued publication of book length critiques and defences suggest he may have been on to something.


Proportioning Belief to Evidence
At the outset, Gaskin offers a paraphrase of Hume's argument. I will offer a paraphrase of that paraphrase.

1. A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence (Norm of Rationality).
2. Weaker evidence can never destroy stronger evidence.
3. Some things seem to happen invariably, for example, that men die. These invariable occurences form the basis of our so-called laws of nature. (Although note: Hume was deeply sceptical about all such causal inferences).
4. Other experiences happen less invariably and constitute probabilities. For example, people sometimes survive falls from great heights. A probability can be attached to this survival rate. This probability could be strong or weak.
5. Corroborative human testimony is usually a strong probability that an event took place. But when it comes to reports of miracles it is weak (for reasons given in Part 2 of Hume's essay).
6. Therefore, from 3, 4 and 5, testimony concerning the miraculous, which is contrary to our invariable experience, amounts to a weak probability opposing a strong probability or certainty (depending on how bullish we wish to be about the laws of nature).
7. Therefore, a wise man will believe in the event with the stronger probability or certainty (from 1 and 2).
8. Therefore, a wise man will not believe in miracles.

Note that, as described, this is an argument concerning the rationality of belief, i.e. it is concerned with whether a report of a miracle can provide you with a reason for adopting religious belief. It is not concerned with whether someone who is pre-committed to a religion should accept a miracle claim, nor is it, as it is often interpreted to be, an argument for the in principle impossibility of miracles.

A Norm of Rationality

There are many avenues down which we could go in challenging Hume's argument. We could argue that he is wrong in defining miracles as he does and in assuming they are rare. We could also challenge his definition of a law of nature. Gaskin mentions these possibilities but prefers to focus on what he considers to be the core of Hume's argument.

To Gaskin, the core of Hume's argument is the development of a norm of rationality to be applied to reports of the miraculous. In particular, to be applied to historical reports of the miraculous. Gaskin wants to know whether Hume got this norm of rationality right.

To this end, he considers a hypothetical example drawn from the work of the Roman historian Tacitus. Tacitus was famous for collecting reports of miraculous or supernatural events and then refusing to comment on their veracity. For example, in response to a report claiming that some of the natives of Scotland were half man, half animal, Tacitus says: "Concerning such unverifiables I will express no opinion."

But suppose Tacitus was not so sober in his presentation. Suppose he stated that the Scots had (a) a single eye in the middle of their skulls and (b) could move from place to place by a form of wish-teleportation. What would Hume's norm have to say about these Cyclopoids?

Well it might say the existence of single-eyed people has some corroboration from Greek mythology, although the strength of that corroboration is weak. It might also point to the existence of some examples of cyclopoidism in animals (Gaskin says there are no such examples, but he is wrong, anomalies in the hedgehog signalling pathway during embryonic development can lead to cyclopoidism). So there is a weak probability in favour of the existence of cyclopoids and a strong probability against.

As for the wish-teleportation, there we really do have an extremely unlikely (dare I say impossible) claim going up against an extremely likely (dare I say certain) natural law: there can be no bodily movement without some actual movement of the limbs, be it aided or unaided).

Miracle reports are usually of this type, i.e. an extremely unlikely event going up against an extremely likely event. Only if the falsity of the report is more unlikely than its veracity, would we have any reason to believe it.

So Gaskin concludes by saying Hume has got the norm of rationality right.


Further Reading

I have linked to this site in my previous posts on Hume, but I want to be more explicit in my promotion of it now:

www.davidhume.org

It has texts of all of Hume's works. It is maintained by Peter Millican, who has an interesting presentation on Hume and miracles, available here:

http://www.davidhume.org/millican.htm 

David Hume on Religion (Part 2): The Design Argument

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This post is part of my series on David Hume's critique of religion. For an index see here.

The series works off an article by J.C.A. Gaskin in the Cambridge Companion to Hume. In this part I cover Hume's attack on the design argument.

Hume's critique of the design argument is justly celebrated. Graham Oppy, in Arguing about Gods, goes so far as to say his arguments were more significant than Darwin's theory of evolution. That's certainly true philosophically speaking, but then again does anyone pay attention to philosophers? Apart from other philosophers?


Versions of the Design Argument
In any case, Gaskin discerns two distinct versions of argument presented and dethroned in Hume's writings:

1. The Argument from the Inexplicability of Order and Beauty: the universe displays a rational order and beauty that could only have emanated from some rational intelligence.
2. The Argument from the Adaptability of Means to Ends: objects within the universe seem to be adapted to perform certain tasks and functions. The only thing that accounts for such adaptability is a rational intelligence that can determine what these functions should be.

For Hume, the design argument constitutes the core of natural theology. Belief in God is nothing more than metaphysical hogwash, unless it is based on idea of a rational intelligence that has created the universe with a particular purpose in mind. If you undermine the intellectual credibility of that idea, you undermine the intellectual credibility of God.


Six Objections to Design Arguments
In his assault on this citadel of natural theology, Hume offers six objections. The objections focus on either the presumptions that go into the argument, or the quality of the inferences and analogies that support the argument.

The following is a brief summary of the objections. It cannot do justice to the strength of Hume's critique.


a. Blind Indifference
Hume points out that the inferred powers and qualities of the designer cannot go beyond the quality of the evidence used to support that inference. In other words, if what we observe in the world is imperfection and moral indifference, then we can infer an imperfect and morally indifferent creator.

Of course, a religious believer could try to reconcile the existence moral imperfection with the existence of a perfect creator. They do this all the time. Crucially, Hume points out a problem with this reconciliation: it only works if you presuppose the existence of God, not if you try to infer the existence of God from observable evidence. So if someone uses the design argument to support their belief in God, they cannot turn around and offer a theodicy to solve the problem of evil.


b. Multiple Hypotheses
The inference to a designer is based on an analogy with human design. But this analogy need not support belief in a monotheistic God. It could support the existence of a committee of gods; or an apathetic God who takes no interest in his creations; or an incompetent God who designed the universe as part of a half-baked experiment in universe creation.


c. Inferring Causes
Throughout his philosophical writings, Hume challenges traditional accounts of causation. He thinks we can only infer a "cause" when we have constantly observed A-events contiguously precede B-events. Given this analysis of causation, it makes no sense to talk about a unique object like the universe being caused by another unknown object that is "outside" the universe. We have no experiential basis with which to ground this inference.


d. Weak Analogy
The design argument is premised on a supposed similarity between the construction of human artifacts and natural objects (creatures, physical laws etc.). Hume argues that this analogy is far too weak to support anything approaching similar causal origin. This argument permeates the entirety of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.


e. Brute Facts and Explanations
The design argument takes it as a given that order requires explanation and cannot be a brute fact. But proponents of the argument explain the order by positing another brute fact, God. Why should we prefer a divine brute fact over a naturalistic brute fact? After all, the divine mind presumably displays ordered complexity and would also require an explanation, right?

Defenders of the design argument have two main responses to this question available to them. First, they can claim that it is desirable to replace two kinds of complexity (physical and mental) with one kind of complexity (mental). This response needs to swim against a tide of scientific evidence which suggests that physical complexity is metaphysically prior to mental complexity.

Second, they can claim that god is simple; that the divine mind does not contain ordered mental "parts". Hume has a famous reply to this doctrine of divine simplicity. He says:

A mind whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive, one that is wholly simple and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all.

These issues are well-covered in Erik Wielenberg's article "Dawkins' Gambit, Hume's Aroma and God's Simplicty".

C'est tout pour maintenant (pardon my French, it's been awhile).

David Hume on Religion (Part 1): Terminology, Structure and Interpretation

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This post in part of my short series on David Hume's critique of religion. For an index see here.

As mentioned in the index, I am working off an article by J.C.A. Gaskin from the Cambridge Companion to Hume. Gaskin begins his article with an overview of the terminology, structure and interpretation of Hume's critique. I follow suit in this part.

1. Terminology
Hume's writings on religion follow the terminology of such debates as it was in his lifetime. This may be confusing to the modern reader. So it is necessary to provide a short bluffer's guide to the somewhat recondite language.

a. Type of Information
The first set of definitions relate to the different types of religious information to which we have access. The first type is that emanating from natural theology. This is the application of reason and logic to observations of the natural world.

The second type is revelation. This is the information which God has revealed to humankind. There are two varieties of revelation: (i) general and (ii) particular. General revelation comes from everyday experience of the presence of god; particular revelation comes from supposedly historical documents such as the bible.

b. Types of Argument
The second set of definitions relates to the different types of argument one encounters in religious philosophy. Nothing too spectacular here, just a distinction between a priori arguments and a posteriori arguments. Hume deals with the latter.

c. Types of Belief
The third set of distinction all relate to the type of belief one has. Deism rejects the existence of an interventionist god but accepts the existence of some divine creating intelligence. Providence accepts the existence of an interventionist God. Hume appears to have objected to being labelled a deist and was certainly not a providentialist.

Two corruptions of religious belief were discussed in Hume's day: (i) supernaturalism and (ii) enthusiasm. Supernaturalism is a state of emotional dread or fear that arises from ignorance and melancholy, and manifests itself in ceremonies, observances and sacrifices. Enthusiasm is equivalent to what we would now call fundamentalism.

Finally, we have fideism: belief grounded in faith, not reason. Hume's critique of early modern philosophical reason is often thought to mandate fideism.


2. The Structure of Hume's Critique
I mentioned this in the index, but a little repetition never hurt anyone. Hume adopts a two-pronged assault on religious belief. First, he critiques the standard reasons and arguments offered for the existence of god. Once he has effectively demolished these arguments, he moves on to consider why religious belief persists in the absence of a sound intellectual foundation.

Hume's critique is spread out over several works. His Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding contains his famous criticisms of belief in miracles and a first-airing of his criticisms of the design argument. These criticisms are more fully developed in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, which is arguably his best work on religion. His explanation of the persistence of religious belief is contained in Natural History of Religion. Several other essays cover religious topics, such as "Of Suicide" and "On the Immortality of the Soul".

It should also be noted that Hume's work, taken as a whole, advances a deeply sceptical attitude to all knowledge claims. This supports and complements his work targeting religion. Indeed, it may be the extension of the sceptical approach into the domain of religion that is Hume's most original contribution to philosophy. After all, many of his predecessors promoted sceptical arguments (Decartes and Berkeley spring to mind). But they all rescued objective knowledge by grounding it in God; Hume made this an illegitimate move.


3. Interpretation of Hume
One thing that is never clear from Hume's work is the actual content of his religious beliefs. It may seem that someone who advances such a rigorous scepticism is an obvious candidate for atheism. But Hume, famously, nearly always followed his sceptical arguments with apparent professions of piety. For example, after demolishing the design argument he says no one can doubt the existence of supreme intelligent force.

Gaskin suggests that Hume is clearly adopting a prudential irony in these passages: his professions of piety are attempts to protect his reputation in an era in which public pronouncements of atheism would have been dangerous. Nevertheless, Hume does not seem to embrace a complete atheism: his scepticism would appear to extend to professions of negative belief as well.

In conclusion, Hume would appear to be a practical atheist, but an intellectual agnostic.