Wednesday, June 30, 2021

91 - Rights for Robots, Animals and Nature?



Should robots have rights? How about chimpanzees? Or rivers? Many people ask these questions individually, but few people have asked them all together at the same time. In this episode, I talk to a man who has. Josh Gellers is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of North Florida, a Fulbright Scholar to Sri Lanka, a Research Fellow of the Earth System Governance Project, and Core Team Member of the Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment. His research focuses on environmental politics, rights, and technology. He is the author of The Global Emergence of Constitutional Environmental Rights (Routledge 2017) and Rights for Robots: Artificial Intelligence, Animal and Environmental Law (Routledge 2020). We talk about the arguments and ideas in the latter book.

You can download the episode here or listen below. You can also subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify and other podcasting services (the RSS feed is here).


Show notes


Topics covered include:
  • Should we even be talking about robot rights?
  • What is a right? What's the difference between a legal and moral right?
  • How do we justify the ascription of rights?
  • What is personhood? Who counts as a person?
  • Properties versus relations - what matters more when it comes to moral status?
  • What can we learn from the animal rights case law?
  • What can we learn from the Rights of Nature debate?
  • Can we imagine a future in which robots have rights? What kinds of rights might those be?

Relevant Links


Monday, June 28, 2021

The Shape of Techno-Moral Revolutions: Lessons from Carlota Perez


Adapted from Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital


One thing that is always daunting about scholarship is the sheer incomprehensible vastness of it. We strive for originality and novelty in research, but this is hard to achieve. So much has been written about so many topics that it is not unusual to find that one's hard earned 'insights' have been pipped by someone else’s hard earned insights of three decades ago.

I felt a bit like this recently when I read Carlota Perez's book Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital. The book reviews five historical technological revolutions, and the impact they have had on our economies and our social structures. It also examines the role of financial capital in fuelling bubbles and speculation around novel technologies. It's a fascinating ride, the centrepiece of which is a general theory about the structure and progression of technological revolutions.

Although not exactly the same, I found that much of what Perez had to say resonated with my own thinking about technology and moral revolutions (which has, admittedly, become something of an obsession of late). In the following article, I want to tease out some of those points of resonance. This serves the dual function of both summarising key aspects of Perez's book and showing how they can be mined for insights on other topics.

I am going to focus on four key insights in what follows. I'll start by summarising Perez's take on them. I'll then consider their relevance for the study of techno-moral revolutions. I'll also offer some critical reflections along the way.


1. The Five Revolutions

Before I get into the four specific insights, it is worth offering a brief overview of Perez's theoretical framework. As noted, Perez looks at five technological revolutions that have occurred since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, and the impact they have had on our economies and societies. Perez defines a technological revolution as:


..a powerful and highly visible cluster of new and dynamic technologies, products and industries, capable of bringing about an upheaval in the whole fabric of the economy and of propelling a long-term upsurge of development. It is a strong interrelated constellation of technical innovations, generally including an important all-pervasive low-cost input, often a source of energy, sometimes a crucial material, plus significant new products and processes and a new infrastructure. 
(Perez 2002, 8)


There is a lot going on in that definition, and we will unpack some of it as we go along. For now, the crucial point is that, according to Perez, there have been five such revolutions in the past 250 or so years. They are:


  • (a) The 'Industrial Revolution', which began primarily in Britain in the late 1700s and arose from developments in mechanisation in cotton, wrought iron and other industries.
  • (b) The Age of Steam and Railways, which again began primarily in Britain in the 1830s (roughly) but spread rapidly to the European Continent and the USA, and arose from developments in steam power and railways.
  • (c) The Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy ENgineering, which began primarily in the USA and Germany in the 1870s, and arose from developments in steel manufacturing (replacing iron) and electrical and chemical engineering.
  • (d) The Age of Oil, Automobiles and Mass Production, which began primarily in the USA in the 1910s, and depended on developments in fossil fuel energy production, the internal combustion engine and scientific management of manufacturing industries (e.g. the motor car production line).
  • (e) The Age of Information and Telecommunication, which began primarily in the USA in the 1970s, and arose from developments in computers, telecommunications and microelectronics.

Perez's book was published in 2002, just as the Age of Information seemed to have entered full steam. She offers minimal speculations on what the next likely technological revolution will be (she hints at biotech and AI as the obvious possibilities). Her gaze is mainly historical. She claims that each of these historical revolutions takes about 50-70 years to fully exhaust themselves. During that period of time they pass through two main phases, each of which is broken down into two sub-phases: (i) the installation phase (which involves an initial irruption of the technology, followed by a frenzy of excitement and investment); and (ii) the deployment phase (which involves synergy between different uses of the technology and maturity in the full economic and social exploitation of the technology).

Each of these revolutions inevitably ends and a new round of technological innovation kicks off. In the mid-point of each revolution, there tends to be a major economic crash after the initial bubble of excitement comes to an abrupt halt.

As I say, Perez's book is insightful and thought-provoking. But people looking for a rigorous defence of the model she proposes might be disappointed. Her focus is not so much on defending a particular mechanical explanation of social and economic history through the rigorous use of data but, rather, giving us a new way to look at social history. I found four of her insights particularly useful and I want to reflect on how they shed light on techno-moral revolutions.


2. The Importance of Visible Attractors

One of Perez's key points is that the technologies that kickstart a revolution often have a long gestation period. The basic concept or idea can be around for years before it really takes off. The steam engine may be an example of this. Primitive versions of the steam engine were around for a long time before the age of the railways began. Similarly, the basic idea of the computer was around for nearly a century before the age of information began in earnest. Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace came up with a workable prototype and an early model of software coding and more modern models date from the late 1940s.

Why did it take so long for the potential of these technologies to be fully appreciated? Perez argues that every revolution requires some initial, highly visible 'attractor' to get started:


...it is suggested here that for society to veer strongly in the direction of a new set of technologies, a highly visible 'attractor' needs to appear, symbolizing the whole new potential and capable of sparking the technological and business imagination of a cluster of pioneers.
(Perez 2002, 11)

 

Examples given include Arkwright's Cromford mill opening in 1771 (kickstarting the Industrial Revolution), and Stephenson’s 'Rocket' locomotive being used on the Liverpool-Manchester railway (kickstarting the Age of Steam and Railways).

Do visible attractors and pioneers also help kickstart moral revolutions too? I think they might. There are often terrible moral tragedies and injustices that awaken the ethical conscience and shock it into a new way of thinking. For example, in his work on the structure of moral revolutions, Robert Baker suggests that the medical ethics revolution in the latter part of the 20th century was kickstarted by revelations regarding Nazi experimentation on concentration camp victims during WWII. The horror of what took place made people realise that some ethical (and ultimately legal) limits had to be placed on medical practice. Similar attractors played a role in the civil rights movement in the US. Rosa Parks's refusal to give up her bus seat; Martin Luther King's speech at the Washington Monument. These were all focal points for social moral attention and helped catalyse a revolution.

It is worth disentangling two different kinds of visible attractor. First, there are morally significant events -- these are the historical occurrences that awaken the moral conscience and tip it into a new mode of thinking. Second, there are the moral pioneers -- these are specific individuals that help symbolise a new mode of moral thinking.

Are there any visible attractors that might be helping to kickstart new techno-moral revolutions? When it comes to morally significant events, there have been some scandals in the past decade or so that captured the public imagination and made them more aware of the ethical consequences of digital technologies. The Snowden Leak and the Cambridge Analytica scandal are two obvious examples. These scandals helped to highlight the pervasiveness of digital surveillance and the potential manipulative power of predictive analytics. Neither scandal was all that shocking to people familiar with the underlying technologies. The problems had been known and written about for decades. But these scandals captured social moral attention in a way that decades of scholarship did not. It's too early to say whether they have kickstarted a moral revolution, or not, but they have certainly ignited policy debates and influenced legal responses.

What about moral pioneers? I have written in the past about contemporary cyborgs as moral pioneers. I'm thinking in particular here about people like the artist Neil Harbisson, who is famous for having an antenna attached to his skull that converts light waves into sound. This allows him to hear in colour (a kind of technologically facilitated synethsia). I'm also thinking of Steve Mann, who is famous for his 'eyetap' which is a prosthetic attachment that augments his visual field in a variety of ways. I see these people as early pioneers in the cyborg mode of life, showing the rest of us what might be possible and desirable about it. I also see them as moral pioneers because they actively fight for the rights of cyborgs and people that want to pursue a non-human or post-human form of life. They are showing the rest of us the potential moral errors of strict human exceptionalism. That said, I would be the first to admit that the popularity of these moral pioneers is currently too small to kickstart a moral revolution. If more prominent and well-known figures follow their lead, this may happen.

The point is not to get too wedded to these particular examples. The point, which I take from Perez, is that particular events or individuals can play an important role in highlighting new moral possibilities and changing social moral practices. It's worth being on the lookout for these events and individuals.


3. The Emergence of a New Techno-Moral Paradigm

The second key insight I take from Perez's work relates to her idea of a 'techno-economic paradigm'. She defines this as:


...a best practice model made up of a set of all-pervasive generic technological and organizational principles, which represent the most effective way of applying a particular technological revolution and of using it for modernizing and rejuvenating the whole of the economy. 
(Perez 2002, 15)

 

This is an abstract definition. The gist of the idea is that a set of new technologies comes along that allows for businesses and economic actors to reorganise or rearrange their practices in a way that best exploits the economic potential of those new technologies. When they do this, they adopt a new 'paradigm’.

I recently discussed an example of a new techno-economic paradigm emerging in the world of car sales in the early 2000s. I won't rehash the details here - you can read the original article for that - but in essence the idea was that internet sales platforms changed the way that people bought and sold cars. Instead of car-selling being a mainly in-person activity in which a naive and often intimidated customer would attend a car dealership and be subjected to all manner of sharp negotiation practices and hard selling, the internet shifted it to being a largely online, over-the-phone business, with greater equality between buyer and seller and fewer sharp practices. Admittedly, this example might be too narrow to constitute a whole new techno-economic paradigm, but the lessons learned from this example are generalisable. The rise of the internet and globalised supply chains has (and continues to) change the way in which the retail industry operates.

What about new techno-moral paradigms? Can they emerge too? I would say 'yes' and they are often equivalent to or part of techno-economic paradigms. New ways of doing business generate new power relationships, new expectations, and new duties. This requires a new moral paradigm. But moral life does not begin and end in the market and so techno-moral paradigms are likely to affect non-economic aspects of life too (there is a debate to be had about the dividing line between economic and non-economic aspects of life; we won't engage with that debate here).

One way to think about techno-moral paradigms is to use the idea of an 'affordance', which is popular in technological studies and behavioural ecology. The basic idea is that humans live in environments that afford them different possibilities for action (i.e. or, to put it another way, environments that contain different affordances). New technologies often generate new affordances. The world in which the automobile exists is a world with very different possibilities for action than the world in which it does not. Each of these new affordances generates a set of moral questions. Should we take advantage of the action possibility? Do we have an obligation to do so? Clusters of related technologies obviously generate long-lists of these questions. As we answer them, a new techno-moral paradigm emerges.

Are there any examples of this process at work? Perhaps. In another recent article, I took a long look at the impact of contraception and home appliances (washing machines, microwaves etc) on moral attitudes toward extramarital sex and women's role in society. Again, I won't rehash all the details here -- read the full thing if you want them. The core idea from that article, however, was that both sets of technologies changed the cost-benefit ratio for certain decisions. Contraception, particularly the Pill, the latex condom and the IUD, dramatically reduced the risk of extramarital pregnancy and the associated stigma and social punishment associated with that. Home appliances reduced the amount of time required for certain household chores. Since women were the ones that bore these costs or performed these chores, these technologies had a particularly dramatic effect on their lives. Of course, it wasn't all plain sailing. Prejudices and taboos die hard, but eventually, over the course of the 20th century, the use of these technologies generated a new moral paradigm. It became permissible, and in some cases morally expected to use these technologies and to take advantage of the possibilities they afforded. The shame and stigma associated with extramarital sex (and also extramarital pregnancy) reduced to a whimper, and women pursuing careers outside the home (not driven by economic necessity) became tolerated and celebrated.

There are other examples too. A more controversial one concerns the rise of digital surveillance and predictive analytics. These technologies enable much greater tailoring of services to individuals. This is true both in business and in government. The rapid collection and processing of personal data allows retailers, for example, to build personal profiles of shoppers and predictive analytics enables them to make recommendations based on those profiles. In some ways, this allows for much greater convenience and, potentially, a boost in well-being for customers. But this comes at the cost of greater intrusions into privacy and the gradual erosion of autonomy. These technologies have generated a new techno-economic paradigm -- commonly referred to as 'surveillance capitalism' thanks to Shoshanna Zuboff -- and this paradigm has generated a set of related moral questions. Should we take the hit to privacy and autonomy in return for convenience and well-being? Or must we fight back to protect privacy and autonomy? The precise answers to these questions remain elusive. In some parts of the world, convenience seems to be winning out over privacy. In other parts of the world, elaborate legal frameworks have been created to eke out some space for privacy. I won't comment on the merits of this debate here. What's interesting from the present perspective is how the set of digital surveillance technologies is forcing the creation of a new techno-moral paradigm.


4. The Importance of Institutional Reform to Accommodate a New Paradigm

A third key idea from Perez's analysis is the problem of resistance between old and new paradigms. This often occurs at the institutional level. What happens is that when new technological revolutions occur, they rapidly generate new possibilities for action. People respond to these new possibilities at a local and individual level. For example, people start taking their mobile phones with them in their cars; they start texting while driving. They fill out the space of possibilities in short order. Eventually, this will generate a new set of social norms and practices, often codified and enforced by a legal system, but in the early days the social institutions tend to lag behind the technological possibilities. This generates a lot of friction and conflict:


Societies are profoundly shaken and shaped by each technological revolution and, in turn, the technological potential is shaped and steered as a result of intense social, political and ideological confrontations and compromises. 
(Perez 2002, 22)

 

Ultimately, the old institutional paradigm will need to adapt if the full potential of the technological paradigm is to be unleashed. But there isn't necessarily a single best institutional reform. There are often different ideological possibilities that compete, sometimes violently, for control. Perez argues that this is exactly what happened during the fourth of the revolutions she discusses (the revolution in oil, automobiles and mass production). This fourth revolution created the possibility of mass production and mass consumption. But how should society be organised to take advantage of those possibilities?


The unleashing of the 'golden age' based on the mass-production technologies of the fourth paradigm that had been diffusing since the 1910s and 1920s demanded institutions facilitating massive consumption, by the people or by the governments. Only in such a context could full flourishing be achieved. At the time, Fascism, Socialism and Keynesian democracies were set up as very different socio-political models giving impulse to growth processes based on mass production and consumptions. 
(Perez 2002, 24)

 

In the West, Keynesianism won out and became the post-WWII consensus until the late 1970s. By then, the next revolution was underway.

What's interesting about these examples is that those three ideologies were competing for control of political morality. They were defining the preferred relationship between citizens and states. What were citizens expected to do for the state (be productive workers; contribute to national armies etc)? And what were governments expected to do for citizens (provide a social safety net; boost demand during economic slumps; etc)? So this conflict between the new techno-economic paradigm and the old institutional order is, at its heart, a kind of techno-moral conflict.

Are we in the midst of new one right now? I have written about this in recent years, focusing in particular on the impact of mass automation on our existing social contract. Whereas in the mid-20th century the fight was about how to retool the state for the age of mass consumption, now the fight might be about how to retool the state for the age of mass leisure. As the latest wave of automation takes hold, the percentage of the adult population needed to keep the economy running may decline. Many people may be underemployed or have no jobs at all. To take advantage of the economic potential of mass automation, a social reckoning may be in order. For instance, redistributive policies may need reform to compensate for the loss of income associated with automation (and to prevent a collapse of consumer demand). The basic income guarantee is the most widely discussed of these policy reforms. In addition to this, education and training systems may also need reform. The goal of such institutions may no longer be to train the next generation of workers but to encourage the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake or to develop their civic responsibilities and sense of public duty (a la Ancient Athens). I'm not claiming that educational systems don't already do these things but a re-prioritisation may be in order. Finally, and more generally, the ideological debunking of the work ethic may be required in order to shed us of this notion that a fully functioning adult is a fully engaged worker. There is more to life than work and this new techno-economic paradigm may allow us to realise this.

These are themes that I explore in more detail in my book Automation and Utopia, albeit not through the lens of Perez's work.


5. The Pattern of Revolutions

The fourth key insight I take from Perez is the pattern she identifies in each historical technological revolution. As mentioned above, Perez argues that there are two main phases to each revolution -- the installation phase and the deployment phase -- and that each of these is broken down into two further sub-phases and that at the mid-point of the cycle there is a crash/turning point. The full sequence thus is: Irruption -> Frenzy -> Turning Point -> Synergy -> Maturity. Do these patterns occur in techno-moral revolutions too?

Before we answer that question, it is worth noting that this is probably the most intellectually dubious part of Perez's work. Carving history at its joints and suggesting that there are distinct patterns to technological development and growth is problematic. You can do it and with a sufficiently flexible interpretation it is possible to make the facts fit the pattern, but it is unlikely that you are uncovering some deeper law of historical progress, and you may have to ignore incompatible data. David Egerton, in his book The Shock of the Old, criticises this tendency in histories of technology. He thinks they focus too much on innovation and invention and not enough on how old technologies linger and proliferate. This, he argues, leads to a false view of history in which new technological eras have distinct boundaries that mark them off from old ones. The reality is much messier. History is like a canvas that keeps getting painted over: the old colours remain and affect the new picture that emerges.

This scepticism is worth bearing in mind. But despite this, I still think there is some value to putting some order on history. We don't have to kid ourselves into thinking we have discovered some universal law of social evolution, but it might help us to make sense of what has gone on and what is going on right now. We shouldn't hold onto the pattern too tightly; we should be open to revising it in light of new information; but we shouldn't discard it so quickly either and assume that history is just one damned thing after another.

Those caveats in mind, do techno-moral revolutions follow a similar pattern to the one identified by Perez? Well, there’s a simple argument for thinking that they might. If, as I suggested above, techno-economic paradigms often generate new techno-moral paradigm (new actions, new power relationships, new duties and expectations), and if techno-economic revolutions unfold according the pattern identified by Perez, then it stands to reason that at least some techno-moral revolutions follow this pattern too. If we return to the example of surveillance capitalism as a techno-moral revolution, we may see some evidence for it following this pattern. First, came a technological revolution in digital surveillance and predictive analytics (the irruption). Second, there was a frenzy of excitement among corporations, governments and (to some extent) individual users (particularly, say, proponents of self-tracking and quantification). These actors rushed to exploit the full potential of the technology, exploring different use cases with fervour (the frenzy). Then, there was a reckoning: scandals revealing the moral costs of this new paradigm. This should lead to a synergy between the moral rules and the new technologies. If I were to guess, I would say we are living through this phase now. People are far more aware of the risks of surveillance capitalism and new institutional mechanisms are being designed to mitigate those risks. This could, in time, lead to a new and relatively stable moral paradigm (balancing the benefits of the technology against the costs of privacy and autonomy), which would constitute the maturity phase of the techno-moral revolution.

One of Perez’s claims is that all techno-economic revolutions exhaust themselves in due course. The profits that were once attainable with the technology eventually dissipate and economic actors seek out other opportunities. One might wonder whether techno-moral revolutions suffer a similar fate. Do moral revolutions eventually exhaust themselves? On the face of it, you would say “no”. Techno-economic revolutions are driven by market incentives. They run out of steam when the profits start to decline. There is no equivalent incentive pressure in the moral sphere.

But is that really true? I think some moral revolutions probably do head in one direction only. I haven’t written about this much myself, but several philosophers have written about moral progress as entailing the expansion of the circle of moral concern — from family, to tribe, to nation, to empire, to humanity, to ecosphere. If they are right then, despite some setbacks, the general trend of moral progress is in one direction only: toward an ever-expanding circle of concern.

But maybe that is a misleading and overly-idealistic way to think about it? It could be that those expansions of concern are, in part, evidence of the exhaustion of a previous moral paradigm (e.g. when humanism is exhausted we turn to animal rights and ecocentrism). David Runciman has gestured at a similar idea in his book How Democracy Ends. He argues that representative democratic governance may have passed its middle age and be on a decline toward death. Why? Because such democracies have one big idea at their heart: you grow the moral legitimacy of the state by extending the voting franchise. Since the franchise has now been fully extended in most democratic regimes (children and prisoners being some of the last holdouts), there is little new space for them to explore. This makes them vulnerable to ideological attack. New methods of participatory governance may hold off the decline for a while, but they too have their limits, not least the fact that most people have neither the time, nor inclination, nor luxury to participate in a meaningful way. Digital technologies are often lauded as potential saviours of participatory governance, but they have yet to yield clear benefits in this regard.

These are just half-baked thoughts, but they would be worth pursuing in more detail. Perhaps some moral revolutions never exhaust themselves but others do? The question is whether we can successfully identify which ones.


Thursday, June 10, 2021

Axiological Futurism: The Systematic Study of the Future of Values



Here's a new paper that I have forthcoming in the journal Futures. This paper has had a long gestation. I wrote it more than two and a half years ago. At the time, I thought it was one of my more interesting pieces. Apparently journal editors disagreed. Vehemently. This paper was rejected from four different journals before finally, on the fifth try, finding a home. I still think it is among the more interesting and important pieces I have written. It makes the case for 'axiological futurism', which is the study of the future of values. This links to my ongoing work on technology and moral revolutions. See what you think of it. Links to prepublication versions are available below. The final version will be open access (thanks to Ireland's new open access publishing agreements with Elsevier et al) and I will post that once it is available.


Title: Axiological Futurism: The Systematic Study of the Future of Values

Links: Official; Philpapers; Researchgate; Academia

Abstract: Human values seem to vary across time and space. What implications does this have for the future of human value? Will our human and (perhaps) post-human offspring have very different values from our own? Can we study the future of human values in an insightful and systematic way? This article makes three contributions to the debate about the future of human values. First, it argues that the systematic study of future values is both necessary in and of itself and an important complement to other future-oriented inquiries. Second, it sets out a methodology and a set of methods for undertaking this study. Third, it gives a practical illustration of what this ‘axiological futurism’ might look like by developing a model of the axiological possibility space that humans are likely to navigate over the coming decades. 

 

 


Wednesday, June 2, 2021

Interviews about Automation and Utopia


I did a few interviews about my book Automation and Utopia over the past year. Once upon a time I was meticulous in documenting and recording all of them on this website (admittedly more for my own records than for the benefit of readers). For some reason, I have lapsed in this practice recently. Anyway, here's my attempt to correct for this oversight with a list of recent interviews. If you want to learn more about the book, check them out:


Tuesday, June 1, 2021

The Technological Future of Love




Here's a new draft paper. This one was co-authored with Sven Nyholm and Brian Earp. It is about the role that technology can and will play in reshaping the value of love. It is forthcoming in an edited collection entitled Love: Past, Present and Future. You can access a preprint version of the paper at the links below.

Title: The Technological Future of Love

Authors: Sven Nyholm, John Danaher, Brian Earp

Links: Philpapers; Researchgate; Academia

Abstract: How might emerging and future technologies-sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms to track, quantify, and 'gamify' romantic relationships-change how we understand and value love? We canvass some of the main ethical worries posed by such technologies, while also considering whether there are reasons for "cautious optimism" about their implications for our lives. Along the way, we touch on some key ideas from the philosophies of love and technology. 

 

 

Thursday, May 27, 2021

The Trouble with Teaching: Is Teaching a Meaningful Job?





Frederick William Sanderson was the headmaster of the Oundle School in England from 1892 to 1922. In a hagiographic biography, HG Wells celebrated him as ‘the greatest man’ he had ever known. If Wells’s reflections, and those of former pupils and colleagues, are anything to go by, Sanderson must have been an impressive figure. Consider, for example, the following recollection from a former student. Having been discovered taking notes in the school library after dark, Sanderson reprimanded the student for his breach of discipline but then, calming down, asked him what he was reading:


He looked over the notes I had been taking and they set his mind going. He sat down beside me to read them. They dealt with the development of metallurgical processes, and he began to talk to me of discovery and the values of discovery, the incessant reaching out of men towards knowledge and power, the significance of this desire to know and make and what we in the school were doing in that process. We talked, he talked for nearly an hour in that still nocturnal room. It was one of the greatest, most formative hours in my life... 'Go back to bed, my boy. We must find some time for you in the day for this’

 

It’s hard not to be moved by this. Sanderson seems to have had a positive impact on his students. He cultivated a sense of wonder in them and, at least in this case, transformed their lives. He may be the quintessential example of a teacher whose career embodied the highest aspirations of that profession.

I have been teaching at universities for over a decade. Although I have never bothered to count, I estimate that I have given over 1000 lectures/seminars and interacted with over 1500 students. When I started out, I was enthusiastic about teaching. I enjoyed the challenge of explaining difficult concepts; of facilitating lively discussions and debates; of encouraging the students (I would never call them ‘mine’ as some do) to think for themselves.

Over the past decade, my enthusiasm has waned. I still enjoy aspects of teaching — and I will talk about those aspects in what follows — but overall I find teaching quite frustrating. I don’t think is a particularly meaningful job, despite what some people claim. In fact, many times I find it disheartening. I’m sure some of this is my own fault — maybe I don’t try hard enough or care enough about the students — but I think some of it is inherent to the nature of teaching, and the problems of teaching in a modern third-level institution.

In the remainder of this article, I will try to explain the reasons for my frustration. I will draw heavily from my own experiences of teaching. I will also examine the extent to which my experiences are (or are not) mirrored in the empirical research. I write this with two hopes in mind. First, I hope that other academics and instructors might find it useful to have someone articulate these views on teaching. Perhaps they have had similar thoughts and would like to know that they are not alone. Second, I hope that someone will convince me that I am wrong. 


1. The Case Against Teaching

I have written a lot about meaningful work in the past. My book, Automation and Utopia, deals with the topic at length. In that book, I conclude that work as whole is structurally bad and that non-work alternatives are more meaningful. Given this argument, you might suspect that my analysis of teaching is biased from the outset. Since I think work in the modern world is structurally bad, it stands to reason that I would not be a huge fan of teaching. It is just a particular case study in the awfulness of work.

But this is not my view. In Automation and Utopia, I did not conclude that all forms of work are necessarily bad. I conceded that despite the structural conditions that make work worse than it ought to be, some forms of work, including my own, can be quite good. My job as an academic has many benefits. I work in a university that is relatively devoid of managerialism (at least when compared to universities in the UK). I have a lot of autonomy. I can research whatever I like and there is very little interference with how I teach and assess my modules. I am essentially free to develop my skills and hone my craft. Furthermore, I work with people I generally like and I have a chance to enrich the minds of the students I encounter. On paper, everything is good. I have one of those jobs that scores highly on standard conceptions of meaningful work.

In practice it is a different story. I’ll explain why in two steps. First, in the remainder of this section, I will outline four arguments for thinking that teaching is less meaningful than you might think. Second, in the subsequent section, I will consider some objections to this negative assessment. In this first part of the analysis, I will be looking at teaching from a largely (though not entirely) consequentialist perspective. In other words, I will be working with the assumption that one of the things that makes teaching meaningful (on paper) is that it serves a valuable purpose (education) and that teachers can derive meaning from their work to the extent that they contribute to that valuable purpose. I don’t think this is an overly controversial assumption, but I will consider some criticisms of it later on.

Anyway, here are the four arguments against teaching understood in those terms.


A1 - The Purpose and Value of Education is Questionable

You might think it is just obvious that education is valuable. Our world is, after all, one that rewards educated people. Educated workers typically earn more money, have more stable personal lives, and are generally better equipped to manage that vagaries of work in a knowledge economy. It is not that things are easy for them, but it would be a lot harder without an education. Competencies such as literacy and numeracy are practically essential in the modern world, and higher-order cognitive abilities such as the capacity for critical reflective thought, problem-solving and the ability to evaluate different sources of information are highly sought after.

I buy this argument, at least at an abstract level. When it comes to education in general, in particular schooling in basic competencies such as literacy and numeracy, I am sure that education does serve a valuable purpose. Where I struggle, is when it comes to the purpose of the particular classes and subjects I teach, and the practical challenge of converting abstract purposes into specific learning outcomes for those classes.

What is it that I should be doing in class every day? Here’s a definition of teaching that I have long admired and, indeed, quoted in my own teaching statements:


…the real aim of education [is]: to waken a student to his or her potential, and to pursue a subject of considerable importance without the restrictions imposed by anything except the inherent demands of the material. 
(Parini 2005, 10)

 

But what does that mean? What is a student’s potential? Does it vary from student to student? Everyone is unique so this would stand to reason. So is it really possible for me, as a teacher, to waken each individual to their unique potential? Also, what are the inherent demands of the subject? It’s not clear. It turns out that I may like this quote because it is so vague. It speaks to the high falutin’ aspirations of teaching as a profession, but means relatively little in practice. The purpose is vague and its value unclear.

There are more practical guides to what the purpose of education might be. Most lecturers are introduced to Bloom’s taxonomy of learning outcomes when they do courses on how to teach. Originally formulated in 1956, this taxonomy has been refined and expanded over the years. Many people claim that these refinements are an improvement on the original. I’m not so sure. I think the original, with its simplicity and hierarchical organisation, is much more memorable than all the subsequent riffs upon it. Anyway, the diagram below illustrates the original taxonomy.



As you can see, the basic idea here is that a well-designed course/module will enable students to ascend through the hierarchy of learning outcomes. The teacher will begin by sharing some key information they want the student to remember and understand. This may be done in the classroom in the form of a lecture, or through reading lists and textbooks. Then they will help the students analyse and apply this information, breaking it down into its key components and seeing the relationships between different concepts. Then they will move on to synthesising and critically evaluating this information. Do the ideas and arguments hold up to scrutiny? Are they true? Do they have value?

This provides a neat structure for teaching and, at least on the face of it, a clear guide as to the purpose of teaching. I start most of my courses with Bloom’s taxonomy. I like to be transparent with students. In my course on contract law, for example, I tell students that I will start most topics by sharing some key legal principle or rule. I will try to help them to understand that principle or rule by reviewing case law. I will then get them to perform a series of practical exercises in which they will analyse these cases, before moving onto applying rules to novel cases, and then critically evaluating their role in the modern world.

It all sounds so simple, but there are a number of problems in practice. First, there is the selection problem, which bits of information or knowledge should I be exposing students to? Most subjects are vast. There are lots of cases and rules relevant to contract law. Which ones should I include in my courses? I cannot possibly cover everything. I have to make some tradeoffs, but every decision to include some topic leads to the exclusion of another. The standard approach is just to follow the existing textbooks or professional curricula, but some people question the value of this. The status quo is biased towards conservative, non ‘critical’ attitudes toward law. Maybe we should be disrupting and decolonising the curriculum? Sharing different voices and different ideas? It’s a challenge to know what you should and should not include. Furthermore, the more you know about a subject, the more complex it becomes. You start to see how knowledge is one vast interconnected web. Whenever we teach, we arbitrarily cleave this web at its joints. We strip away the context that helps it all fit together.

Second, there is the value problem. Is the information I am sharing and asking students to critically evaluate, really important? Is this stuff they need to know? I often kid myself that it is. I will claim that a subject as apparently dry and boring as contract law is intrinsically fascinating because it raises important questions about trust, freedom, reciprocity, economic value and so on. I will also claim that it is eminently practical since people make and enter into contracts all the time. But I’m not so sure that this is true. Many of my students won’t ever use the information I cover again in their lives. They won’t need to remember those obscure Victorian cases on shipping and medical quackery that I cover in such loving detail. Heck, I don’t need to remember them in my own life and I teach the subject. Furthermore, the deep and important questions relating to trust, freedom and reciprocity, can be covered in other, more interesting and more direct ways. And this is, in some ways, a best case scenario: contract law is probably one of those subjects that lends itself to a credible argument on behalf of the value of the underlying subject matter. Many academics teach incredibly obscure and niche courses whose contents are unlikely to have any lasting importance for their students lives.

Third, there is the meta-value problem. Even if the information I am sharing is not, in and of itself, intrinsically or practically valuable, I might argue that students are still learning valuable transferable skills from my courses. For instance, I could (and frequently do) argue that students are learning the capacity for critical and self-reflective awareness as result of my teaching (in fact, I teach an entire course dedicated to critical thought). Let’s set to one side the question of whether this is true (we’ll return to it in a moment). Assume that it is. Is it, in fact, valuable to learn such meta-skills? The claim is often made that critical thinking skills are valuable from a social perspective: people with the capacity for critical thought are more discerning consumers of information, better problem solvers, better citizens and so on. But I don’t know how true this is. There is plenty of research on the benefits of high intelligence for society and individuals, but there is also quite a bit of evidence to suggest that people with high critical intelligence can be more ideologically entrenched and biased than others. Keith Stanovich is possibly the leading researcher on this issue, documenting how ‘myside’ bias tends not to diminish with intelligence. Instead of people becoming more open to other views and more willing to admit when they are wrong, they engage in motivated reasoning that reinforces existing beliefs and opinions. Similarly, David Robson, in his book The Intelligence Trap reviews several studies (and some famous anecdotes) suggesting that more intelligent people fall into many cognitive traps, even when they are aware of the potential biases and errors underlying human reasoning.

What about the personal benefits of critical thinking? Cognitive behavioural therapy, which is a popular treatment for many psychological disorders, including depression and anxiety, is, in a sense, a kind of applied critical thinking. The idea underlying CBT is that we fall into certain cognitive traps that lead to psychological distress. For example, we tend to exaggerate negatives, catastrophise, engage in ‘all or nothing’ thinking and so on. CBT tries to get people to identify these cognitive errors and correct them through systematic reevaluation, behavioural experiments and so on. CBT is a well-evidenced therapeutic intervention and while it is not a miracle cure, it can work well for some people. Given this, we might feel confident that teaching critical thinking could make people more at home in the world and less psychologically distressed. The problem is that the benefits of CBT are hard won. It usually requires extended one-on-one interactions with a therapist who will guide you through the methods and give feedback and encouragement along the way. This is very different from how critical thinking is taught at university. Furthermore, most critical thinking classes at university are not directed at our beliefs about ourselves, they are, rather, directed towards specific subject areas. For example, I teach a course on critical thinking for lawyers that focuses on common errors in legal reasoning, not errors in reasoning about ourselves (though I do bring in a range of non-legal examples and sometimes refer to CBT). Also, balanced against the benefits of CBT there is evidence suggesting that people with high intelligence are more prone to mood disorders, including anxiety and depression. Ruth Karpinski and her colleagues surveyed over 3000 members of Mensa to see if there was a link between high intelligence and psychological disorders. They found that there was a correlation. People at Mensa were about 2.5 times as likely to experience high levels of anxiety and depression. That said, this was only a correlational study. A similar European study by Navrady et al, with a much larger sample size (over 180,000) found that intelligence was only associated with a higher risk of depression among those who scored highly on neuroticism. Otherwise, intelligence seemed to be protective against psychological disorders though the effects were small.

Speaking from my own example, I suspect that I am above (though not by much) average when it comes to the disposition for critical thought. I spend my whole life dissecting arguments and information, probing their truth and persuasiveness from multiple angles. Has this made my life better? I’m not sure. If anything I suspect it makes me more neurotic, less trusting, and less confident. For example, I’m not sure that I have many strong convictions or principles. Pretty much everything I believe is defeasible and open to doubt. This often leaves me with a lack of motivation or desire. This can be an immense source of frustration for others.

Socrates once said that the unexamined life is not worth living. Teachers love that line. But as Kurt Baier once said, the over-examined life isn’t much to write home about either.


A2 - Teaching Often Fails to Achieve Its Purpose

The previous argument might be interesting to some but it is not, in my view, the most significant problem with teaching. I am happy to concede that teaching might serve a valuable purpose. What I’m much less convinced of is that teaching actually achieves its purposes. Let’s assume that the purposes of teaching align with Bloom’s taxonomy. The goal is to share valuable knowledge, and then to get students to remember, understand, analyse and critically evaluate that knowledge. If possible, the further goal is to get them achieve these goals in a specific module by developing metacognitive skills that they can then transfer to other aspects of their lives. Does teaching achieve those ends?

Let me start with some anecdotal evidence. I’ve been teaching the same subjects for years now. I have a good handle on what I want students to achieve in these subjects. I also assess in similar-ish ways year on year. (I say ‘ish’ because I do ‘innovate’ to some extent.) Despite this, I don’t see any discernible improvement in outcomes for my students, nor in their results. Roughly the same number of students achieve first and second class grades each year. The quality of the assessments varies little as well. The abiding impression I get is that the students that do well in my courses would have done well no matter what I said or did (as long as I attained some minimal level of competence). They were self-motivated and would have thrived no matter who was teaching. I’ve had this confirmed, to some extent, when I review the grades of these students upon entry to university and across all other subjects. The single best predictor of how well a student will do in one of my courses is how well they did on their entrance assessments and in their other modules. Furthermore, having spoken to students years after they left university, many of them tell me that they remember little, if anything of what they learned in my classes. If they remember anything at all, it tends to be the trivial stuff: the day I cancelled class, the day one student ran through the lecture theatre in a chicken costume, the day my powerpoint presentation wouldn’t work and so on. In short, the benefits of teaching seem to be narrow and transient, and the impact of the teacher (i.e. me) seems to be minimal.

That’s just my impression. Is this confirmed by empirical data? Bryan Caplan’s book The Case Against Education is probably the most damning monograph on the effectiveness of teaching. Caplan argues that the benefits of higher education (which he admits are significant, at least when it comes to income) are all down to a signalling effect. Students that make it through 3-4 years of higher education are signalling to potential employers that they would be good employees. The benefits are not down to any learning that takes place at university. Most professors do not teach anything that students need to know in the long-term; most valuable skills are learned on the job.

Caplan reviews the available evidence on learning in Chapter 3 of his book. He is unimpressed. As he notes at the outset, there is a basic problem when it comes to measuring the effectiveness of teaching:


Measurement is tricky. Using students’ standardized test scores implicitly assumes students learn everything they know in school. What about changes in students’ standardized test scores? A little better, but the basic problem remains: the fact that students improve from grade to grade does not show that schooling caused their improvement. Maybe they’re maturing, or learning in their spare time. Given these doubts, most researchers strongly prefer controlled experiments: randomly give some kids extra education, then measure their surplus knowledge. Unfortunately, all these approaches — controlled experiments included — neglect retention. 
(Caplan 2018, 72)

 

Looking at the available information on long-term retention, Caplan’s conclusion seems to be a depressing one. For example, despite spending many hours learning math (algebra, trigonometry, calculus) few adults remember what they have learned. The same holds true for other subjects like history. Basic literacy and numeracy seems to be the only knowledge that is retained, but this is presumably because people have to read and engage with numbers (pay checks, bills etc) on an ongoing basis. If this didn’t happen, they would forget that too. That’s how our brains tend to work: thinking is hard; if we can get away with it, we let the knowledge atrophy.

Of course, we know this to be true. Unless we are forced to keep up with a given area of study, we tend to retain nothing in the long run. I teach at a law school. I studied all the standard law subjects as an undergraduate (company, equity, land, tort, criminal, constitutional, contract etc). I have retained virtually none of the information I learned. Indeed, I forgot most of contract law before I was required to teach it. I had to relearn on the job.

What about transferable skills and learning to learn? Maybe we forget subject specific knowledge, but retain metacognitive learning skills that we can apply to new domains? Caplan also reviews the evidence on this and finds it lacklustre. For example, commenting on studies of science graduates who were tested on their ability to apply scientific methods outside of their narrow domains of study, Caplan notes:


… college students are bad at reasoning about everyday events despite years of coursework in science and math. Believers in “learning how to learn” should expect students who study science to absorb the scientific method, then habitually use that fruitful method to analyze the world. This scarcely occurs. By and large, college science teaches students what to think about topics on the syllabus, not how to think about the world. 
(Caplan 2018, 89)

 

That said, the results are not entirely dispiriting. Caplan notes that students do appear to learn skills through college courses. Law students get better at verbal reasoning and science students improve at statistical reasoning. It’s just that the skills tend to be narrow, and subject specific. There is limited evidence for any improvement in general cognitive ability. Furthermore, the effect of college itself on these skills is often questionable. Students who score highly on skills tests tend to be the ones that score highly on such tests before starting college.

Caplan may be too pessimistic. He seems to overemphasise the negative, and he marshalls the evidence in order to defend the signalling theory of education’s value throughout his book. Nevertheless, I think his scepticism reveals an important epistemological problem for any university teacher who claims to be doing a good job. I don’t carry out randomised controlled tests on students in my class. I don’t track their progress over the long-term. As a result, I have little, if any, information to suggest that they gain anything from my classes. This leaves me in the perpetually troubling position of not knowing whether anything I’m doing is making a difference.


A3 - Any Feedback You Do Receive is Unhelpful

You may question the conclusion of the previous section. Surely, teachers do receive feedback about the quality of their teaching? If you teach at a university, you will regularly give students forms and surveys to complete. Students will rate the quality of your teaching on scales from awful to excellent. They will also provide qualitative feedback on what they liked or disliked. Doesn’t this tell you that you are (or are not) making difference?

To say that the value of student feedback surveys has been questioned is an understatement. The link between survey results and other measures of teaching effectiveness has been subject to innumerable studies over the years. Indeed, it may be the best researched topic in the entire field of higher education studies. The results are pretty grim. Feedback surveys do not seem to measure the effectiveness of teaching, at least if effectiveness is understood as enhanced cognitive ability as measured by educational assessment. Instead, feedback surveys seem to be a measure of how fluent and likeable a lecturer is. On top of that, surveys are often biased against women, ethnic minorities and non-native language speakers.

The most comprehensive study in recent times is the meta-analysis from Uttl, White and Gonzalez. As they note, many early studies on the link between student surveys and effectiveness were of limited value. Instructors were often surveying their own students and then measuring their success on their own assessments. There was no random allocation of students to different instructors, and no attempt to subject all students to the same final assessment. Furthermore, the studies were generally small in size, often involving little more than 100 students. More recent studies have tried to correct for this by adopting a ‘multisection’ experimental protocol. I’ll leave them describe it:


An ideal multisection study design includes the following features: a course has many equivalent sections following the same outline and having the same assessments, students are randomly assigned to sections, each section is taught by a different instructor, all instructors are evaluated using SETs at the same time and before a final exam, and student learning is assessed using the same final exam. 
(Uttl et al 2017, 23)

 

Analysing 97 such multisection studies, Uttl et al find that there is practically no correlation between positive survey outcomes and test results. Only small studies, and studies that do not correct for prior learning, tend to find a positive effect. Their conclusion, which is blunt, is announced in the title of their paper: “Student evaluation of teaching ratings and student learning are not related.”

Carpenter, Witherby and Tauber have also looked at the value of student surveys. Theirs is not a meta-analysis but rather a simple literature review. They note that students are not particularly good judges of how effective their learning is. Students tend to like engaging presenters, not people that challenge them with difficult concepts or the injunction to think for themselves. They like a fluent teaching style, not a challenging one. As a result, students are prone to a number of ‘illusions of learning’ that show up on survey results. There are many famous experiments that reveal this problem. One of the best known is the Dr Fox study from the 1970s. This involved an actor giving a class. The content of the class was deliberately nonsensical and contradictory. The actor delivered the class in two different styles: one hesitant and disfluent; the other confident and fluent. The students rated the second lecture more highly and reckoned they learned a lot from it. This is just one small study but its results are consistent with others.

Carpenter et al are particularly interesting on the phenomenon of active vs passive learning. If you read any book on teaching for higher education, it is likely to encourage you to adopt an active learning approach in the classroom. Instead of being the ‘sage of the stage’, delivering wisdom and knowledge from the lectern, you are supposed to be the ‘guide on the side’, setting exercises for the students, getting them to engage with the material for themselves, and then providing them with feedback on how they did. The claim is that this is a more effective approach to teaching. Students retain more and gain more from this approach. The empirical literature appears to confirms this and it is supported by more basic psychological studies (see, for example, the discussion of this in Make it Stick and Small Teaching).

The problem is that most students hate active learning and often tell you about their hatred of it in the student surveys. As Carpenter et al note:


The passive lecture gives the impression of a fluent, smooth, and seamless learning experience, whereas active learning creates a more disjointed, less fluent experience, in that students may need to think more deeply about, and struggle with, the material to understand and apply it. It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that many students resist active learning techniques on the grounds that they feel they are not learning…[In one study] students who experienced the passive lecture gave significantly higher ratings of their own learning, and they also rated the instructor as significantly more effective, than did students who experienced the same lesson via active learning. Scores on the test at the end of the lesson, however, revealed a significant advantage for students who experienced active learning compared to students who experienced the passive lecture. 
(Carpenter et al 2020, 140)

 

My own experience with active learning chimes with these findings. In 2020, I created a new course on critical thinking for law students. I read several teaching guides in advance. I drew, in particular, from James Lang’s book Small Teaching, which was recommended to me by several people as a great practical guide to implementing active learning techniques. I drunk the active learning Kool Aid. I decided the course would be all about active learning. Students would be given exercises each week. I would ask students to engage with those exercises first, then I would give some short lectures explaining important concepts and cognitive tools, I would then get them to reengage with the same or similar exercises. I would provide feedback on these exercises, correcting 20-50 mini assignments each week, explaining where students were doing well and how they could improve.

It was a lot of work from my perspective, but students were expected to put in a commensurate amount of effort. I explained to them at the outset that they might find this approach more disfluent and, perhaps occasionally uncomfortable, than what they were used to. But I asked them to be patient, explaining the teaching philosophy behind what I was doing and the empirical research that seemed to support it.

The end result? I got the worst feedback I’ve ever received. Many students hated the class. They found it uncomfortable and didn’t know what they were supposed to be doing. They felt they were being unnecessarily challenged by the exercises. I was surprised since I repeatedly explained the intended learning outcomes, provided more feedback than I have ever provided before, and clearly linked the assessment to the in class exercises. But despite this, several students told me that I wasn’t doing my job properly because I was expecting them to do too much.

Of course, maybe I should just suck it up, keep my head down and persist with this active approach (I probably will). But it’s hard to do so when the feedback is so negative. And this is the problem. If the research is right, then this feedback isn’t particularly relevant, but it’s pretty much all you get in the way of information about how well you are doing. To repeat the point from above: we typically don’t do the randomised controlled experiments to see if students actually benefit from our classes. All we have to go on is their feedback and class results.

Here’s an analogy that might explain the predicament of a teacher. I’ve long been fascinated by the art of stand-up comedy. Comedians spend years honing their craft. They often play to rooms of people that don’t laugh at their jokes, and may even heckle and abuse them. But if they are good, there’s no denying it. They will get the laughs — a constant trickle of feedback that tells them they are doing their job right. Well, teaching is a bit like stand-up comedy without the laughter.*


A4 - Minor Niggles

There are several other minor complaints I have about teaching. These are less important than the three preceding arguments, but they do add to the frustration one experiences while teaching.

First, there are the institutional constraints that make it harder to implement an effective teaching style. There are many of these and some of them might be unique to my own institutional experiences. The obvious one is student numbers. Student numbers still seem to be growing at 3rd level, without corresponding increases in teaching staff. This means we get ever larger student groups to teach with fewer per student resources. For example, I teach five classes of 150+ students and one class of about 50 students. It’s very hard to do anything interactive or discursive with the larger groups, despite numerous attempts to do so. Things might be better if I taught postgraduate courses or smaller group seminars but, alas, I don’t do any of that. Creeping managerialism also makes teaching harder by increasing the demand for pointless form-filling accountability exercises. This takes away autonomy from teachers, which is one of the few redeeming features of the job.

Second, there are the repetitive, but annoying, student behaviours. I don’t like to complain about students. Many of them struggle with much higher academic workloads, expectations and financial concerns than I ever had. Still, there is no denying that there are repetitive student behaviours that sap away a lot of energy. For example, despite crafting long week-by-week summaries of class content and assessment guides that explain what I’m looking for in assignments, I still get dozens of emails from students asking me questions that would be answered if they took the time to read these documents. In the past week alone, for example, I have received 14 emails from students asking the same question about a word limit on an assignment I set, even though this question is answered in the assignment guide. I suppose I can’t blame students for this. I don’t read lots of things I am sent. But it still grates. Similarly, student attendance and engagement with classes seems to inevitably decline as the semester progresses. In one of my classes, I start out the semester lecturing to over 100 students and, by the end, that can be down to less than 30. This is not an unusual problem. I’ve read accounts from academics at ‘elite’ institutions like Harvard and Oxford making the same complaint, and there are many people that actively boast about how few classes they attend (and still succeed academically). Nevertheless, it is dispiriting to see the student numbers dwindle, despite your best efforts to make the classes interesting and to maintain your own enthusiasm. It seems like a referendum on who you are.

This is to say nothing about the practical and ethical challenges of marking student assessments, which I have written about at length before. Suffice to say, this is possibly the most frustrating aspect of the job.

I could go on, but I won’t. I don’t want this to turn into a long ‘woe is me’ memoir. Overall, I think the four preceding arguments provide a prima facie case for thinking that teaching is not a particularly meaningful job: it’s not clear that it serves a valuable purpose, or what its precise purpose should be; even if we could agree upon a purpose, it’s not clear that teaching actually helps to achieve that purpose, or that teachers play a significant role in helping students to achieve that purpose; and the kind of feedback you receive from students tends not be a good indicator of whether you are doing an effective job and, in fact, may be inversely correlated with how effective your teaching is (although this presumes we have a measure for effective teaching). This is to say nothing about the other minor niggles and annoyances one experiences as a teacher.


2. Objections to the Case Against Teaching

I’ve front-loaded this article with the negative stuff. Is there any reason to think that teaching is more meaningful and fulfilling that the preceding arguments might suggest? Maybe. Here are some objections to what I’ve just argued, along with some replies.


O1 - Nothing lasts forever, why expect teaching to buck this trend?

You could object to my case against teaching insofar as it expects too much. Nothing lasts forever. All humans degrade and die. All our cultural institutions and legacies will crumble to dust. Why expect so much from education? If you think you are going to transform a student’s understanding and ability over the long-term, then you are expecting too much. The best you can hope for is short-term changes. If students need some bit of knowledge or some skill, then they will be forced to retain it by the pressures of work and life. A teacher cannot control for that.

This is fair. If we expect lasting change, then very little of what we do is meaningful. Also, it would be arrogant and coercive to expect students to love our subjects as much as we do. But shouldn’t we expect some medium-to-long-term change? And how short-term is short-term? Most students benefit from classes up to the point of assessment, and then quickly forget everything they have learned. I can’t deny this since it has been my own experience. That seems a bit too short, but maybe it is the best we can hope for.


O2 - Effective Teaching Cannot be Measured

You could object to my case against teaching on the grounds that the benefits of effective teaching cannot be measured, or at least cannot be measured easily. The assumption underlying the empirical work on effective teaching is that if you test students in the right way, you can determine whether teaching has been effective. But perhaps that’s not the right way to go about it. Maybe effective teaching has more nebulous or difficult to discern benefits?

I can see where this objection is coming from. Thinking back over my own education, there are some subtle benefits I received from it that probably would not show up on any test. For example, teachers often mentioned important thinkers or concepts in class that I then researched in more detail myself. I remember, in particular, one teacher that briefly ran through the prisoner’s dilemma in class. This caused me to read up on game theory myself. Game theoretical explanations of morality then became a major component of my PhD thesis. Maybe I would have come across the idea anyway without that teacher’s input, but their mentioning of it did open a door for me. It would be hard to test for that. Perhaps teachers have many such subtle influences over their students lives?

The problem with this argument is that, even if it is true, it isn’t particularly uplifting from a teacher’s perspective. Even if you are having such an influence on the students in your classes, you are unlikely to ever know about it — indeed, the students mightn’t be aware themselves. It also makes teaching something of a crapshoot — random things said or done can have a lasting impact. Students may even learn a lesson that is completely antithetical to the one you were trying to teach.

I have an example of this. The only lecture I remember from my undergraduate days (and I’m not kidding about this: it’s the only one I remember) was in Evidence Law. I remember it like it was yesterday. The teacher asked five students to leave the classroom while the rest of us watched a clip from a movie. The clip depicted a crime. The clip was a particularly notorious scene from the 1972 movie Last Tango in Paris. If you’ve seen the movie, you’ll probably know the one. It involved butter.** This was in the days before trigger warnings and sensitivity to student trauma. Anyway, we watched the scene and then the five students who left the class returned and had to ask the rest of us about it. They were playing the role of investigating officers or lawyers. I can’t remember which. Now, I’m sure the point of this exercise was to highlight problems in witness testimony. Did everyone in the class agree on what they had just seen? Did they have different memories? Was it all a bit Rashomon-like? But that’s not what I remember about it. What I remember is that the students who watched the clip thought it was their job to make it as difficult as possible for the students that did not to figure out what had happened. It was like a guessing game. Eventually, the lecturer abandoned the exercise once they realised that the students weren’t doing it right. The lesson I took from this is that students are oddly competitive, and if you don’t explain the purpose of an exercise to them then they will subvert it for their own ends.

So did this lecture have an effect on me? It did. As I say, it’s the only one I still remember. But it wasn’t the effect the lecturer intended. It’s possible that lots of the things I do in class could be having a similar, unintentional, effect. I’m not sure that I should be happy about that.


O3 - It’s Not About Outcomes 

You could object to my case against teaching on the grounds that it is too outcome-oriented. Maybe that’s the wrong way to think about it. Since we cannot control the outcomes, and since the outcomes are hard to measure in practice, maybe we should focus more on the day-to-day experiences and the ongoing relationship we have with students? Maybe the goal of teaching should be to create enjoyable and entertaining in-class experiences, no matter what the long-term consequences of this might be? Maybe teachers should dedicate energy to ensuring that students are having fun and being treated with respect, nothing more than that?

I think there is a lot to be said for this. On a previous occasion, I wrote a critique of outcome-oriented approaches to parenting. I suggested that parents that think the goal of parenting is to raise an optimal child are barking up the wrong tree. We don’t really know what an optimal child is or how to go about raising one. What parents can do is avoid obvious harms (like malnutrition, abuse or neglect), create enjoyable experiences for their children, and forge a meaningful ongoing relationships with them. Now, I am not going to fall into the trap of claiming that raising a child is like teaching a student. They are very different processes in most respects, but perhaps they are similar in this one respect. Perhaps we should drop the commitment to significant learning outcomes in teaching and focus on the ongoing experiences and relationships instead?

I like this proposal, but there are some problems with it. First, it’s worth noting that it would be quite a transformative reorientation in how most people think about teaching. It would also go against most best practice guidelines. All university lecturers are now encouraged to plan their curricula around ‘learning outcomes’, and all the guidebooks and empirical research focus on finding the methods that are best able to achieve those outcomes. Much of this ‘best practice’ guidance would have to be abandoned, or reimagined if we cared less about outcomes. Also, perhaps ironically, shifting to this approach would mean that student surveys are, in fact, a good guide to what works in teaching. Students may not be able to tell you whether they are achieving significant learning outcomes, but they can tell you whether they are having a good time and whether you are treating them with respect.

Second, I would be wary of any claim that teaching is about ongoing relationships and not outcomes. It depends on what is meant by ‘ongoing relationship’ but I have previously explained my views on the ethics of teacher-student relationships. To briefly summarise, I don’t think it is desirable or wise for teachers to have meaningful relationships with students. Intimate relationships are obviously a no-no but even friendship is, in my view, problematic. I think teachers should be respectful, collegiate and obliging, but anything more than that is ethically fraught. In any event, it is practically difficult in the era of mass higher education. You cannot possibly have meaningful relationships with over 500 students, and selecting a handful of them (because they are more vocal or pushy or you happen to like them?) smacks of arbitrariness and favouritism. This doesn’t mean that we cannot create enjoyable learning experiences — maybe that should be the focus — but assuming that meaningful ongoing relationships should emerge from this doesn’t seem right to me.


O4 - What do you know? You are just a bad teacher

People might object to my case against teaching on the grounds that it stems from some bitterness or incompetence on my own part. Perhaps I am a really bad teacher and I am just rationalising my own incompetence?

I understand the tendency to seek biographical explanations for pessimism. I have read Schopenhauer’s essay on women. It’s hard not to imagine that something so misogynistic and hateful doesn’t have its origins in his own life story. His troubled relationship with his mother, maybe? Ultimately, it’s for others to judge my incompetence, but I’m not sure that this essay stems from it.

For one thing, one of the arguments I am trying to make is that I have no idea whether I am a competent or not. I am not sure what the standard for being a good teacher is. If we assume that it is having some lasting impact on student knowledge and skills, then the evidence seems to suggest that most teachers are not particularly good at doing that. But this is irrelevant since I don’t collect that kind of evidence for students taking my classes. So even if this was the right standard neither I nor most teachers would know whether they are hitting it.

The one thing I do have to go on are the results of the student feedback surveys in my classes and other, more informal, types of feedback I receive from students and colleagues. By these metrics, my teaching does not appear to be particularly bad. I tried to review my feedback results from previous years before writing this article to make sure I was not distorting the truth. I quickly discovered that I am not a good record keeper. I only have records from 2018 and 2020 (I was on sabbatical in 2019). In those years, my student feedback was generally positive. For example, I taught a module on Banking Law to two separate cohorts of students in 2018 (both over 150 in number). In both cases, more than 90% of respondents to the survey agreed that I was either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ at explaining key concepts and that my lectures were well prepared. Over 75% of students rated me as ‘very good’ on both questions. Furthermore, I got lots of positive comments too, such as:


I find John is brilliant at teaching this subject, his passion and level of knowledge really helps me to understand this module.
…the lectures are very well prepared and the topic matter is explained and demonstrated extremely well.
John you are an amazing professor who explains everything clearly and accurately.

 

Similarly, in my 2020 Contract Law module (which was taught entirely online and at a time when most students seemed to be really hating the learning experience), over 90% of respondents in two separate cohorts agreed that my lectures were well prepared and that I was effective in explaining difficult concepts. I also got lots of positive qualitative comments, such as:


The module is very well organised. I have access to everything I need to achieve the learning outcomes. The podcasts and supplemental materials are in depth and easily accessible. I have enough resources to fully understand the materials and concepts.
It is probably my best organized module. All the podcasts are very helpful and explain everything well. The lectures are well organized too
John was a really good lecturer and the material was very interesting.

 

I am not citing this to blow my own trumpet. Frankly, I find some of it embarrassing. And I receive negative feedback too. Some students find me boring, few find me likeable, and I already mentioned my experiment with the critical thinking module that appeared to backfire. My point is that I have no reason to think I am particularly bad at teaching. All the indicators are essentially positive or neutral. In addition to the feedback surveys, I have been nominated for teaching awards by students on two occasions over the past five years (though I have never submitted an application for such an award)*** and I receive emails from current and former students thanking me for my classes. The latter are nice but I tend to discount their importance. They are few and far between — perhaps a dozen at most over the years — and all the students that really hated my classes are unlikely to contact me.

All that said, I will concede that my frustration with teaching may be linked to my biography in one important way. I’ve read on several occasions that most people that end up in academia have a ‘teacher story’. Somewhere along the line they had a teacher that inspired them and welcomed them into the world of ideas. I don’t have such a story. The one subject area that I now specialise in (philosophy and ethics) is one in which I have never taken a class. I’m entirely self-taught. My sense is that most of the valuable things I have learned I have learned through my own reading and research. In this respect I sympathise with one of the things Jay Parini says in his memoir on teaching:


I often felt that a teacher was someone who got between me and my reading. I used to believe that teachers unfairly attempted to control the nature and pace of my work, my rate and quality of retention, the ultimate direction of my thoughts….If a book was listed on a syllabus, I naturally veered away from it, not toward it. 
(Parini 2005, 9-10)

 

I had the same attitude to my own teachers and my suspicion is that this is the way it is for most people that are really excited by ideas. Teachers play a limited role in their lives. They do the important stuff themselves. But I must be wrong since I hear so much testimony to the contrary


O5 - Surely there is something meaningful about teaching?

I have been finding the dark cloud attached to the silver lining throughout this article. What about the silver lining? Is there nothing positive to say about teaching? Sure there is. As a teacher you get to enhance your knowledge and understanding of many interesting things; you sometimes get to facilitate enjoyable discussions and debates among students; and you nearly always learn something yourself from the process. Furthermore, despite creeping managerialism, teaching remains (for me, at least) a relatively autonomous job. Without teaching, I wouldn’t be able to do the research work I do, which remains enjoyable and fulfilling.

There is plenty to like about teaching. It’s just not as noble or inspiring as some people suppose. It’s a job and often a frustrating one.


* Of course some teachers are genuinely funny and may get many laughs. That’s not the point. The point is that there is no equivalent of the laugh when it comes to informative feedback for effective teaching.

** I don’t know why I am being so coy. The scene depicts an anal rape. The actress involved (Maria Schneider) has complained about it in the years since, saying that it was not in the script and that she found it traumatic.

*** I don’t know how teaching awards work in all universities, but at my current one nominated lecturers have to submit a five page application explaining why they are ‘excellent’ teachers. I just can’t bring myself to argue that I am an excellent lecturer.