Hobbes's Moral Theory (Part 2): Material Definitions

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This post is part of my brief series on Thomas Hobbes's moral theory. The series works off the discussion in David Gauthier's The Logic of Leviathan. For an index, see here.

In Part One I covered the formal definitions of Hobbes's key moral concepts. These formal definitions were detached from Hobbes's psychological theory.

In this part, I cover the material definitions of the key moral concepts. These are connected to Hobbes's psychological theory.

It is worth noting at the outset that Hobbes's psychological theory is mechanistic and egoistic. That is to say: Hobbes's argues that the mind is material, is structured like a machine, is attracted to particular things (and repulsed by others), and functions so as to move the human body toward the attractive things and away from the repulsive things.

With that out of the way, we can move on to the material definitions of the moral concepts.


1. The Right of Nature
The right of nature has a very straightforward material definition. As follows:

A has the natural right to do X = A doing X is initially believed by A to be conducive to A's preservation.

This is simply saying that in the state of nature, men and women will do whatever they believe to be conducive to their own preservation. They may be incorrect in what they believe, but they will do it nonetheless.

It is this natural inclination that Hobbes thinks leads to a state of perpetual war. Why? Because we compete for scarce resources, because we anticipate and retaliate attacks from others, and because it behooves us to cultivate a reputation for violence.


2. The Laws of Nature
According to the formal definition, a law of nature was a precept, discovered by reason, that told us what was conducive to our preservation. The material definition is practically identical:

Law of Nature = Precept laying down what is required for preservation.

Hobbes puts some flesh on these definitional bones by proceeding to identify approximately 19 laws of nature. Of these, three are most relevant here:

1. "Every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it."
2. "A man [must] be willing, when others are so too...to lay down his right to all things and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself."
3. "That men perform their covenants made". 

What Hobbes is saying here is that the war of all against all is a deeply unpleasant state of affairs and that we must do all we can to avoid it. His own description of this still sparkles with despair:

In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no cultivation of the earth; no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by the Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require such force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.

Who could countenance living in such a state of affairs? No one, and as soon as they appreciate the grim, ineluctable logic of violence they will follow Hobbes's laws of nature: they will seek peace; they will give up the right of nature; and they will comply with any covenants they happen to make.


3. Obligation
We learned in Part One that an obligation only exists if a covenant has been made. Well, the material definition of obligation arises from the second law of nature (discussed above), which allows a person to give up their natural right to do anything in the interest of self-preservation. The definition is the following:

A has an obligation not to do X = A has laid down the natural right to do X, in accordance with the second law of nature.

Now there are limitations on what we can give up the right to. In particular, we cannot give up the right to self-defence (there are other restrictions that pertain to Hobbes's religious views, they can be ignored here).


4. Justice
Like obligation, the material definition of justice arises from the second law of nature:

X is a just act = X does not involve the breaking of a covenant undertaken in accordance with the second law of nature.

That's it for now, in the next part we'll cover a whole suite of problems that arise from Hobbes's moral concepts.

Hobbes's Moral Theory (Part 1): Formal Definitions

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This post is part of my series on Hobbes's Moral Theory. The series covers material from David Gauthier's book The Logic of Leviathan. For an index, see here.

Gauthier argues for a particular interpretation of Hobbes's moral theory, an interpretation that is contested by others. Given its contested nature, Gauthier expends considerable energies in justifying it. I see no need to follow his justificatory programme. I will simply outline his interpretation.

Gauthier divides his discussion into four segments. The first segment formally defines the crucial moral concepts employed by Hobbes. The second segment offers material definitions of these concepts. The third segment covers the problems that arise for these moral concepts. And finally, the fourth segment asks whether or not Hobbes has a "moral" theory (as opposed to a theory of rational choice). In this post I will cover the first segment.

Now you may be wondering: what differentiates the formal and material definitions? The answer is that the formal definition detaches the moral concepts from Hobbes's mechanistic psychology; whereas the material definition connects the moral concepts to Hobbes's psychology.

The four concepts employed by Hobbes are:

1. The Right of Nature
2. The Laws of Nature
3. Obligation
4. Justice

Let's see what the formal definitions of each of these is.

1. The Right of Nature

Hobbes defines the right of nature as "the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature". The concept is not moral, in the strict sense of "moral". That is to say: Hobbes is not saying people have a moral right to use their power as they see fit; he is saying that they can do this (it is within their power to do this).

Another way of looking at this is to say that, for Hobbes, the right of nature gives rise to no correlative duties. I am under no obligation to respect any actions you perform for your own survival; and you are under no obligation to respect actions I perform for my own survival.

Hobbes does bring reason into his definition of the right. He says that it is not contrary to reason to preserve one's life (it is a "blameless liberty"). It is important to realise that "reason", in this context, does not implicate Hobbes's psychological egoism. It is possible to be reasonable without being egoistic.

Anyway, after all this, we end up with the following formal definition of a right of nature:

A has the natural right to do X = A doing X is initially in accordance with right reason.

The use of the word "initially" may puzzle some, but it is there only to indicate that these definitions apply only in the state of nature, and so all come prior to the social contract (or construction of Leviathan).


2. Laws of Nature
The laws of nature flow directly from the right of nature. Hobbes defines them as precepts which are discovered by reason, and that help a person to avoid self-destruction. In other words, they are rational precepts that guide conduct.

Gauthier offers two definitions of the laws of nature:

(a) X is contrary to the laws of nature = Doing X is contrary to right reason.

(b) Law of nature = a precept laying down the requirements of right reason. 

3. Obligation
The definition of an obligation is tricky. Mainly because Hobbes is not himself explicit about it. Nonetheless, Gauthier thinks the concept is, in Hobbes's theory, intimately linked to the idea of a covenant or contract.

For Hobbes. all obligations are self-imposed. After all, the right of nature allows us to do anything we see fit to preserve our existence. Any restrictions on action must be voluntary.

The formal definition is the following:

A has an obligation not to do X = A has laid down the natural right to do X

It is important to realise that this has no psychological element to it. In other words, we are not at this stage wondering about the psychological motivations that might lead a person to give up their rights.


4. Justice
Finally we come to justice. For Hobbes, the just act is one that does not involve the contravention of a covenant.

As follows:

X is a just act = X does not involve the breaking of a covenant.

 That's it for now. In the next part, I'll cover the material definitions of these concepts.

Hobbes's Moral Theory (Index)

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Thomas Hobbes has always held a particular fascination for me. I am drawn to his unrelentingly mechanical understanding of human behaviour and his valiant attempts to derive a moral theory from this mechanistic understanding. I'm not convinced that he succeeds in his attempts (can anybody?), or that his solution is pleasant, but he is still worth reading; there is a breathless, urgent and poetic quality to his prose.

One of my favourite works of Hobbesian scholarship is David Gauthier's The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes. It was published in 1969 and was, as far as I know, one of the first attempts to undertake a game theoretic analysis of Hobbes's work. Of course nowadays it has become de rigeur to highlight the similarities between Hobbes's state of nature and the prisoner's dilemma.

Anyway, over the next few posts, I want to go through Gauthier's chapter on Hobbes's moral theory. I think it is informative, thought-provoking and will find a congenial home in my swelling archive on moral theory.

Index


1. Formal Definitions of Hobbes's Moral Concepts

2. Material Definitions of Hobbes's Moral Concepts

3. Problems (Lots of them)

4. A Moral Theory?