Thursday, October 20, 2011

What can Law's Evil God Challenge Do?



Stephen Law debated William Lane Craig on Monday night. I didn’t go, though I would have liked to. I did, however, get the chance to read Law’s contributions to the debate (which he posted on his blog) as well as some other internet reviews and discussions of the event. Public debates of this sort are never particularly illuminating — if you want to be illuminated there’s no substitute for reading the primary academic literature and thinking about it for yourself — but they may serve some purpose. They may encourage people to view something from a different perspective, to take their first steps toward self-learning, and to appreciate different viewpoints.

As might be expected, there is much bias affecting the internet reviews and discussions of Monday night’s event. Still, from what I’ve read it seems that Law did relatively well in the debate, at least when compared to Craig’s former opponents. He had a strategy, he stuck to it, and didn’t get bogged down in peripheral issues (for instance, he studiously avoided any discussion of Craig’s Kalam argument). That said, there is some confusion about the precise nature of his strategy and what it was intended to do.

The strategy in question centred on the Evil God Challenge (the EGC, for short). This is something Law has written about in the past, and his output on it includes a rather good article published a couple of years back in the journal Religious Studies. The problem with Law’s use of the EGC is that the EGC is open to several interpretations. In this post, I want to review three plausible interpretations of the EGC and pass some comments on which I think is the strongest. Before getting to those three interpretations though, I want to briefly outline the main features of the EGC.


1. The Main Features of the Evil God Challenge
The EGC is, in effect, a clever inversion of the traditional evidential problem of evil. The evidential problem of evil runs something like this:


  • (1) If an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good being existed, that being would not allow gratuitous suffering to occur.
  • (2) Gratuitous suffering probably does occur.
  • (3) Therefore, (probably) an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good being does not exist.


The argument is evidential in that it does not claim that there is a logical inconsistency between God and evil, but, rather, that there is strong evidence against the theistic hypothesis. There are two key elements to the argument. The first is the meaning of the term “gratuitous suffering”, which is simply “suffering that does not help to secure some greater good or prevent some greater evil”. The second is the truth or falsity of premise (2).

In responding to premise (2), theists can adopt one of two strategies: (i) they can argue that every apparently gratuitous instance of suffering does, in fact, serve some greater good (or prevent some greater evil); or (ii) they can argue that we have no way of knowing whether or not they serve some greater good. The first of these strategies can be called constructing a theodicy and the second can be called donning the skeptical theist’s hat. In responding to the theist, the proponent of the evidential argument will either: (a) argue that none of the profferred theodicies do account for observed instances of suffering (there’s so much of it, after all); or (b) point to the worrying implications of skeptical theism. No doubt theists will remain unconvinced.

This is where the EGC comes into play.

As I mentioned above, the EGC inverts the evidential problem of evil. That is to say: it presents us with an evidential problem of good. It does so by first asking us to imagine that an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-evil being exists (call it “Evil God”). It then highlights all the wonderful, joyous events that occur in the world, events that don’t seem connected to any greater evils (call them “gratuitous joys”). And finally, it suggests that these gratuitous joys provide evidence against the existence of Evil God. As follows:


  • (4) If an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-evil being existed, that being would not allow gratuitous joy to occur.
  • (5) Gratuitous joy probably does occur.
  • (6) Therefore, (probably) an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-evil being does not exist.


Again, the argument can be responded to in one of two ways. First, the believer in Evil God can argue that every apparently gratuitous instance of joy does, in fact, serve some greater evil (call this constructing an e-theodicy). Or second, the believer in Evil God can argue that we have no way of knowing whether or not apparently gratuitous joys serve some greater evil (call this donning the skeptical e-theist’s hat). The Evil God skeptic will respond by either (a) arguing that none of the profferred e-theodicies do account for observed instances of joy (there’s so much of it, after all); or (b) pointing to the worrying implications of skepticial e-theism.

At a first pass, the EGC is simply the presentation of this inversion in as clear and detailed a manner as possible (Law’s original article certainly does this). It is then left to the theist to work out the implications of the inversion for their own belief system. But this is unsatisfactory. It would be better if we could spell out in more detail exactly how the EGC should affect the theist’s belief system. So let’s look at three possibilities.


2. The EGC as a Reductio of Theism
The first possibility is to present the EGC as a reductio of classical theism. Classical theists believe in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being. The problem is that while their standard arguments (cosmological, design etc.) may establish the existence of a creator God, they do nothing to establish that the creator is all-good. Hence they must do something more to show that the creator is all-good. This brings the EGC challenge into play since it suggests that the case for an Evil God is just as strong as the case for a Good God.

This is where things get interesting. When confronted with the idea of an Evil God, most classical theists will be inclined to simply dismiss it as being absurd. But if all other arguments fail to support the existence of a Good God, and if the evidential problem of good is just as strong as the evidential problem of evil, shouldn’t they then accept that idea of a Good God is absurd too? In other words, shouldn’t they accept the following argument:


  • (7) The EGC shows that the evidence in favour of the existence of a Good God is roughly equal to the evidence in favour of the existence of an Evil-God.
  • (8) The case for Evil God is absurd.
  • (9) Therefore, (probably) the case for Good God is equally absurd.


This seems like a reasonable enough way in which to run the EGC. The problem is that classical theists have some responses. They can argue against (7) by suggesting that the evidence is not perfectly equal (or that there are other arguments for the goodness of the creator); or they can argue that (9) does not follow from (8) because the concept of a Good God is crucially disanalogous from the concept of an Evil God; or, they can even argue that the concept of an Evil God is not absurd.

Law’s original article on the EGC considers these kinds of responses, which suggests that he too originally understood the EGC as a reductio of classical theism. (To be fair, his approach was softer: he argued that both were equally unreasonable, not equally absurd). But in clarifying his argument from Monday night, I think he gestures toward an alternative interpretation.


3. The EGC as Support for the Evidential Problem of Evil
Go back, for a moment, to my earlier presentation of the evidential problem of evil. As you recall, the key premise there was:

  • (2) Gratuitous suffering probably does occur.

This premise is supported by identifying instances of suffering that seem pointless to us, applying the principle of warranted induction (i.e. what seems to be the case probably is the case), and concluding that there probably are genuinely pointless instances of suffering. Generally, classical theists do not accept this line of reasoning. While many of them will accept that there are instances of seemingly gratuitous suffering, they will reject the idea that we are warranted in jumping from a claim about what seems to be the case to a claim about what actually is the case.

Now look at the key premise in Law’s evidential problem of good:

  • (5) Gratuitous joy probably does occur.

This premise is structurally equivalent to premise (2). That is to say, we would support it in exactly the same way: by first identifying instances of joy that seem (to us) not to serve any greater evil, by applying the principle of warranted induction, and by concluding that there probably are genuinely gratuitous instances of joy. But what do theists say in response to this? Do they reject the inference in the same way that they rejected the inference in the evidential problem of evil?

Law suggests that many will accept the inference in the case of the evidential problem of good. But this means that they ought to accept the inference in the original argument too. In other words, it implies that they ought to be persuaded by the evidential problem of evil. In more long-winded fashion, we say the following:


  • (10) When confronted with the EGC, classical theists accept the principle of warranted induction.
  • (11) The principle of warranted induction states that if a defined reference class of events in the world seems, after a reasonable search, to have a certain quality Q, then it probably does have that quality Q.
  • (12) A reference class of events in the world seems, after a reasonable search, to have the quality of gratuitous suffering.
  • (5*) Therefore, (classical theists ought to accept that) gratuitous suffering probably does occur.


The idea that the EGC can be used to reinforce the evidential problem of evil is an attractive one, but it is also somewhat suspicious. After all, part of the strength of the EGC was its suggestion that the evidential case for an Evil God is just as good as the evidential case for a Good God. To turn around and then use the EGC to support the evidential case against a Good God is downright odd. This is does, however, open up a pathway to a third possible interpretation of the EGC.


4. The EGC as Part of the Argument for Indifference
Paul Draper’s 1989 article “Pain and Pleasure: an Evidential Problem for Theists” suggested that the debate between theists and non-theists could be construed as a debate between those who think the universe has some morally good creator behind it (theists), and those who think it it is morally indifferent (non-theists). In other words, between those who think the Hypothesis of Indifference (HI) is, on the available evidence, more likely to be true than the Hypothesis of Theism (HT).

I think Law’s EGC could be employed as part of the evidential case for HI. How so? Well, go back to the idea of the principle of warranted induction. This principle states that we can make warranted inferences about the actual nature of a defined reference class of events by performing a reasonable survey of the members of that reference class. So we must ask: When trying to make warranted inferences about the moral character of the universe, what is the relevant reference class of events? I would argue that the relevant reference class of events is all events affecting sentient beings. Why only those events? Because under most conceptions of morality, it is only such beings that have moral significance.

What Law’s EGC does (when read in its totality) is show us that the reference class of events involving sentient beings appears to have a balanced set of moral qualities. Yes, it is true that some events have the quality of gratuitous suffering, but it is also true that a roughly equal number have the quality of gratuitous joy. In other words, the events in the relevant reference class seem to have equal amounts of the quality Q (goodness) and ~Q (badness).

But wouldn’t that imply that the universe has no discernible moral character? And isn’t this exactly what we would expect if the hypothesis of indifference were true?

I’m not entirely sure how to move from these rhetorical questions to a proper argument, but maybe something like this could work.


  • (11) The principle of warranted induction states that if a defined reference class of events in the world seems, after a reasonable search, to have a certain quality Q, then it probably does have that quality Q.
  • (13) The moral character of the universe should be observable in the class of events affecting sentient beings.
  • (14) If HT is true, then we would expect there to be significantly more goodness than badness in the class of events affecting sentient beings.
  • (15) If HI is true, then we would expect the class of events affecting sentient beings to have roughly equal amounts of goodness and badness in it.
  • (16) If HI is probably true, then HT is probably false.
  • (17) The EGC suggests that the reference class of events affecting sentient beings, after a reasonable search, seems to have roughly equal amounts of goodness and badness.
  • (18) Therefore, the reference class of events affecting sentient beings probably does have equal amounts of goodness and badness in it (from 11 and 17).
  • (19) Therefore, HI is probably true (from 15 and 18).
  • (20) Therefore, HT is probably false (from 16 and 19).


I haven’t mapped this out because it’s incomplete (for instance, premises 13 and 14 don’t feature in any of the argument’s derivations so I’m wondering what they’re doing there). But if it could be completed, I think it would be the most promising and most persuasive way in which to employ the EGC. That said, it would certainly still be open to critique. For instance, (15) is particularly problematic. The claim it makes is that roughly equal amounts of goodness and badness imply indifference, but that isn’t necessarily true. After all, we would expect the same if Manicheanism were true. So how can I say HI is supported by that evidence more than Manicheanism (or even some forms of polytheism)?

To sum up, I think there are at least three different interpretations of the EGC. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. The reductio interpretation could be rhetorically effective but there are some well-known responses. The “supporting the evidential PoE-interpretation is intriguing but, ultimately, suspicious. And the indifference-interpretation is, to my mind, the most promising but also the most incomplete. More work needs to be done on the concept of moral indifference, and the expectations we would have from a morally indifferent universe, for it to become persuasive.

11 comments:

  1. "part of the strength of the EGC was its suggestion that the evidential case for an Evil God is just as good as the evidential case for a Good God. To turn around and then use the EGC to support the evidential case against a Good God is downright odd."

    I'm afraid I don't follow you here. Surely, if the evidence for A is just as good as the evidence of B, this doesn't mean that the evidence for either is (on the whole) good? I would think that Law himself would prefer to say that the EGC shows that the evidential cases for Evil God and Good God are equally *bad*.

    ReplyDelete
  2. The reductio interpretation is supposed to capture the notion that both cases are equally bad (I said equally "absurd", but the gist is the same). I agree that Law probably intends that interpretation.

    The second interpretation is just a variation on this. It only intended for the theist who thinks the evidential problem of good defeats the Evil God hypothesis. It just spells out in more detail how they would, in that case, be forced to accept the evidential problem of evil.

    I agree that saying the evidence is just as good does not mean the evidence is actually good. That's why I moved on to the third interpretation.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Do you think the argument for indifference is actually strengthened by the EGC? It seems a distraction to me.

    I can see the EGC working rhetorically as a reductio, but only if the theist concedes that the reason for believing in a Good God is gratuitous joy, and I don't know why a theist would fail to challenge that. A skilled debater could even turn this rhetorical tactic, which I agree has an intuitive appeal at first, against the atheist by suggesting that even trying to use the EGC shows either profound ignorance or lack of intellectual honesty.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Well I think the EGC could strengthen the argument for indifference. I guess I would need to spell this out in more detail before it becomes clear.

    Can we agree that the argument for indifference arises from a warranted induction from the events and states of affairs in the relevant reference class (events of moral significance)? If we can, then the question becomes what makes an induction warranted? I think the answer is that an induction is warranted if it follows from a rigorous and reasonably exhaustive interrogation of the events in the relevant reference class. In other words, after considering as much relevant evidence as possible and after considering good arguments for and against different possible interpretations of that evidence.

    In relation to the argument for indifference, I think the EGC, when combined with the traditional evidential problem of evil, and when spelled out in sufficient detail, can help us to perform a rigorous and reasonably exhaustive interrogation of the relevant set of events (namely: events affecting sentient beings).

    The idea is as follows: The evidential problem of evil, when defended in full and vivid detail, suggests that a large number of events affecting sentient beings are bad (and that it is reasonable to believe this). Likewise, the EGC (or, rather, the evidential problem of good), when defended in full and vivid detail, suggests that a large number of events affecting sentient beings are good (and that is just as reasonable to believe this as it is to believe that a large number of good). My argument then would be that these two effectively cancel each other out, i.e. that a reasonable person, after interrogating the relevant evidence, would have to conclude that there is no discernible moral bias in the universe. This is what we would expect if the hypothesis of indifference were true, but not if either the Good God or Evil God hypotheses were true. Conclusion: the hypothesis of indifference is more likely to be true.

    A couple of qualifications here: (1) by "full and vivid detail" I mean the basic presentation of the argument, a consideration of available counterarguments, and a rebuttal of those counterarguments. (2) I appreciate this is not how Law understands the EGC, I'm simply proposing an alternative use that I think is interesting. (3) I'm not convinced the argument because I think the concept of indifference it appeals to needs to be defended.

    Anyway, as for your question about the reductio, two points occur to me.

    First, I don't think that the argument is only effective when the theist concedes the reason for believing in a Good God is gratuitous joy (my second interpretation appeals to that scenario, but not my first). I think it could be effective as long as the theist concedes that the evidential arguments for both sides are equally good (or, indeed, equally bad) but that belief in an Evil God is still unreasonable. Why? Because then they have to explain why one is more unreasonable than the other.

    Second, I guess a skilled theistic debater could always get one over on a less-skilled one, but they would have to know the arguments. If the point is that a skilled debater could argue that the concept of an Evil God is not as equally-well supported as that of a Good God (e.g. because the ontological argument could never support the existence of a necessarily evil being), then it's worth noting that Law responds to these kinds of claims in his original article. I think that's an important point: Law and others (e.g. Wes Morriston) have done quite a bit of work to show that the concept of an Evil God can't be easily dismissed. Whether that can be got across in the course of two-hour debate is a separate matter.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Darn it, a few typos and incomplete sentences in that last comment. Hopefully my meaning is still clear.

    ReplyDelete
  6. I see what you mean on strengthening the argument for indifference. Arguing that the available evidence does not support either a Good God or an Evil God could have more impact than simply arguing against the Good God.

    I'm still unclear about the merits of the reductio. The Evil God Challenge as you've stated it doesn't really get into evidence for a Good God/Evil God, nor does the Problem of Evil; rather each presents evidence against the Good/Evil God in the form of gratuitous suffering/joy. Regardless, it still seems to me that EGC only works as a reductio if the theist relies on gratuitous joy either as reason for accepting a Good God or as reason for dismissing an Evil God. Is it the case that many do, especially on the level of academic debate? Admittedly this is purely my intuition, but I would expect most theists to dismiss the Evil God by either claiming that it is God who determines (by his nature or my his will) what is good in the first place and so God cannot be evil; or by claiming something to the effect that life is inherently good or the universe is inherently good regardless of the relative amounts of gratuitous suffering/joy found within. How could the EGC serve as a reductio against any theist who did not appeal to gratuitous joy either as evidence for a Good God or at least as evidence against an Evil God?

    ReplyDelete
  7. Good idea of making a post out of this and you've done a nice job of it, John.
    Unrelated comment here, I apologize, but I saw your question on law's blog asking how cambridge debate went.

    Some friends told me that it was amazing how packed out it was: usually only half the floor is full for debates, but this time the entire floor was full! Not only that, but so were all the galleries, and they had to create not one but two overflow rooms and even linked to it in the bar on CCTV so people could watch it there!

    The debate itself was slightly underwhelming apparently, and i'm not surprised tbh (union debates usually are), but very interestingly the motion that God is not a delusion passed, albeit marginally. With so many Cambridge students there most people would think that this would be an outright victory for the atheist position, let alone for it to be close, let alone for the theist position to end up winning it.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Hello John,

    I haven't read up on Law's challenge in the literature (no time any more!) But I think Law's use in the debate was almost an intuition pump. Law almost seemed to be saying "even if you are crazy enough to accept Skeptical Theism, you need to be even more crazy to accept that appearances of gratuitous joy is not evidence against evil God, so you should reject sceptical theism." I'm not sure I share that intuition.

    (I'm glad I'm not the only one who thought there is a connection to be made between here and Draper's Hypothesis of Indifference).

    Anyway, following your lead in argument mapping, I have fully mapped all of the Craig Law debate via prezi. Linky:

    http://www.thepolemicalmedic.com/2011/10/stephen-law-vs-william-lane-craig-debate-argument-map/

    I'd be particularly interested in seeing what you thought of it!

    ReplyDelete
  9. Zeb,

    You may be right. My feeling is that the reductio works if the theist accepts a symmetry in terms of argumentative strength, but still thinks (for an unspecified reason) that Evil-God is ridiculous. That said, it may be that the only way for a theist to accept symmetry is by accepting the gratuitous joy argument.

    Michael,

    Thanks for the report. I was hoping somebody could say what happened. I was slightly disappointed to learn it was a panel debate since I think a solo Craig-Ahmed debate would have more interesting, but then again I'll probably never know anymore about it.

    Thrasymachus,

    I commented on your blog and I provided a link in a whole new post.

    ReplyDelete
  10. I should really re-read my comments before posting them. Please apply the principle of charity to my typos and omissions!

    ReplyDelete
  11. "peripheral issues"...how would the Kalam be peripheral in a debate on God's existence?

    One of my biggest criticisms of both of them is they should have communicated better before the debate. Law was clearly there to debate God's moral properties. It would have been much more interesting to see them focus on that topic.

    ReplyDelete