Posts on the Philosophy of Mind

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Regular readers will know that I recently completed a series of posts on the philosophy of mind. All were based on material found in William Jaworski's book Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction. The following is a list of all these posts.


1. Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Theoretical Space

2. Substance Dualism (Part One): The Basic Argument

3. Substance Dualism (Part Two): Criticisms of the Basic Argument

4. Substance Dualism (Part Three): The Problem of Other Minds

5. Substance Dualism (Part Four): The Problem of Interaction

6. Substance Dualism (Part Five): Explanatory Impotence

7. Mind-Body Physicalism (Part One): Argument from Past Explanatory Success

8. Mind-Body Physicalism (Part Two): Hempel's Dilemma

9. Mind-Body Physicalism (Part Three): The Knowledge Argument

10. Mind-Body Physicalism (Part Four): Absent and Inverted Qualia

Mind-Body Physicalism (Part Four): Absent and Inverted Qualia

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(Part One, Part Two, Part Three)

Right now I am looking at my laptop. To me it appears to be grey and black. Or at least, “grey” and “black” are the names I’ve come to associate with the colour experiences that I have when I look at it. Convention being what it is, you would probably associate the same names with your colour experiences of my laptop, but would our colour experiences really be the same? How do I know that your “black”-experience is not similar to my “green”-experiences?

These questions point us toward the problem of absent or inverted qualia. This problem forms the basis of an objection to mind-body physicalism that will be front and centre in today’s post. The post is part of a series on mind-body physicalism. And the series follows the material in William Jaworski’s Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction .


1. The Argument from Absent or Inverted Qualia
In the previous post, we discussed Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument against physicalism. This argument appealed to the private facts of experience (qualia), and their apparent separation from the subject matter of the physical sciences, in an effort to undermine physicalism. The argument from absent or inverted qualia does something similar. The argument itself looks like this:

• (1) If absent or inverted qualia are possible, then physicalism is false.

• (2) Absent or inverted qualia are possible.

• (3) Therefore, physicalism is false.

On the face of it, this is very simple stuff. But, of course, the devil is in the detail. We need to know exactly what absent or inverted qualia are and why they imply that physicalism is false; and we also need to know why absent or inverted qualia are possible. Let’s look at each of these issues in turn.

Inverted qualia are easily explained since they were alluded to in the intro. Qualia can be said to be inverted if different people have different qualitative experiences associated with the sensation of the same objects or states of affairs. As in your “black”-experience is equivalent to my “green”-experience. Absent qualia are slightly different. They can be explained by reference to the (infamous) philosophical concept of zombies. These are beings who are externally identical to us - i.e. they walk the same walk, and talk the same talk - but who completely lack the qualitative experiences we associate with activities such as walking and talking (note: there’s nothing special about these activities; I chose them for illustrative purposes only).

Why would either of these phenomena pose of problem for physicalism? Well, if physicalism is true, then qualia would have to be either (i) physical states of some sort or (ii) non-existent. Since we all appear (from our own perspective) to be having qualitative experiences, (ii) would seem like a non-starter. So qualia must be physical states. But if they are physical states, then their presence should be determinable by identifying physical states such as patterns of brain activation. This is where absent or inverted qualia become important. If such things are possible, then the same physical states can either (a) be associated with different qualitative experiences or (b) be associated with no qualitative experiences at all. But this can’t be right if qualia are identical to physical states. So the possibility of inverted or absent qualia would indeed imply the falsity of physicalism. Let’s phrase this in the form of an argument:

• (4) If physicalism is true, then qualitative states (qualia) must identical to specific physical states.

• (5) If absent or inverted qualia are possible, then the same physical state can be associated with completely different qualitative states.

• (3) Therefore, if absent or inverted qualia are possible, physicalism is false.

Finally, let’s move on to consider why absent or inverted qualia are possible. Again, if you’ve been following this series closely, it should come as no surprise to learn that a conceivability-possibility principle is doing all the work here. Proponents of the argument will say that since zombies and inverted qualia are conceivable (you just conceived of them as you were reading this, right?), they are also metaphysically possible. Hence, premise (2) of the argument is justified.


2. Responding to the Argument
In Chapter 4, Jaworski doesn’t go into the various responses to this argument in any great depth. This is mainly because he addresses them elsewhere in the book. His discussion of this argument is among the first stops on a very long trek through all the different physicalist theories. Still, a few words can be said about possible responses.

First, the argument relies on the dubious conceivability-possibility principle. We discussed the problems with this when looking at substance dualism. I advise the interested reader to read back over that discussion. In any event, even if the principle is sound, it is open to the physicalist to object to the true conceivability of absent or inverted qualia. They could say that the relevantly similar physical states must, necessarily, be associated with the same qualitative states. In doing so, they can challenge the proponent of the argument to come up with a clear and distinct conception of both phenomena.

Second, physicalists can reject the reality of qualia. As counterintuitive as it seems, several have taken this route. Daniel Dennett is probably the most well-known exponent of this view, but Wittgenstein’s private language argument has similar implications. Jaworski discusses both in chapter 8. To make this series somewhat self-contained, I’ll present Dennett’s argument now (I won’t evaluate it though).

Qualia are typically defined as properties that are (a) intrinsic/non-relational and (b) directly knowable. They are non-relational in that they do not play a part in the kinds of causal relations analysed by physicalists; and they are directly knowable in the sense that they are known non-inferentially from the first-person perspective. Dennett denies that qualia can be both of these things at the same time. His argument starts by assuming that proponents of qualia think that qualia play some role in our behaviour and then deduces from this the fact that qualia cannot exist. It looks like this:

• (6) Exponents of qualia must claim either (i) that qualia influence behaviour in conjunction with our beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes; or (ii) that qualia influence behaviour independently of propositional attitudes.

• (7) If qualia affect behaviour independently of our propositional attitudes, then qualia cannot be non-relational.

• (8) If qualia affect our behaviour in conjunction with our propositional attitudes, then qualia cannot be directly knowable.

• (9) Therefore, qualia cannot be both non-relational and only directly knowable.

Premise (6) might seem a little odd, but it makes sense. Speech acts such as verbal reports are a kind of behaviour. So if speech acts like “I see a blue ball” or “I see a red ball” are linked with qualitative experiences — as proponents of qualia would have us believe — then those experiences must exert some influence on our behaviour.

Premise (7) is supported by the idea that if qualia directly influence behaviour, then they must do so by playing a direct causal role in behaviour, i.e. < Red quale → “I see red” >. So they would have to be defined in relational, as opposed to non-relational terms.

Premise (8) is a little trickier. The idea is that if qualia only influence behaviour when they are conjoined to other beliefs and desires, then one cannot know one’s qualia without knowing those other beliefs and desires. In other words, qualia can only be known when the surrounding circumstances are known. Dennett supports this idea with a few thought experiments. Here’s one:

• (10) Mad Scientist : A mad scientist has manipulated your brain while you were asleep. When you wake up, you declare that your sensory experiences are qualitatively different from the way they were before. But how can you know this? It could be that the mad scientist succeeded in altering your qualitative experiences, or it could be that he altered your memories. Either is possible if it is “qualia + beliefs” that influence behaviour. One can only tell the difference by knowing something about one’s memories and/or the brain states manipulated by the mad scientist.

This probably seems a little strange. It does to me, at any rate. But Dennett argue that denying the existence of qualia need not be as counterintuitive as it first appears. He reckons that a third-person conception of mental phenomena can accommodate most of the facts cited in support of qualia. He does so partly on the grounds that many phenomena that are thought to be non-relational turn out, on closer inspection, to be relational.

Like I said, I won’t evaluate this here but one obvious objection should be noted. The first premise of Dennett’s argument (premise 6 above) assumes that qualia influence behaviour. There is at least one school of thought — epiphenomenalism — that would deny this.

Okay, well that’s it for this series. As I said at the outset, unlike Jaworski’s book, this has been far from a comprehensive assessment of the arguments for and against physicalism. It was only intended to introduce some of the evidence cited in support of physicalism (argument from past explanatory success) and some of the classic objections to the physicalist worldview (Hempel’s dilemma, The Knowledge Argument, and the problem of absent or inverted qualia).

Mind-Body Physicalism (Part Two): Hempel's Dilemma

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(Part one)

This post is the second in a brief series on the basic arguments for and against mind-body physicalism. The series follows the discussion in William Jaworski’s book Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction . This post is subject to all the caveats and qualifications mentioned in the first post.

To recap a little, the mind-body physicalist is, at the most abstract level, committed to the view that mental reality is ultimately identical to, supervenient upon, or realized by the entities posited in fundamental physics. As we saw the last day, one argument for this thesis is the argument from past explanatory success: physicalist explanations have been successful in the past so they are likely to be successful in the future. In today’s post we’re going to consider a classic objection to physicalism: Hempel’s dilemma. This is, in fact, a specific instance of a broader problem in the philosophy of science and so has ramifications that extend beyond the mind-body problem.

Let’s see what all the fuss is about.


1. Hempel’s Dilemma
For the purposes of this presentation, I am going to reach beyond the confines of Jaworski’s book and look instead to (part of) the discussion of Hempel’s dilemma in Andrew Melnyk’s book A Physicalist Manifesto . I do so because - solid and all as Jaworski’s presentation is - Melnyk is slightly clearer about both the constraints facing the physicalist that give rise to the dilemma, as well as the subsequent implications of the dilemma. Indeed, Melnyk has a gift for clarity, rigour (and, indeed, humility) that is on display throughout his book. This gift makes his probably the best overall defence of physicalism on the market.

Anyway, Melnyk notes at the outset of his book that a physicalist need not perform any sort of conceptual analysis on the term “physical”. This is because the physicalist’s goal is not necessarily to closely track ordinary language or meaning, but instead to provide content to a thesis. Thus, it is open to the physicalist to provide an entirely stipulative definition of the “physical” and work from there. Still, even that stipulative definition will be subject to some constraints. He lists three:

(i) It cannot be obviously false : This seems like a straightforward constraint. Anyone who commits themselves to a thesis cannot also be committed to its falsity, can they?

(ii) It cannot be analytic or trivial : This seems legitimate. For example, if physicalism were simply defined as the thesis that “whatever exists is physical” it would be trivially true. It would have no possibility of being false and would say nothing interesting about the fundamental nature of reality (including mental reality).

(iii) It must have some content that is determinable now by us: This, also, seems legitimate. We cannot, it would seem, accept a theory that is devoid of currently determinable content because such a theory would have two unwelcome implications. First, it would not automatically exclude many things that we now take to be non-physical. And second, it would prevent us from taking currently available scientific evidence as evidence for or against physicalism.

Although each of these constraints is plausible, they create a bit of a problem for the physicalist. The problem is that it is impossible for an adequate definition of physicalism to satisfy both (i) and (iii) at the same time. This can be expressed in the form of an argument, as follows:

• (1) If “physicalism” is to be an adequate theory, it’s definition must satisfy three conditions: (i) it must not be false; (ii) it must not be trivial and (iii) it must have content that is determinable now by us.

• (2) “Physicalism” can either be defined by reference to the current content of physical theories or to the content of some future ideal physical theory.

• (3) If “physicalism” is defined by reference to current physical theories, then conditions (ii) and (iii) are met but (i) is not.

• (4) If “physicalism” is defined by reference to a future ideal physics, then conditions (i) and (ii) are met but (iii) is not.

• (5) Therefore, physicalism is not an adequate theory.

Now you may be wondering: what reason do we have to accept (3) and (4)? The answer is the following. We have reason to accept (3) because past experience suggests that physical theories are constantly being refined, replaced and superseded by better physical theories. So if past experience is any guide - and who are we to assume otherwise? - the content of current physical theories is almost certainly false. We have reason to accept (4) on the grounds that a future ideal physics must, necessarily, have content that is not now determinable by us, otherwise we would already be in possession of the ideal theory.

The argument contains within in it a dilemma, usually attributed to Carl Hempel: either the physicalist accepts a theory that is almost certainly false; or he accepts a theory that has no content; he can’t do both.



2. Responding to the Dilemma
I’ll switch back to Jaworski’s book now. He notes that, as with all dilemmas of this sort, there are various strategies open to the physicalist in response. They can grasp one or other of the horns and say that the implications are not as dire as they first appear; or they can deny one of the premises that gives rise to the dilemma, thereby slipping between its horns. Jaworski notes that the second strategy is - perhaps surprisingly - not all that popular (although Melnyk could actually be interpreted as opting for that approach). Instead, most defenders of physicalism have grasped one of the horns.

For instance, there are those who say that accepting a theory, even though it is likely to be proved false in the future, is not that big a deal (again, Melnyk could be interpreted as taking this approach). They take their inspiration from the fact that this is simply par for the course in physics. One defends whatever theory seems most likely to be true at a particular moment in time. This is how we progress toward better theories. There’s no real problem here.

• (6) There is no real problem associated with accepting a theory that is probably false: this follows best scientific practice.

Alternatively, there are those who accept that physicalism must be defined relative to an ideal physics. They tend to deny that a commitment to physicalism in the here and now lacks content. They’ll say current physics provides some clue as to the content of future physics. They justify this claim by pointing out that although physical theories have been refined and replaced over the past 400 years or so, the older theories are rarely deemed to be completely false. Some of the content from those theories carries over. Thus, even if physics hasn’t bottomed-out at the fundamental level of reality yet, we know enough now to say that mental entities will not exist at that fundamental level. They will, instead, be made up of components from that level.

• (7) Defining physicalism relative to an ideal future theory does not render it devoid of content.

As I see it, both (6) and (7) function as denials of (1). That is, they supply reason for thinking that a theory which fails to meet those three conditions can still be adequate. This is reflected in the diagram below.

Okay that’s it for now. In the next post we’ll consider the famous knowledge argument against physicalism.

Mind-Body Physicalism (Part One): The Argument from Past Explanatory Success

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Since I did a whole series on the basic arguments for and against substance dualism, I thought it might be nice to do a symmetrical series on the basic arguments for and against mind-body physicalism. I’m sure some of my readers will like this too - they suggested as much in the comments section. As with my series on substance dualism, William Jaworski’s book Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction will be the source material.

It’s only right that I warn you at the outset: Although the motivation for this series is to serve the interests of symmetry, there are differences between the treatment of the two positions that will make this series on physicalism far less satisfactory than the one on substance dualism. Primarily, this is due to the fact that there has been a lot more theoretical refinement of physicalism over recent years. Indeed, such is the volume of theoretical refinements that Jaworski spends four whole chapters going over them.

I don’t wish to follow each and every refinement here - there’s no sense in producing the book as a whole - so instead I’ll just cover one basic argument for physicalism (the argument from past scientific success) and three objections to physicalism (Hempel’s dilemma, the knowledge argument, and the problem of inverted qualia). These three objections provide the springboard for the further refinements mentioned above. Some of these are impressive and the arguments in their favour can be quite compelling, but if you’re interested in these then I recommend getting a hold of Jaworski’s book (this is the last recommendation for a while - I don’t want to end up as Jaworski’s personal promoter).


1. The Argument from Past Explanatory Success
Physicalists come in many flavours, but they usually share one basic commitment: the commitment to the fundamentality of the physical sciences. That is to say, they all tend to believe that whatever reality ultimately consists in will only be properly described using the language of physics. Furthermore, that which is properly described using the language of physics is called “physical”. So since the mind is part of reality, it would seem to follow that mind must ultimately be physical.

Clearly this commitment to physics is in want of justification. This is where the argument from past explanatory success comes into play. Before discussing that argument it’s worth making something clear: there are other arguments in favour of physicalism in general and also in favour of particular forms of physicalism. Indeed, we encountered one such argument - the argument from the problem of interaction - when looking at substance dualism. But even that argument would seem to trace its authority back to the explanatory success of physics. Anyway, the argument itself takes the following form:

• (1) If explanations of type A have, in the past, been superior to explanations of type B (with respect to a broad range of subject matters), then explanations of type A are likely to be superior to explanations of type B with respect to other subject matters.

• (2) Physical explanations have, in the past, been superior to non-physical explanations with respect to a broad range of subject matters.

• (3) Mind-body relations are a subject matter in want of an explanation.

• (4) Therefore, physical explanations are likely to be superior to non-physical explanations with respect to mind-body relations.

Now this might look a little bit strange. For one thing, it doesn’t appear in this form in Jaworski’s text. He presents the argument as a straightforward {“Physical explanations have been superior to non-physical explanations in the past” → “Therefore, physical explanations are likely to best with respect to mind-body relations”} inference. His version makes the inductive gap between the premise and the conclusion transparent. I’ve tried to plug this gap by introducing an explicit inductive principle in the shape of premise (1). But this does not change the overall strength of the argument.

And this is the critical point. Inductive arguments of this sort cannot provide decisive reasons in favour of a particular conclusion. They can only provide probabilistic reasons for supporting a conclusion. The probabilities in question might be very high, but they are probabilistic nonetheless. Does this make things easier for the critic of physicalism? Not necessarily. We each of us rely on inductive principles, so the proponent of an alternative theory should be reluctant to dismiss the argument solely because it is inductive in nature. Instead, they should prefer to provide some good reason for thinking induction is unwarranted in this particular instance. Which brings us to….


2. Supporting the Argument
The key to the argument from past explanatory success is the support given to premise (2). If many impressive examples of successful physical explanations can be given, then dualists will have their work cut out. To block the induction from these case studies, they will need to show that mind-body relations are completely disanalogous to them. That’s certainly not impossible but it must be done nonetheless.

So what examples can be adduced in support of premise (2)? Jaworski offers four. Now, I’m not a historian of science so I can’t really vouch for the accuracy of each of them. They sound plausible to me but, for instance, I have no idea if people ever really did explain magnetism by appeal to non-physical spirits. Also, I would presume that the success of physicalistic explanations in each of these domains is determined by following the rules of inference to best explanation or some probabilistic alternative (Bayesian or Likelihoodist). In other words, physicalist explanations win against competitor explanations because they are simpler, afford us greater predictive and manipulative powers, confer a higher probability on the data and so on ( see this series for more ).

Anyway, the four examples are:

• (2.1) Magnetism : At one point in time people tried to explain magnetic by positing the presence of nonphysical spirits in magnetised objects. A physicalistic explanation of magnetism in terms of the electromagnetic force proved far more successful.

• (2.2) Planetary Motion : At one point people thought non-physical intelligences (gods) could account for the orbital movements of the planets. This was replaced by a far more successful physicalistic explanation of those movements by reference (initially) to Newtonian laws of gravity and (eventually) to the warping of spacetime.

• (2.3) Life : People once thought that the only thing capable of explaining the nature and behaviour of living things was by positing the existence, in them, of non-physical vital spirits. This has now been replaced by a far more successful explanation of life in terms of mechanical metabolic and reproductive processes.

• (2.4) Mental Illness Abnormal human behaviour was once explained by reference to possession by non-physical beings. Now many (if not all) such abnormalities can be explained by reference to tissue pathologies or alterations in the electrical and chemical balance of the brain.

We can plug these four examples into the argument and then map it out as follows.

Now as has been stressed already this argument is far from watertight. We’ll consider the various problems with it, and with physicalism as a whole, over the remainder of this series.

Substance Dualism (Part Five): Explanatory Impotence

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(Part one, Part two, Part three, Part four)

This is the last in a series of posts on substance dualism. The series has been following the discussion in William Jaworski's book Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction. Having initially addressed the basic argument for substance dualism, we have more recently been concerned with three problems that the substance dualist must confront. Two of these have already been outlined. In this post, the third problem - that of explanatory impotence - will be discussed.

Substance Dualism (Part Four): The Problem of Interaction

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(Part One, Part Two, Part Three)

I've been addressing arguments for and against substance dualism over the past week. In the most recent post on the topic, I considered the first of three arguments against the theory. In this post, I turn to the second of those three argument: the argument from the problem of interaction. In the course of addressing this problem we will encounter some possible refinements of the substance dualist position.

Substance Dualism (Part Three): The Problem of Other Minds

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(Part One, Part Two)

Substance dualism has been preoccupying me over the past week. In the two previous posts, I've looked at the basic argument for it, as well as the criticisms of that argument. In this post, I'll consider the first of three arguments against substance dualism: the argument from knowledge of other minds. Once again, William Jaworski's excellent book is the source for this post.

Substance Dualism (Part Two): Criticisms of The Basic Argument

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In the previous post, I summarised William Jaworski’s presentation of the basic argument for substance dualism. In this post, I’ll be covering Jaworski’s discussion of the criticisms of that basic argument. Remember, substance dualism is a time-honoured position within the philosophy of mind and it’s well worth knowing why some find it persuasive and others do not.

As we saw the last day, the basic argument for substance dualism relies on two premises. The first of those premises derives from the axioms of identity and is relatively uncontroversial. The second of those premises makes a modal claim. It says that we (i.e. minds/persons) can exist without bodies. This claim is controversial and is supported by two equally controversial arguments: (i) the conceivability-possibility argument; and (ii) the essential property argument. Both were discussed in part one. Now we turn to the criticisms of both those arguments.

Substance Dualism (Part One): The Basic Argument

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Substance dualism is an enduring theory within the philosophy of mind. According to substance dualists the mind is ontologically distinct from the body.

With the rise of neuroscience in the 19th and 20th centuries, the theory appeared to become less tenable: the evidence seemed to point, overwhelmingly, toward a deep connection between mind and brain. But despite the continued presence of this evidence, a satisfactory theory of mind-brain relations remains elusive. As a result, my current sense is that substance dualism may be due to undergo something of a recrudescence. Thus, those of us with an interest in the philosophy of mind would be well-advised to understand the arguments that can be mustered in its support.

Fortunately, William Jaworski, through the medium of his recent book Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction, is on hand to assist. I’ve mentioned and recommended this book before. In this post, I will run through Jaworski’s presentation of the basic argument in favour of substance dualism. In future posts, I’ll consider the various criticisms and responses to this argument.

Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Theoretical Space

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If you’ve any interest in the philosophy of mind, I highly recommend picking up a copy of William Jaworski’s recently-released Philosophy of Mind: a Comprehensive Introduction. It does exactly what it says on the tin. It provides detailed, but not overwhelming, coverage of all the major theories and arguments in the field. I’d say it might be heavy going if you’re a complete newcomer to the topic, but if you’re familiar with it it’s definitely one way to seriously bump-up your knowledge.

One of the particularly nice things about the opening chapter of the book is Jaworski’s attempt to map the theoretical space within the philosophy of mind. In other words, his attempt to delineate and organise all the different theoretical positions on the nature of the mind. To give you a flavour of the book, I’m going to summarise this cartographic exercise.

At the most general level, theories about the nature of the mind can be separated into three categories: (i) monistic theories; (ii) dualistic theories and (iii) non-standard theories. Let’s look at each category in more detail.


1. Monistic Theories
The philosophy of mind is motivated primarily by the desire to resolve a number of mind-body problems. I’ll look at these in a future post. For now, all that needs to be known is that these problems generally concern the appropriate relation between our understanding of the physical world of scientific description and our understanding of the mental world of first-person description.

Monistic theories propose that the distinction between the physical and mental worlds is ultimately illusory: they are both, fundamentally, made up of the same kind of stuff. But what kind of stuff? There are three theories to contend with:

Idealism: This theory maintains that everything is ultimately mental. That our supposition of an external physical world is merely the result of an elaborate way of describing subjective mental experiences. 

Neutral Monism: This theory maintains that everything is ultimately made up of a neutral substance that is neither physical nor mental. But this substance can be described in physical or mental terms. 

Physicalism: This theory maintains that everything is ultimately physical. That our subjective mental experiences can ultimately be redescribed in physicalistic terms.

Of these three, it is physicalism that has been subjected to the most refinement in the past 50 years or so. Thus we are forced to further distinguish between a number of physicalist theories:

Eliminative Physicalism: This theory maintains that a complete physicalist theory of reality will ultimately eliminate the need to refer to the mental. Our mentalistic vocabulary is just a folk theory that needs to be replaced.

Reductive Physicalism: This theory maintains that mental facts are ultimately reducible to physical facts, but this does not mean all reference to the mental is somehow redundant or unimportant. There are two subdivisions within this theory (actually there are even more, but there’s no need to get too fine-grained when you’re starting out): 

• (a) Behaviourism: mental facts are reducible to facts about behaviour; 

• (b) Identity Theory: mental facts are reducible to facts about the brain.

Non-reductive Physicalism: This theory maintains that although everything could ultimately be described by physics, the special sciences (psychology, sociology etc.) have descriptive and explanatory interests that cannot be fulfilled by physics. These interests are satisfied by the use of mentalistic descriptions. There are three sub-divisions within this category of physicalism: 

• (a) Realisation Physicalism: Mental phenomena are realised by physical phenomena. Indeed, they can be realised by multiple kinds of physical phenomena. 

• (b) Supervenience Physicalism: Mental phenomena supervene upon physical phenomena. 

• (c) Anomalous Monism: All events are describable in physical terms; but some events are also describable in mental terms. The psychological explanations that use these mental terms are, however, not law-like (a - nomos, without law).

The descriptions of these different positions are exceptionally brief. As a result, it might be difficult to fully appreciate the distinctions between some of them.


2. Dualistic Theories
Dualistic theories adopt the same basic tagline: the distinction between the mental and the physical is real. Where they disagree is over the precise nature of that distinction:

Substance Dualism: This theory maintains that there are ultimately two kinds of stuff: mental stuff and physical stuff. Our minds, obviously, are made up of the former, not the latter. 

Dual Attribute Theory: This theory maintains that there is ultimately only one kind of stuff but some of this stuff exemplifies irreducible mental properties that are not captured by physical explanations. This position is sometimes referred to as “property dualism” but Jaworski prefers the dual-attribute moniker for reasons presented in his chapter on this theory (mainly, because substance dualism is also committed to a kind of property dualism).

As was the case with physicalism, most of the philosophical action has been associated with one of these theories over the past 50 years or so. The theory in question is Dual Attributism, which can be broken down in the following manner:

Organismic DAT: This version of dual attributivism maintains that the kinds of entities displaying mental attributes are physical organisms. This theory can, in turn, be split in two: 

• (a) Emergentism: This theory maintains that mental properties emerge from or are caused by physical phenomena and that these mental properties can play an actual role in physical reality. 

• (b) Epiphenomenalism: This theory maintains that mental properties emerge from or are caused by physical phenomena, but that these mental properties play no causal role in physical reality.

Non-organismic DAT: This version of dual attributivism maintains that the kinds of entities displaying mental attributes might have some physical components, but are not organismic. This is a somewhat obscure position and is similar to substance dualism.

3. Non-Standard Theories
Finally, we come to non-standard theories. These theories reject one or more of the key assumptions upon which the standard theories are premised. Three such theories are mentioned by Jaworski.

Instrumentalism: This theory rejects the realist assumption of the standard theories. According to this assumption the mental predicates we use are intended to pick out objects, events and states of affairs in the external world. Instrumentalism rejects this by maintaining that these predicates are merely tools used to predict human behaviour. 

Hylomorphism: This theory rejects the mental-physical distinction-thesis that is assumed by the standard theory. According to this thesis, there really are two vocabularies used to describe and explain human behaviour. Monistic theories may think the two can be reduced to one, and dualist theories may think they cannot, but they both agree that the vocabularies exist. Hylomorphism does not. It maintains that their is a unique vocabulary for describing and explaining human behaviour. One interesting feature of Jaworski’s book is his defence of the claim that hylomorphism is a distinct theory. 

Mind-body Pessimism: This theory rejects the optimism underlying the standard theories. That optimism encourages proponents of the standard theories to believe that their theory can give a satisfactory account of mind-body relations. This theory maintains that we may forever by cognitively closed-off from such a satisfactory account.