Anyway, here are the full details, along with a link to a preprint version (I don't know when the final version will be out, but hopefully it won't be too long from now):
Title: Hyperagency and the Good Life - Does Extreme Enhancement Threaten Meaning?
Journal: Neuroethics DOI: 10.1007/s12152-013-9200-1
Abstract: According to several authors, the enhancement project incorporates a quest for hyperagency - i.e. a state of affairs in which virtually every constitutive aspect of agency (beliefs, desires, moods, dispositions and so forth) is subject to our control and manipulation. This quest, it is claimed, undermines the conditions for a meaningful and worthwhile life. Thus, the enhancement project ought to be forestalled or rejected. How credible is this objection? In this article, I argue: “not very”. I do so by evaluating four different versions of the “hyperagency” objection from four different authors. In each case I argue that the objection either fails outright or, at best, provides weak and defeasible grounds for avoiding enhancement. In addition to this, I argue that there are plausible grounds for thinking that enhancement helps, rather than hinders, us in living the good life.