Saturday, June 12, 2010

Constructivism with Sharon Street

This is an index for my posts on Sharon Street's various articles on metaethical constructivism. According to Street's version of constructivism, moral judgments are correct if they withstand scrutiny from the practical standpoint. The practical standpoint is the one we all occupy and consists in taking things to be valuable.

Street argues that constructivism can be developed into a complete and satisfying answer to the major metaethical questions. In particular:
  • It shows how moral judgments fit within a naturalistic picture of the world.
  • It allows for a robust form of moral truth.
  • It offers a plausible moral epistemology (i.e. the method of "withstanding scrutiny").
  • It answers at least some questions about moral semantics (although it considers these to be of lesser importance).
I have covered two of Street's articles so far. I may cover more in the future.

1. What is Constructivism in Metaethics?

2. Constructivism about Reasons

3. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Rethink It


  1. I've read through most of your stuff on street- so so helpful. I'm currently writing my final essay on her- I wish I could quote you on some of this stuff, but this obviously isn't a credible source- any chance you've published any of this anywhere? Or do you recommend another resource I could use which examines Street as well as you do?

  2. I don't have any published material on this. Not really my area. I would suggest quoting the original articles by Street. I don't think I say anything over and above what she says there.

  3. thanks, will do. what's your area of expertise?

  4. Hey, I would simply like to thank you for providing your work on Street. It really, really helped me out, I was totally lost and confused with her article on constructivism in ethics and metaethics, thanks to you I finally got it (:

  5. Likewise, thank you John! Really great explanations.

  6. The link for part 4 of Objectivity and Truth... is missing by the way. It's here: